The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan By Adam D. Sheingate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 279p. $45.00.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 248-249
Author(s):  
Grace Skogstad
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Objective ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Princeton University ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Institutional Relationships

This is a helpful addition to the growing body of historical institutionalist literature that demonstrates the influence of macro- and sectoral-level institutions on policymaking. The central arguments, examined here with regard to agricultural policy, are two. First, institutional relationships among state and nonstate actors may facilitate one policy objective but impede other policy goals. Neither novel nor inconsistent with the literature, this proposition is advanced through elaboration of how various interrelationships between political parties and interest groups shape governments' policy capabilities. Second, Sheingate argues that the American institutional framework of dispersed authority and pluralism does not necessarily render governments incapable or subject to interest group capture. In advancing this proposition, he seeks to put paid to popular depictions of American agrarian politics as constituting iron triangles and all-powerful farm groups.

Agricultural policy debates: Examining the alternative and conventional perspectives

1993 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis E. Beus ◽  
Riley E. Dunlap
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Alternative Agriculture ◽  
Conventional Agriculture ◽  
Considerable Similarity ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Wide Range

AbstractControl of agricultural policymaking by the “agricultural establishment” has been challenged by a wide range of interests concerned with the externalities of modern industrialized agriculture. An “externalities/alternatives” or “ex/al” coalition appears to be an emerging force in agricultural policy debates. We surveyed three alternative agriculture groups, three conventional agriculture groups, and a statewide sample of farmers to learn whether each category forms a distinct, unified interest group whose perspectives on agricultural policy diverge substantially from the others'. There is considerable similarity among the alternative agriculture groups and among the conventional agriculture groups, the differences between them being much greater than the differences within each category. The statewide farmer sample is generally intermediate between the two sets of interest groups, but is closer to the conventional perspective on most issues.

scholarly journals The contingent character of interest groups–political parties’ interaction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Laura Chaqués-Bonafont ◽  
Camilo Cristancho ◽  
Luz Muñoz-Márquez ◽  
Leire Rincón
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Issue Salience ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Western Democracies

Abstract This article examines the conditions under which interest groups interact with political parties. Existing research finds that interest group–political party interactions in most western democracies have become more open and contingent over time. The close ideological and formal organisational ties that once characterised these relations have gradually been replaced by alternative, more pragmatic forms of cooperation. However, most of this research stresses the importance of the structural factors underpinning these links over time and across countries, but sheds little light on the factors driving short-term interest group–party interactions. Here, by drawing on survey data on Spanish interest groups obtained between December 2016 and May 2017, this article seeks to fill this gap by taking into account party status, issue salience and a group’s resources as explanatory variables. It shows that mainstream parties are the primary targets of interest groups, that groups dealing with salient issues are more likely to contact political parties and that the groups with most resources interact with a larger number of parties.

scholarly journals Healthcare Reform Repeal Efforts in the United States in 2017: An Inquiry into Public Advocacy Efforts by Key Interest Groups

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-204
Author(s):  
John Hoornbeek ◽  
Bethany Lanese ◽  
Mutlaq Albugmi ◽  
Joshua Filla
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Healthcare Reform ◽  
The United States ◽  
Business Community ◽  
Policy Feedback ◽  
Design Features ◽  
Feedback Effects

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was subjected to repeated repeal and replace efforts in the United States Congress in 2017. Attempts to repeal and replace the law failed, but penalties for not complying with its mandate that individuals purchase health insurance were removed in tax legislation passed late in the year and administrative actions taken by President Trump yielded additional concerns about the stability of the law’s reform approach and the expanded health insurance access that it created. This article explores public advocacy efforts by key interest groups from three major policy sectors—health providers, the insurance industry, and the business community—that had served as an “axis of opposition” to past American healthcare reform efforts. It identifies resource and incentive policy feedback effects that appear likely to influence these groups due to design features of the ACA and assesses whether patterns of advocacy efforts in 2017 are consistent with what might be expected if these design features had their predicted effects. Our assessment reveals patterns of interest group advocacy that are consistent with what might be expected to arise from resource and incentive based policy feedback effects, and interest group political dynamics that differ from what was in place prior to passage of the ACA. It also reveals advocacy patterns that are not well explained by resource and incentive based policy feedback effects, and—in so doing—yields insights that are relevant to the design of policy reforms and future research.

Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union

2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINE MAHONEY
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Original Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Institutional Differences ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Interest Group Influence ◽  
Strategy I

Scholars have avoided studying interest group influence because of the difficulty operationalising the concept. The research presented here introduces a new way of measuring lobbying success and lays out a model of its determinants. To understand why interest groups sometimes succeed and at other times fail, we must consider the institutional structure of the political system within which the advocates are operating; the characteristics of the issue at hand; and finally the characteristics of the interest group itself and their lobbying strategy. I test these factors with original data based on interviews with 149 advocates in Washington D.C. and Brussels active on a random sample of 47 policy issues. From the results, issue context emerges as a much more important determinant of lobbying success than institutional differences. The institutional differences that do emerge suggest that direct elections coupled with private campaign finance lead to winner-take-all outcomes biased in favour of wealthier business interests, while the lack of these institutional characteristics leads to more balanced policy compromises with more advocates achieving some of their policy goals.

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