Who Gets Hung in a Hung Parliament? A Game Theory Analysis of the 1987–88 British General Election

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153
Author(s):  
Jorgen S. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Party System ◽  
General Election ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
The Government ◽  
Political Scene

The arrival of the Alliance on the British political scene has complicated the party system to an extent unknown for over half a century. Elections can no longer be counted upon to produce straightforward and immediate shifts in partisan control of the government. The next election could very well produce a hung Parliament.

Game Theory Analysis of Private Supply in Farmland Water Conservancy

2014 ◽  
Vol 641-642 ◽  
pp. 279-282
Author(s):  
Xiao Yu Ji ◽  
Min Song
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Water Infrastructure ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Marginal Benefit ◽  
Water Conservancy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Private Investors ◽  
Investment Constraints

From the perspective of quasi-public goods, this paper studies the investment of the farmland water infrastructure, and uses game theory to analyze government and private investors. It is found that in the presence of investment constraints, the government can not complete quasi-public goods investment in farmland water infrastructure independently, so the government needs to provide appropriate policies to increase the marginal benefit of private investors to attract private cooperation. Then this paper compares spontaneous investments and incentive investment from private investors, and concludes with policy recommendations.

Imbalanced Environmental Interests among Subjects with Distinctive Rights

2014 ◽  
Vol 955-959 ◽  
pp. 1229-1234
Author(s):  
Li Na Fa
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Positive Regulation ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Environmental Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Rights Sharing ◽  
Environmental Interests ◽  
Intrinsic Feature

The environmental interests among subjects with different rights pose an imbalance, involving specifically of the imbalance in environmental rights sharing as well as responsibilities shouldering among different subjects. Using the method of game theory analysis, we concluded that the optimal alternatives turned out to be the public authorities’ positive regulation on the companies’ pollution, or the companies’ voluntary conduct of pollutants removing, thus achieving the overall improvement of environmental interests of the government, companies and residents. However, the co-existence of both market and government malfunction derived from the intrinsic feature of quasi-public goods, appears to be a formidable obstacle to the subjects’ environmental interests equilibrium. Consequently, the ultimate aim to achieving equilibrium in environmental interests is apparently in line with coordination among the abovementioned subjects, mutually requiring companies’ voluntary assumption of their responsibilities, government’s endeavor from the regulation level and residents’ awareness of their environmental rights.

A coalition of chaos

2018 ◽  
pp. 190-211
Author(s):  
Rosie Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
General Election ◽  
The Other ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
The Government ◽  
Theresa May

This chapter takes stock of the post-election landscape. It describes how the Conservatives and Prime Minister Theresa May emerged from the 2017 general election as a minority government and negotiated a confidence-and-supply arrangement with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). It considers how the government might be affected by the twin challenges of austerity and Brexit, as well as the other major parties. It finishes by examining the electoral instability in the party system and the possible implications going forward.

Coalitions and Government Formation: An Empirically Relevant Theory

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Budge ◽  
Valentine Herman
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Real World ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
The Real ◽  
Relevant Theory ◽  
The Government ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Government Coalition

Traditional theories of government coalition formation concentrate on formal criteria inspired by – if not directly drawn from – game theory. One such criterion is that the coalition which forms must be winning; another is that it should have no surplus members without whom it would still be winning, i.e. it should be minimal; and a third is that the number of parties should be as few as possible. The closest that such theories come to considering the substantive issues affecting the formation of coalitions in the real world is their focus on reducing the ideological diversity of parties within the government. On many occasions, however, such ideological considerations receive negligible attention from politicians, who often ignore size factors altogether.

scholarly journals Game Theory Analysis and Modeling of Sophisticated Multi-Collusion Attack in MANETs

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 61778-61792
Author(s):  
Burhan Ul Islam Khan ◽  
Farhat Anwar ◽  
Rashidah F. Olanrewaju ◽  
Miss Laiha Binti Mat Kiah ◽  
Roohie N. Mir
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Collusion Attack

Portugal: 19 July 1987

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Local Level ◽  
National Level ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Universal Suffrage ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Economic Regime

THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 19 JULY 1987 initiated a profound change in the Portuguese party system and in the system of government. From 1974 onwards, Portugal had moved peacefully towards a democratic political system, enshrined in the 1976 Constitution. This evolution lasted about eight years and culminated in the revision of the Constitution in 1982. From 1982 onwards the present political regime has been a democratic one, coexisting with a capitalist economic regime attenuated by state monopoly in key sectors and by public companies which were nationalized between 1974 and 1976. It is also since 1982 that the system of government has been semi-presidential. There is pure representativeness as referendums do not exist at national level and have never been regulated at local level. But the government is semi-presidential in the sense that, owing to French influence, it attempts to balance Parliament with the election of the President of the Republic by direct and universal suffrage.

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