Portugal: 19 July 1987

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa

THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 19 JULY 1987 initiated a profound change in the Portuguese party system and in the system of government. From 1974 onwards, Portugal had moved peacefully towards a democratic political system, enshrined in the 1976 Constitution. This evolution lasted about eight years and culminated in the revision of the Constitution in 1982. From 1982 onwards the present political regime has been a democratic one, coexisting with a capitalist economic regime attenuated by state monopoly in key sectors and by public companies which were nationalized between 1974 and 1976. It is also since 1982 that the system of government has been semi-presidential. There is pure representativeness as referendums do not exist at national level and have never been regulated at local level. But the government is semi-presidential in the sense that, owing to French influence, it attempts to balance Parliament with the election of the President of the Republic by direct and universal suffrage.

Author(s):  
Adriana Boersner

Venezuela formally democratized in 1958 after several political and social forces fought together against the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. The evolution of this democracy was fast, partly due to the rapid economic growth and social mobility that prevailed as a result of oil wealth. In October 1958, three political parties, Acción Democrática, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, and Unión Republicana Democrática, signed a political pact, commonly known as Punto Fijo. In this document, all political parties committed themselves to respect the results of the elections and establish a government of national unity with equitable representation of the political forces. In 1961 a new constitution consolidated the principles of the nascent representative democracy. However, over time, economic inequality, power centralism, and patronage relationships led the country to fall into an institutional crisis. After a strong devaluation of the national currency in 1983, a critical event known as Viernes Negro, and fiscal adjustments, the government proposed macroeconomic adjustments in 1989, including cuts in subsidies on domestic gasoline. This resulted in massive riots across the country. This episode is historically known as El Caracazo or El Sacudón. Amid the economic and social turmoil, a lieutenant colonel named Hugo Chávez and other military leaders launched a military coup in 1992. Although the coup was unsuccessful in removing the president from power, Chávez became known at the national level. After two years in prison and launching a political party, Hugo Chávez won the presidential election in 1998. The contemporary literature on Venezuelan politics is periodized, emphasizing the division between the pre- and post-Chávez periods. Much of the work analyzing Venezuela prior to 1998 focuses on specific issues such as the economy and oil rentierism, El Caracazo, and the characteristics of the party system. Contrary, initial accounts of Chávez’s government mostly highlight his charismatic leadership. Later works, especially after the year 2002, focus much more on the authoritarian features of Chávez regime related to, for example, autocratic legalism, the supremacy of one-party regime, the connections between the government of Venezuela and other nondemocratic leaders in the world, and attacks against media and the press. Although experts do not agree about what type of authoritarianism exists is Venezuela, or even if one can characterize the first years of Chávez’s rule as an authoritarian one, since 2013, with Nicolás Maduro as president, the authoritarian features of the Venezuelan political regime are more manifest than ever.


Baltic Region ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-31
Author(s):  
Dmitry A. Lanko ◽  
Irina S. Lantsova

This article explores the Estonian ‘integration’ project, which was launched in the early 1990s to bridge the differences between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians by assimilating the latter with the former. Since the project will soon turn thirty, it is timely to ask whether it has been a success. This article employs Grigorii Golosov’s index of political party nationalization to understand whether the ‘integration’ project has helped to narrow the ideological divide between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians. In other words, the study asks whether ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians vote for the same political parties in comparable proportions or there are ‘Estonian’ and ‘Russian’ parties in the country. The analysis of the outcomes of four local and four parliamentary elections that took place in Estonia in 2005—2019 shows that by the mid-2000s Estonia achieved a considerable level of political party system nationalization at both national and local levels. At the national level, political party system nationalization remained high in 2007—2019 despite significant changes in the country’s political party system. At the local level, however, political party system nationalization has been diminishing since 2013, leading one to conclude that the Estonian ‘integration’ project has failed to close the ideological divide between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asel Doolotkeldieva ◽  
Alexander Wolters

The parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in October 2015 garnered widespread approval from commentators for the level of fairness and freedom maintained throughout the campaign. However, the results of the vote do not provide a clear indication of the current state of affairs of parliamentarism in the republic. Focusing on the commercialization of party lists, we argue that neither identity politics nor the logic of neopatrimonialism adequately explain the dynamics of political competition in Kyrgyzstan. Instead, we see perpetual uncertainty emerging from contradicting yet increasing attempts to harness the capital of privatized party lists and to impose discipline. Eventually, and beyond short-term threats of an emerging super-presidentialism, Kyrgyzstan risks suffering from hollow parliamentarism, with political parties persistently failing to supply legislative initiatives with substantial agendas and adequate professionals. The weakly institutionalized political parties and their short-sighted electoral strategies undermine both the parliamentary system and its political pluralism.


Subject Proposed reforms in the oil and gas sector. Significance In the face of strong resource nationalism, President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's government faces strong pressure to improve the balance between public control and private participation in the oil and gas sector. To that end, the government proposes to amend the 2001 oil and gas law. Its draft amendment proposes, most notably, that state enterprises should control all production operations, while private investors provide technology and capital. The government is also considering revisions to the upstream regime, which is currently based on production-sharing contracts (PSCs). These changes require parliamentary approval. Impacts Private firms, especially foreign ones, are likely to delay fresh investment in energy assets, given the oil and gas market glut. Indonesia's vast natural resource endowment will attract private interest, but regulatory uncertainty will be an abiding problem. Transparency in the extractive sector will continue to rise at the national level, but local level reforms will be slow.


Subject The May 22 parliamentary elections. Significance The elections had the lowest turnout in the history of the Republic of Cyprus and brought about significant changes in the composition of the chamber. They were conducted amid a climate of fragile economic recovery and talks with the Turkish Cypriots on reunification. The outcome was a weakening of parliamentary support for the talks and a louder voice for nationalist, anti-austerity and anti-reform views. Impacts The government that is in place will not be affected because Cyprus has a presidential system. However, the lack of a parliamentary majority could hinder the Cypriot economy's fragile recovery. Resolving the division of Cyprus problem would be a significant positive boost for the very insecure Eastern Mediterranean.


Humaniora ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 755
Author(s):  
Hagung Kuntjara

"War againt the forgot" – Some time ago the government through a bill drafted by the Ministry of Home Affairs rolled leadership succession issues covered in the bill of Privileges Yogyakarta which hands polemical dichotomy of choice 'Sultan is not automatically Governor' (by election) or 'Sultan is automatically Governor' (direct designation). Social and political conditions that nation endlessly polemical dichotomy is heating up at the public grassroot level to the national level lead to opposite parties and keep fire as unresolved. A Fine Arts Festival event titled "Nagari Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat" one century to coincide with HB IX, was presented in Jogja National Museum (JNM) 13 April 2012 and 2 weeks later, became a kind of 'witness marker' of the existence and the constellation 'Nagari Yogyakarta Sultanate - HB IX' with the Republic of Indonesia. Form of attitudes, arts events as a marker – ‘Titi pranoto mongso’ - in ancient agrarian societies of Java was used as a natural event signs to be observed, the Arts Festival events can be read as a reminder to not forget, will conduct historical Yogyakarta. Practice of art criticism writing is about the Arts Festival event "Nagari Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat" in the perspective of art criticism, which is not only a cultural festival article coverage of events, but also the existence of a strong side shoot 'Nagari Yogyakarta Sultanate - HB IX 'is presented in the form of representation of the works of art are very diverse and are free to respond to a given topic.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
L. Ya. Prokopenko

The article analyzes the transformation of the political image of Frederick Chiluba, President of the Republic of Zambia in 1991-2001. As a representative of a new formation of African leaders in the era of the continent’s transition from authoritarianism to political pluralism, he was an ambiguous figure. His role in the return of the multi-party system in the country and in the liberalization of the national economy is discussed. It is stressed that within the framework of the existing political culture this politician was not immune to inevitable mistakes. However, the style and methods of Chilubas leadership (persecution of his predecessor, manipulation using the ethnic factor in order to retain power, ignoring criticism of the opposition and allies) periodically led to tension in the internal situation in the country and negatively affected his political image and the image of the government in general.In 1990-2000s the negative impact of tensions between Zambian politicians who held the presidency at different times on the stability of the country was clearly manifested. The persecution of ex-President Chiluba charged with corruption demonstrated the authorities’ policy to combat this social evil, but it was ambiguously perceived and interpreted by the society and by analysts. It is noted that for all the mistakes and shortcomings of Chilubas ten-year rule, it is necessary to recognize his merits in creating the economic base of Zambia and in proclaiming it a Christian country, which was practically forgotten after his death.The article shows the gradual rehabilitation of Chilubas memory, in which all living ex-presidents and the current Head of State take part. The experience of Zambia shows that under African realities, former presidents enjoy honors and certain privileges, provided they do not participate actively in politics and do not enter into open conflicts with their successors.


2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-72
Author(s):  
Cristina Jayme Montiel ◽  
Judith M. de Guzman

Using social representations theory, we studied the social meanings of a controversial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In Study One, we describe the discursive content of the social debate by content analyzing articles from newspapers and selected websites. Study Two uses a survey to examine the fit between social representations of the political elite, as found in media, and the nonelite in Mindanao territories where the MOA was hotly contested. Study Three presents the social representations of the MOA at the local level through analysis of key informant interviews and archival data. Discriminant analysis on survey data shows that in general, the debate of political elites in media mirrors the contentions on-the-ground. However, the issue of constitutionality was only taken up by the political elite. Our findings suggest that the political stumble of the GRP-MILF peace process lay in a lack of procedural fairness and an on-the-ground participatory process acceptable to all antagonistic parties. However, the socially represented fair procedure is not about conventional democratic ways like using or not using a constitutional frame, but rather about pragmatic positioning and public consultations.


Author(s):  
Vitaly N. Ivanov ◽  

The object of the research is the modern party system in Russia. The aim of the article is to study the organizational, financial, and political potential of the main parliamentary political parties: Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia (UR)), CPRF, LDPR, and Spravedlivaya Rossiya (A Just Russia). The comparative analysis of party resources revealed a significant disparity between the potential of UR and the opposition parties. The latter are inferior to the UR in terms of the number of members and the development of the organizational structure. The total number of members and local organizations of these parties is one-third of UR's indicators. The lack of a developed infrastructure for the opposition parties preserves their limited representation and influence at the local level of public power. The financial potential of the parties is formed mainly by state funding and donations from sponsors. Today, four parliamentary parties are eligible for state support. The share of public finance in their budgets is more than half of all revenues. They also receive the bulk of donations, the size of which is limited by law and is official in nature. It can be argued that Russia has formed a mechanism that allows the state to support parties without allowing the establishment of monopoly influence on their activities by individuals and elite groups. The political potential of the parties is determined by the level of their representation in state and local government bodies. Today it is dominated by UR. Its parliamentary fractions actually control the legislative branch of power at the federal and regional levels. Together with the presidential structures of power, UR also ensures the election of presidential creatures to the posts of heads of regions. Party members today form the basis of the governor's corps, with a single representation from other political parties. UR's organizations include more than half of deputies and heads of municipalities, ensuring its influence on the local government system. The high level of dominance of UR and the limited potential of the opposition parties is an important condition for the stability of the existing political regime. UR's significant opportunities allow the ruling elite to maintain and strengthen their positions: cut off the forces of the radical opposition from power, control the legislative process providing legal support for decisions of the government and the head of state, consolidate the federal and regional elite, ensuring the rotation of elites and coordination of their interests. In these circumstances, the parties of the parliamentary opposition are important for preserving the democratic nature of the political process. They do not question the dominant role of UR, offer limited competition to it, and do not have the potential to really influence key political decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-292
Author(s):  
Anatoliy Romanyuk ◽  
Vitaliy Lytvyn

This article is devoted to study and comparative analysis of the features and levels of support for new political parties during parliamentary elections in Ukraine, in particular the period 1998–2019. With this in mind, mainly based on the calculations of the indices of overall electoral volatility, intra-system electoral volatility and extra-system electoral volatility, we analyze the parameters of changes in electoral support (by voters) for political parties, in particular new ones, during the 1998–2019 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. In addition, we correlate overall, intra-system and extra-system electoral volatility, and present the correlation of overall electoral volatility in the sample of all political parties as the subjects of electoral processes in Ukraine and political parties elected to the national parliament (the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). As a result, the study outlines two clusters of extra-system electoral volatility, which show the highest level of similarity, and calculates the dependence of the level of electoral volatility and stability of the party system in Ukraine. With this background, we conclude that electoral volatility in Ukraine is largely determined by the effect of party affiliation or desire to belong to the government or opposition, and is regulated by the special context of identity politics in this country.


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