scholarly journals Cultural Backlash? How (Not) to Explain the Rise of Authoritarian Populism

Author(s):  
Armin Schäfer

Abstract This book review examines the theory of populism advanced by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart in Cultural Backlash. The authors offer a distinct explanation of the rise of authoritarian populism in advanced democracies. As societies become more liberal over time, older, more conservative cohorts feel under threat of losing majority status and allegedly turn towards authoritarian-populist parties that promise to stop the tide of liberalism. However, this theory of populism finds little empirical support. In contrast to what the authors argue, there is no polarization of attitudes between younger and older cohorts, and younger cohorts are more likely to vote for authoritarian-populist parties. To substantiate this claim, I replicate many of the analyses in Cultural Backlash and add additional ones with the newest wave of the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. I conclude by observing that while the cultural backlash theory of populism does not hold, this does not invalidate cultural approaches more generally.

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 135-141
Author(s):  
Kenneth D. Locke

Abstract. Person–job (or needs–supplies) discrepancy/fit theories posit that job satisfaction depends on work supplying what employees want and thus expect associations between having supervisory power and job satisfaction to be more positive in individuals who value power and in societies that endorse power values and power distance (e.g., respecting/obeying superiors). Using multilevel modeling on 30,683 European Social Survey respondents from 31 countries revealed that overseeing supervisees was positively associated with job satisfaction, and as hypothesized, this association was stronger among individuals with stronger power values and in nations with greater levels of power values or power distance. The results suggest that workplace power can have a meaningful impact on job satisfaction, especially over time in individuals or societies that esteem power.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 556-557
Author(s):  
Richard Settersten ◽  
Jack Day ◽  
Gunhild Hagestad

Abstract Is there a “double standard” (i.e., a harsher judgment) in the perceived ages at which women and men reach old age, and have these judgments changed over time? We use European Social Survey data from 23 countries in 2006 and newly released data from 16 of those countries in 2018. In both 2006 and 2018, men typically assign women substantially earlier ages than women themselves do. In some places, however, men also give themselves lower ages than women give them. With respect to when women become old, the differential views of men and women are persistent. So is the fact that women differentiate less between the sexes¬–though men differentiate less in 2018 relative to 2006. We use multilevel modeling to examine variation explained by both individual characteristics and country indicators of demographic and policy contexts. Findings underscore the significance of the double standard in cultural constructions of aging.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882091246
Author(s):  
Miroslav Nemčok ◽  
Hanna Wass

Popular consent is an essential element for success and stability of democracies. Research has repeatedly demonstrated that “electoral winners” (i.e. voters casting a ballot for government parties) are more satisfied with democracy than supporters of the opposition parties. However, little is known about the dynamics of satisfaction during the electoral cycle: Do winners become happier and losers even more discontent over time? We approach this question by utilizing an interview date in the European Social Survey (rounds 1–8) to position individuals within the different stages of electoral cycle. The results based on 199,207 responses from 199 surveys in 31 countries suggest that satisfaction with democracy stays relatively stable during the electoral cycle across various electoral systems if the political development is predictable. However, if actions of the parties are uncertain, namely the alternations of governments tend to be frequent, partial, and opened to all parties, and hence neither winners nor losers know how steady their status is with respect to the political development in the country, their satisfaction tend to fluctuate over time. Therefore, the conclusion reached is the more stable West European democracies have limited generalizability to the low-predictable systems in Central and Eastern Europe.


Social Forces ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian S Czymara

Abstract In 2015, the number of people seeking asylum in Europe skyrocketed. However, asylum applications were mainly concentrated in a few destination countries such as Germany, Austria, or Sweden. After the so-called EU-Turkey deal, asylum rates quickly dropped in subsequent years. I examine how these developments affected public opinion from both a static and a dynamic comparative perspective. The rapid and largely unpredicted rise in refugee numbers and their prominence in public debates make demographic changes potent drivers of out-group hostility. The analysis of data from over 50,000 individuals in 22 countries contained in the seventh and eighth waves of the European Social Survey shows that attitudes toward refugees do not simply follow trends in asylum applications. Significantly lowering refugee numbers, hence, did not counter anti-refugee sentiments in the European public. Based on intra-country variation over time, the model rather predicts an increase in negative attitudes during times of considerable demographic shifts. Deeper analyses reveal that this effect is stronger for conservative Europeans as well as for those who distrust EU-politics. Moreover, while a general willingness to help is associated with more openness toward refugees, actually experiencing foreigner inflow diminishes this link, suggesting limitations of humanitarian concerns. Results are stable across various modelling and sample choices and not driven by individual countries. In sum, these findings demonstrate the importance of temporal dynamics for the formation of attitudes toward refugees in contemporary Europe and point to potentially polarizing effects of immigration along ideological lines.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Joly

How is the protest behavior of citizens in new democracies influenced by their experience of the past? Certain theories of political socialization hold that cohorts reaching political maturity under dictatorship are subject to apathy. Yet, it remains unclear whether mobilization during the transition can counterbalance this effect. This article examines the protest behavior of citizens socialized in Eastern Germany, a region marked by two legacies: a legacy of autocracy and, following the 1989-90 revolution, a legacy of transitional mobilization. Using age-period-cohort models with data from the European Social Survey, the analysis assesses the evolution of gaps in protest across generations and time between East and West Germans. The results demonstrate that participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts is lower for East Germans socialized under communism in comparison with West Germans from the same cohorts. This participation deficit remains stable over time and even increases for certain protest activities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 704-737
Author(s):  
Philippe Joly

Abstract How is the protest behavior of citizens in new democracies influenced by their experience of the past? Certain theories of political socialization hold that cohorts reaching political maturity under dictatorship are subject to apathy. Yet, it remains unclear whether mobilization during the transition can counterbalance this effect. This article examines the protest behavior of citizens socialized in Eastern Germany, a region marked by two legacies: a legacy of autocracy and, following the 1989-90 revolution, a legacy of transitional mobilization. Using age-period-cohort models with data from the European Social Survey, the analysis assesses the evolution of gaps in protest across generations and time between East and West Germans. The results demonstrate that participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts is lower for East Germans socialized under communism in comparison with West Germans from the same cohorts. This participation deficit remains stable over time and even increases for certain protest activities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 440-463
Author(s):  
Aaron Ponce

Research has overlooked the influence of countries’ colonizing histories on how present-day diversity shapes forms of social cohesion. Ethnic boundary theories suggest that legacies of colonizing external territories could strengthen the boundaries that separate natives from foreign migrants. Alternatively, colonization could simply give countries greater experience with foreign populations over time, thus diffusing boundaries through sustained integration processes. This article investigates how history shapes diversity’s influence on horizontal and vertical forms of social cohesion: support for welfare to reduce hierarchical class differences and trust of the generalized other. Using 2002 to 2014 European Social Survey and country history data, I find that while diversity often directly reduces both welfare support and trust, histories of conquest moderate this relationship. Specifically, diversity’s negative influence on social cohesion outcomes gradually diminishes with the occupation of foreign territories, in contrast to their colonization. While prior research emphasizes diversity as a straightforward negative force, current findings show that it is shaped by historical episodes of symbolic boundary making.


2020 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
Aurelija Stelmokienė ◽  
Karina Kravčenko

Abstract Both scientists and practitioners acknowledge leadership as a key predictor of success in organizations. Leaders’ values could be a significant criterion for the analysis of changes in leadership recently. This study aims to investigate changes in leaders’ values over time among Baltic countries. The results of the European Social Survey (ESS) showed that leaders’ values did not significantly change over time (from 2008 to 2016). However, the expression of values significantly differed between leaders of different countries.


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