Delimitation of the Continental Shelf—Conventional and Customary International Law

1970 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-9
Author(s):  
C. A. Hopkins
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 827-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin A. Baumert

Abstract“Seldom has an apparent major change in international law been accomplished by peaceful means more rapidly and amidst more general acquiescence and approval,” Lauterpacht observed of continental shelf claims nearly seventy years ago. When considered today, this observation merits a caveat, as the question of how far the continental shelf extends into the sea is not yet fully settled. This article explores the customary international law applicable for determining continental shelf limits and also examines the legal procedures used by states to gain international acceptance of those limits.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 562-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne Grisel

A rule of customary international law of recent origin has conferred sovereign rights over the continental shelf to individual states for the limited purposes of exploration and exploitation. The attribution of such exclusive jurisdiction required the delimitation of boundaries between the submarine areas appertaining to various littoral states. The importance of such partition of the seabed and subsoil is self-evident, but two points do call for comment. First, since the shelf may be considerably extended in the future according to the criterion of exploitability, the method now adopted will have a constantly growing significance. Second, the acquisition of the sea bottom by coastal nations has created inequalities between them, depending on their relative degree of technical development as well as on their geographical circumstances. The drawing of boundaries separating their respective shelves can aggravate or diminish these inequalities.


Author(s):  
Tullio Treves

This Note focuses on the Judgment handed out by a special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in a dispute concerning delimitation of maritime areas between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. This is the only decision of substance of ITLOS during 2017. Among the elements of particular interests of the Judgment the following should be noted. First, the consideration and rejection of the argument that oil concession practice may constitute a tacit agreement. Second, the reliance, however limited to this case, as regards delimitation of the territorial sea on the same methodology used for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, namely, the equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology. Third, the distinction between the function of the Chamber in delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm and that of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in delineating the outer limits of the shelf. Fourth, the examination of the question of whether the Chamber had jurisdiction to decide on questions of responsibility, and of the applicability of customary international law thereto. Fifth, the statement that to adjudicate on the claim that Ghana had contravened the Chamber’s Order on provisional measures belonged to the Chamber’s “inherent competence”. Sixth, the analysis of the regime of contested areas in light of Article 83 of UNCLOS.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinmin MA

AbstractThis paper provides an assessment of the Tribunal’s Award on the merits relating to the Philippines’ Submissions No. 1 and 2. First, it argues that the Convention is not the sole legal source of maritime rights. Second, the Tribunal erroneously infers from Article 311 that the Convention prevails over customary international law. Meanwhile, Article 293 does not terminate rules of general international law that are incompatible with the Convention. Third, the Tribunal, by deciding that historic rights under general international law have been superseded by the regimes of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf established under the Convention, fails to draw a distinction between the two separate legal regimes, namely the Convention and general international law. Fourth, as one of the “matters not regulated by the Convention”, historic rights should be governed by, and have been well established in, general international law.


1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 828-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef L. Kunz

The so-called “doctrine and practice of the Continental Shelf,” hardly more than ten years old, has, through many unilateral proclamations highly different in character and contents, led at this time to a situation which only can be characterized as one of confusion and abuse. The whole development, especially in its exaggerated claims, gives the impression of a triumphant upsurge of national sovereignty, and threatens to endanger the long-established principle of the freedom of the high seas—a norm juris cogentis of general customary international law.


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 892-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony D’Amato

The World Court’s recent decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases is a major contribution to that branch of the theory of customary international law dealing with norm-creation by means of a treaty. The Court articulated a new methodology for determining which provisions in treaties can form the basis of universally binding customary law. As the spreading network of international conventions becomes more fine-meshed, the substantive rules of international customary law may be expected to conform more and more closely to the provisions in these conventions. The World Court has implicitly recognized this process in many prior opinions, but it was not until the Continental Shelf decision that the link between treaty and custom was focused upon with precision. I shall argue in this essay that the Court used a method which might be called the rule of manifest intent, that this method differs from a more traditional approach found in the writings of publicists, and that this new method accords well with the growing need to objectify and place upon a scientific basis the methodology by which one may determine what in fact are the rules of customary law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-253
Author(s):  
Shelly Aviv Yeini

The orthodox view of the Specially-Affected States Doctrine (SASD), grounded in the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) 1969 judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, is that practice leading to the emergence of a customary rule must include that of states “whose interests were specially affected.” The framing of this passage of the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment seems to imply both a positive and a negative importance for the practice of specially-affected states. Such practice is a requirement for the emergence of a new rule of customary international law. Acceptance by specially-affected states is, in other words, necessary but not sufficient for a rule of custom to emerge. Whether practice of specially-affected states can be sufficient to form a general custom is not resolved by this formulation, although it seems reasonable to infer that the ICJ had in mind that the combined involvement of specially-affected and other states was needed for the formation of such a rule of customary international law concerning basic principles of continental shelf delimitation. Conversely, the absence of rule-supporting practice by specially-affected states would have a negating effect on the emergence of a rule of customary international law, despite rule-affirming practice of states not specially affected. On this view, practice of only such states could not crystalize into a custom. One commentator has suggested that the negative construction does not mean that a single specially-affected state necessarily holds veto power over the formation of a new rule of customary international law, but asserted that “[i]f several ‘states whose interests are specially affected’ object to the formation of a custom, no custom can emerge.” Unsurprisingly, given this level of abstraction, such formulations do not themselves provide specificity as to how many (or which) specially-affected states would be sufficient to prevent the formation of a custom in a particular situation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-474
Author(s):  
Bjørn Kunoy

Abstract: The sovereign and exclusive rights of States to explore the continental shelf and exploit its resources implies an unfettered right to exclude any exploitation by a third State of hydrocarbons that are located on its continental shelf. Yet, these rights do not allow impairment to the sovereign and exclusive rights of third States to exploit resources that extend onto their continental shelves. State practice demonstrates multiple definitions of hydrocarbon deposits implying that the decision of whether a hydrocarbon deposit is transboundary may vary depending on the relevant treaty provision. State practice also indicates heterogeneous procedural and substantive approaches to the commencement of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits exploitation. These differences have substantive implications relevant to the determination of the constitutive elements of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits and for the circumstances under which a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit can operate under customary international law.


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