Sharing is Caring: Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits on the Continental Shelf

2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-474
Author(s):  
Bjørn Kunoy

Abstract: The sovereign and exclusive rights of States to explore the continental shelf and exploit its resources implies an unfettered right to exclude any exploitation by a third State of hydrocarbons that are located on its continental shelf. Yet, these rights do not allow impairment to the sovereign and exclusive rights of third States to exploit resources that extend onto their continental shelves. State practice demonstrates multiple definitions of hydrocarbon deposits implying that the decision of whether a hydrocarbon deposit is transboundary may vary depending on the relevant treaty provision. State practice also indicates heterogeneous procedural and substantive approaches to the commencement of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits exploitation. These differences have substantive implications relevant to the determination of the constitutive elements of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits and for the circumstances under which a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit can operate under customary international law.

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Cameron Miles

Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute provides that “judicial decisions” may serve as a subsidiary means for the determination of customary international law. The absence of a qualifying adjective to the term “judicial decisions” confirms that, at least ex facie, there is no priority to be given to international over domestic judgments in this respect. And yet – as the International Law Commission’s Draft Conclusions on Formation and Identification of Customary International Law confirms – the reality of international adjudication is one in which domestic judicial decisions are often side-lined. In this paper, I question the ILC’s assertion that this is due to the relative expertise of international versus domestic courts, and instead posit a model based on the shifting architectonics of international adjudication. Two related developments are key: (1) the florescence of international adjudicative bodies in the post-1945 era, and (2) the tendency for international courts and tribunals to see domestic judicial decisions as evidence of state practice and opinio juris under Article 38(1)(b), rather than as subsidiary means for the determination of custom – that is, as factual rather than legal precedents.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony D’Amato

Central to the World Court’s mission is the determination of international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Students of the Court’s jurisprudence have long been aware that the Court has been better at applying customary law than defining it. Yet until Nicaragua v. United States, little harm was done. For in the sharply contested cases prior to Nicaragua, the Court managed to elicit commonalities in argumentative structure that gravitated its rulings toward the customary norms implicit in state practice. The Court’s lack of theoretical explicitness simply meant that a career opportunity arose for some observers like me to attempt to supply the missing theory of custom.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Brian Sang YK

Despite criticism of targeted killing of suspected terrorists, states continue to justify extensive bases for lethal-force responses to terrorism by arguing that rigid adherence to prescriptive law cannot always be observed in the context of clear and present danger. But, while seemingly cogent, this view wrongly presumes the mutual exclusivity of security considerations and the imperatives of law. It risks exceeding the limits of permissible use of lethal force prescribed in conventional and customary international law. A contrary and more balanced view is advanced in this article. It argues that current international law protecting individuals against intentional killing offers sufficient and practicable guidance for states confronting terrorism. Systematic legal criteria are thus expounded to clarify the legality and admissible limits of targeted killing of suspected terrorists in three contexts: law enforcement, self-defence and armed conflict. With reference to treaties, policy documents and state practice, the article critically examines the preconditions for lawful state-sanctioned killings in counter-terrorist operations. It also identifies the legal challenges and policy implications of resorting to targeted killing. Using comparative case law and operational practice, a legal basis is offered on which Kenya and other nations can effectively tackle the spectre of terrorism within the fair strictures of the law. Every struggle of the state – against terrorism or any other enemy – is conducted according to rules and law. There is always law which the state must comply with.


Author(s):  
Duško Glodić

This article explores the role and importance accorded to customary international law in contemporary international law. First of all, the author has explored a number of issues related to this topic. Particluarly, the manner in which norms of customary international law are being established through the relevant State practice and the formation of opinio juris, as well as how the changes in contemporary international relations generated some chages in custromary international law were examined from both theretical and practical point of view. Than, the article elaborated, in a more concrete manner, different ways of impact of changes in international relations and subjects of international law to the formation of customary international rules. It has also paid attention to the evolution in international law and its reflection to the creation of international legal norms, including customary rules. The article concluded that, despite an ever increasing number of treaties, customary rules are still present in international law and are important for regulation of international relations, thus ensuring that dynamics and developments within the international community are followed by the development of legal framework.


2009 ◽  
pp. 565-590
Author(s):  
Raffaella Nigro

- In the well-known Lozano case, an Italian intelligence agent, Mr Nicola Calipari, remained killed in 2005 by an American soldier, Mr Mario Luis Lozano, while entering a US checkpoint on the way to the Baghdad airport soon after securing the release of an Italian journalist from Iraqi kidnappers. In the ensuing case, Italian courts addressed a number of sensitive questions, including that of jurisdiction over national troops involved, directly or indirectly, in so-called "humanitarian missions" abroad. Italian courts did have jurisdiction over the killing under Italian domestic law. Indeed, the murder of Mr Calipari can be regarded as a "political crime" under Article 8 of the Italian penal code. On such a premise, the question is whether Article 8 was superseded by a customary international law rule under Article 10 of the Italian Constitution aimed at excluding jurisdiction over Mr Lozano. State practice suggests that neither a customary rule on the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State (as claimed by the Court of Assise of Rome in 2007) nor a customary rule on Mr Lozano's functional immunity (as claimed by the Court of Cassation in 2008) are established in customary international law. Rather, State practice reveals that a number of States are likely to recognize immunity from jurisdiction to the armed forces only in certain specific circumstances. Moreover, such immunity is quite different from the functional immunity traditionally enjoyed by diplomatic and consular agents, as well as from the immunities enjoyed by other high-ranking State officials, such as the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-225
Author(s):  
Raffaella Nigro

The dispute between Italy and India on the Enrica Lexie incident has finally been decided by the Award handed down on 21 May 2020 by the Arbitral Tribunal to which the Parties had referred the case. After having concluded that it had jurisdiction on the issue of the immunity of the two Italian marines involved in the case at hand, the majority judgment (by three votes to two) affirmed that under customary international law the latter enjoyed functional immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of India. This article will argue that the Arbitral Tribunal’s conclusions are unconvincing, first and foremost, considering that, based on State practice, it is not possible to affirm without reservations that a settled customary rule exists under international law conferring immunity to all State officials, and regardless of the type of functions they perform. In fact, immunity has often been recognized as applying only to certain categories of State officials, and on the basis of the governmental nature of the functions they perform on behalf of the State. Given the doubtful existence under customary international law of a clear rule establishing the functional immunity of all State officials, for all the acts performed in the exercise of their functions, this article argues that the Arbitral Tribunal should have firstly ascertained the existence of a specific customary rule on the immunity of the military abroad, together with the exact content of such rule and, secondly, whether this was applicable in the case of the Enrica Lexie. As current practice stands, military forces abroad are entitled to immunity only under specific circumstances, which do not seem to occur in the present case. In particular, this article maintains that the Italian marines were not entitled to functional immunity. While the acts they performed did indeed fall within their typical functions, they were exercised on behalf of a private subject and not on behalf of the Italian State.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

Many areas of international law developed first as custom and were only subsequently, generally in the course of the twentieth century, subject to codification. Human rights law was different. It was viewed as quintessentially a matter of domestic concern, a subject shrouded in State sovereignty. Only following the Second World War was international human rights law recognised as a source of binding obligations, mainly through the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments of the United Nations as well as the regional systems. Later, jurists began contending that the norms in these instruments might also be customary in nature. They struggled with identifying the two classic elements in the determination of custom, opinio juris and State practice. Most analysis of the content of customary international law was rather perfunctory and also quite conservative, confining itself largely to civil and political rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-739
Author(s):  
Xuexia Liao

Abstract This article revisits the package deal nature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and its implications for determining customary international law. A survey of the case law illustrates that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not given particular weight to the fact that the LOSC was negotiated and accepted as a package deal. Nevertheless, the ICJ’s declaration that Article 121, paragraph 3 of the LOSC is a customary rule tends to be based on a ‘package deal approach’, which focuses on the textual and logical links between the paragraphs that manifest an ‘indivisible régime’. By exploring the difficulties of determining the customary status of Article 76(2)–(7) concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which may arise in the pending Nicaragua v. Colombia II case, this article calls for a cautious attitude towards determination of customary rules from the LOSC.


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