Political Conditions for Electoral Accountability in Federalism
2017 ◽
Vol 50
(4)
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pp. 1037-1059
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AbstractA theory of voting under federalism requires that attributions of responsibility moderate the strength of retrospective voting. Scholars have spotty evidence that voters do this but put this down to the effects of institutions and citizens’ capabilities. I show thatpoliticalvariation also affects electoral accountability. Using panel surveys across provincial and federal elections and qualitative media content analysis, I show that voters only live up to a federal theory of voting when governments make policy changes independent of the other level and those changes and their consequences are prominent in political discourse. Federal institutions affect electoral accountability through the politics that they generate.
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2019 ◽
Vol 13
(2)
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pp. 368-386
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