6. Resolution of the General Assembly on Permanent Missions to the United Nations, December 3, 1948.

1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-212

CONSIDERING that, since the creation of the United Nations, the practice had developed of establishing, at the seat of the Organization permanent missions of Member States,CONSIDERING that the presence of such permanent missions serves to assist in the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and, in particular, to keep the necessary liaison between the Member States and the Secretariat in periods between sessions of the different organs of the United Nations,CONSIDERING that in these circumstances, the generalization of the institution of permanent missions can be foreseen and that the submission of credentials of permanent representatives should be regulated,

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 682-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Víctor Genina

On September 19th, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/1, the text of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (the “New York Declaration”). Resolution 71/1 is the outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, held at the UN headquarters. The New York Declaration reflects how UN member states have decided to address the challenge of large movements of people in two main legal categories: asylum seekers/refugees and migrants. Resolution 71/1 includes an annex titled “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (the “global compact for migration” or “global compact”). This document is comprised of several thematic issues related to international migration that will be the basis of a globally negotiated agreement on how member states should respond to international migration at the national, regional, and international levels, as well as to issues related to international migration and development. The global compact for migration is intended to be adopted at a conference on international migration and development before the inauguration of the 73rd annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. This paper addresses how UN member states should plan to address international migration in the future. It does not refer to refugees and asylum seekers: a global compact on refugees will be drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2018, and to be presented to the UN General Assembly for states' consideration during its 73rd annual session, which starts in September 2018.1 For those who have been involved in migration issues within the United Nations, the fact that member states have finally agreed to convene an international conference on international migration represents a major achievement. It is the result of an extended process that started decades ago and was made possible by a long chain of efforts by many state delegations and other stakeholders. The global compact for migration will not be the first outcome document dealing exclusively with international migration. A declaration2 adopted at a high-level meeting at the United Nations in October 2013, for example, paved the way for the 2018 conference. Nonetheless, the global compact represents a unique opportunity to address international migration comprehensively and humanely. This paper contributes to the discussion on the elements that should be included in the global compact for migration. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the main elements of Annex II, “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” and the criteria that needs to be adopted in order to achieve a substantive outcome. In particular, participants in the negotiation process should aim to balance the concerns of states and the members of host societies, on one hand, with the needs and rights of migrants, on the other. The second section includes proposals to enrich the final global compact for migration and takes into account two documents written by two different actors within the UN system, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. In particular, the paper proposes that the global compact for migration: • sets forth principles that can inform the actions of governments in relation to international migration at all levels; • enunciates a clearer definition of state protection responsibilities in relation to migrants in crisis situations and so-called “mixed flows”3; affords a substantive role to civil society organizations, the private sector, and academic institutions in the global compact's follow-up and review process; • defines the institutional framework for the implementation and follow-up of the global compact within the United Nations, including through the work of the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF); • establishes a mechanism to fund migration policies for states that lack enough resources to invest sufficiently in this task; and • builds a cooperation-oriented, peer-review mechanism to review migration policies. The paper has been conceived as an input for those who will take part in the negotiation of the global compact for migration, as well as those who will closely follow those negotiations. Thus, the paper assumes a level of knowledge on how international migration has been addressed within the United Nations during the last several years and of the complexities of these negotiation processes. The author took part in different UN negotiation processes on international migration from 2004 to 2013. The paper is primarily based on this experience.4


Author(s):  
Mazlan Othman

The United Nations briefly considered the issue of extra-terrestrial intelligence at the 32nd session of the General Assembly in 1977. As a result, the Office of Outer Space Affairs was tasked to prepare a document on issues related to ‘messages to extra-terrestrial civilizations’, but this area has not been followed through in more recent times. This discussion paper describes the United Nations’ activities in the field of near-Earth objects in some detail, and suggests that this might be used as a model of how Member States could proceed with dealing with this issue in case the existence of extra-terrestrial life/intelligence is established.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-202

1. On 21 November 1947, by its resolution 117 (II), the General Assembly requested the Interim Committee to:“1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of die General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;“2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;“3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to the General Assembly.”


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 489-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL H. JOYNER

This article argues that in passing Resolution 1540, the UN Security Council has confused the proper scope of its enforcement powers under Chapter VII with the proper scope of its long unused, limited, lawmaking powers under Article 26. It has thereby taken to itself by unilateral exercise of its Chapter VII powers a role which, under the Charter system, it is to share with both the General Assembly, in the exercise of its Article 11(1) powers, and the general membership of the United Nations, to whom it is directed under Article 26 to submit proposals for the creation of new international laws in the area of weapons proliferation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 652-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Burmester ◽  
Michael Jankowski

Existing research suggests that European Union member states are increasingly able to act in concert in the United Nations General Assembly. Based on several hundred co-ordination meetings per year, the European Union ‘speaks with one voice’ on most of the resolutions voted upon in the United Nations General Assembly. However, little is known about instances where the European Union member states do not vote coherently. Three questions remain unanswered. First, what factors determine deviating voting behaviour of European Union member states? Second, who are the most frequent defectors from the European Union’s majority position? Third, which voting blocs within the European Union can be identified? The article answers these questions in a quantitative design by controlling for domestic factors, issues of resolutions and the position of the United States. The results suggest that domestic factors determine deviating voting behaviour far less than agenda-related issues and the position of the United States.


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-100 ◽  

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1966 and Information Annexes; Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: In its report to the General Assembly on the budget estimates for the financial year 1966, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions noted that the Secretary-General had proposed for 1966 a gross expenditure budget of $116,737,110, an increase of $8,361,405 over the total 1965 gross level of $108,375,705 recommended by the Committee. Of the total estimated income of $17,918,800 for 1966, income from staff assessment (for distribution to Member governments as credits through the Tax Equalization Fund) was calculated at $11,530,000 and income from all other sources (for deduction from gross appropriations for purposes of the assessment of contributions) at $6,388,800. After deduction of estimated income, the net expenditure level for 1966 would be $98,818,310, an increase of $7,402,505 over the total 1965 net level of $91,415,805 recommended by the Advisory Committee. In its report the Advisory Committee recommended reductions in the expenditure estimates totaling $2,130,590. These, together with adjustments in the income estimates, would reduce the net expenditure level for 1966 from $98,818,310, as proposed by the Secretary-General, to $96,814,220. After detailing the contributions made to other organizations in the United Nations family during the years 1961–1966, the Advisory Committee pointed out that, with the 1966 budget estimates submitted by the Secretary-General for the United Nations, the aggregate which member states of the various organizations would be asked to appropriate for the year 1966 would amount to approximately $254·3 million as against $234·7 million for 1965 and $213·3 million for 1964.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Panke

Most international organizations are based on the principle of equality of states. Their institutional design grants all member states the same formal rights. Although formally equal, states differ immensely concerning their power capacities and size. Can institutional designs of international organizations mitigate real-world power- and size-related differences between member states, and if so, to which extent? To provide an answer, this article focuses on the United Nations General Assembly, which combines an equalizing institutional design with a large very heterogeneous membership. It shows that the strength of the equalizing effect varies across stages of the policy cycle. It is the weakest in the negotiation stage and the strongest in the final decision-making stage, while institutional design of international organizations has a de facto equalizing effect of medium strength in the agenda setting stage. Thus, while power and capacity differences matter, larger powerful states are not systematically better off throughout the entire policy cycle.


1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga

Many recent and important treaties contain provisions in favor of third states. The United Nations Charter, for instance, confers upon non-member states the right to participate in the discussion of disputes in which they are involved (Article 32); the right to bring such disputes to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly (Article 35); and the right to consult the Security Council with regard to the solution of special economic problems arising from the application of preventive or enforcement measures (Article 50). Also Articles 2 (7) and 81 have been interpreted and applied as conferring rights upon states not Members of the Organization.


Author(s):  
Pedro Keil

The creation of the International Law Commission arouses from the necessity imposed by the text of the UN Charter. According to article 13 paragraph 1 (a) of the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly is responsible for the promotion of the progressive development of international law and codification of such. In this regard, the Resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947 came with this purpose. So, the Commission’s nature is of an institutional and permanent subsidiary organ to the General Assembly of the UN, serving the purpose of perfecting the sources of law in the international ambit.


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