Council of Foreign Ministers

1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 320-326

Austrian State Treaty: In furtherance of the September 14, 1951, statement of the French, United Kingdom and United States foreign ministers, that there was “no justification for any further delay in the conclusion of a treaty for the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria”,1 the United States deputy for the Austrian State Treaty (Reber) issued an invitation on December 28, 1951, suggesting that a meeting of the deputies be held at London on January 21, 1952. The governments of the United Kingdom and France immediately accepted the invitation, but the Soviet reply, dated January 18, made the following objections that: 1) no action had been taken on the Soviet proposal to conduct an investigation on the extent of Austria's implementation of the four powers' decisions on demilitarization and denazification; and 2) conclusion of an Austrian treaty was unwise until the western powers had implemented their obligations under the Italian treaty, particularly with regard to the creation ofthe Free Territory of Trieste which had been “turned into an Anglo-American military base. The reply of the western powers, dated January 19 pointed out that: 1) their views on denazification and demilitarization had been made clear in the Allied Council in Vienna, “the proper body to consider such questions”; 2) the Trieste issue had no relation to the Austrian treaty; and 3) that the express purpose of the meeting which had been called for January 21 was to conclude an Austrian treaty as speedily as possible, to which end they reiterated their invitation to the Soviet deputy.

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229

Proposed Meeting of the Council: Meeting in Prague on October 20 and 21, 1950, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, eastern Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement in reply to the communiqué on Germany released on September 19 by the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Charging that the position of the three western governments was merely a screen to conceal the aggressive objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the creation of mobile police formations was nothing less than the reconstitution of a German army, the eight foreign ministers stated that they considered as urgent 1) the publication by the three western powers and the Soviet Union of a statement of their intent to refuse to permit German rearmament and of their unswerving determination to create a united peace-loving German state; 2) the removal of all restrictions hindering the development of the peaceful German economy and the prevention of a resurgence of German war potential; 3) the conclusion of a German treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year of its conclusion; and 4) the creation of an all-German constituent council to prepare for a provisional German government. The text of the communiqué was communicated to the United Kingdom, the United States and France under cover of a Soviet note on November 3. Stating that the Prague declaration possessed “the greatest significance for the cause of assuring international peace and security” and touched the “fundamental national interests of the peoples of Europe,” the Soviet government proposed the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers „for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany.”


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 646-650

On April 9, 1951, the deputies of the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union began their sixth week of Paris meetings in an attempt to frame an agenda for a conference of the foreign ministers.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-400

The ANZUS Council held its second meeting in Washington, D.C., on September 9 and 10, 1953. While the first meeting of the Council had been devoted largely to organizational matters, the second meeting provided an opportunity for the foreign ministers of Australia, New Zealand and the United States to review the developments of the past year and to discuss common problems in the Pacific area. Prior to the opening of the meeting, there had been speculation in the press about the possibility of providing some form of associate membership in ANZUS for other countries — particularly the United Kingdom – and other international organizations. The United Kingdom was reportedly dissatisfied with its exclusion from the organization; Prime Minister Churchill had been quoted as telling the House of Commons on June 17 that he “did not like the Anzus Pact at all” and that he hoped that “perhaps larger and wider arrangements could be made which would be more satisfactory than those now in force”. According to the communique issued at the close of the meeting, however, the ministers “unanimously concluded … that to attempt to enlarge its membership would not contribute directly and materially” to the strengthening and defense of the ANZUS area. The communique pointed out that ANZUS was one of a number of arrangements for the furtherance of the security of the nations of the area; specifically the communique mentioned the mutual security pacts between the United States and the Philippines and Japan, United States defense understandings with the government of China on Formosa and the relationship of Australia and New Zealand with the other Commonwealth nations. Together, the communique noted, these arrangements ‘constitute … a solemn warning to any potential aggressor and represent the growing foundation for lasting peace in the Pacific”.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 178-180

On December 6, 1948, a note was sent to the United States, France, USSR and the United Kingdom by the Austrian Federal Government pointing out that no progress had been made in the preparation of the Austrian peace treaty since the adjournment of the Deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London in May 1948. The note declared that Austria was anxious for the conclusion of the treaty, the subsequent withdrawal of occupation forces and the elimination of the four zones artificially dividing the country, as it considered the occupation an impediment to Austrian economy.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 832-834

The three foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and United States met in Washington from September 10 to 14, 1951. The agenda of the conference included items on: 1) the general situation and measures to contain communist expansion; 2) the Atlantic command and the United Kingdom suggestion for a middle east command; 3) inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Pact;1 4) the French plan for a European army with German units; 5) change in the three governments’ relations with Germany; 6) revision of the Italian peace treaty; 7) French and United Kingdom objections to United States activities in regard to Spain; 8) the Korean war and the consequences of the Japanese treaty on the situation in the far east; 9) war in Indo-China and the French request foreconomic and military aid; 10) question of the Austrian treaty; 11) attitude to be adopted towards communist China; 12) Iranian oil situation and the situation in the middle east; 13) economic and political measures to protect the interests of the western nations behind the “iron curtain”. This item had been suggested by the United States as a result of the Oatis case.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 591-593

The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, M. Robert Schuman; of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky; of the United Kingdom, the Right Honorable Ernest Bevin, and the United States of America, Mr. Dean Acheson, took place in Paris from May 23 to June 20,1949.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-564

The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris from May 23 to June 20, 1949, to discuss the German question and the Austrian treaty. The fifth session, held in London in November–December 1947, had closed without agreement as to the drafting of peace treaties for Germany and Austria. At the recent meeting France was represented by Robert Schuman, the USSR by A. Y. Vishinsky, the United Kingdom by Ernest Bevin and the United States by Dean Acheson. A preliminary requirement for the opening of this meeting was the lifting of the Berlin blockade and counterblockade measures by members of the Council. Informal discussions in New York between Soviet and United States representatives (Jacob Malik and Philip Jessup) resulted on May 12 in preliminary agreement on this problem, which had stood for ten months as an obstacle in the way of any consideration by the members of the Council of the German question as a whole.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 724-726

The foreign ministers have reviewed the situation in Germany and Allied relations with the Federal Republic in the light of development since their last meeting in London in May, 1950. They have taken into account in their examination the views which have been expressed on recent occasions by the Government of the Federal Republic.


1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 554-556

During the period under review, the Foreign Ministers' Deputies on the Austrian treaty, meeting in London, failed to agree on the terms of the proposed treaty of peace for Austria. Following a deadlock on the question of Yugoslavia's claims on Austria, the four-power talks were adjourned indefinitely on May 6. These claims, backed by the USSR, included a demand by Yugoslavia for 788 square miles of territory in Carinthia and Styria and $150,000,000 in reparations. The United States position, backed by the United Kingdom and France, was that Austrian territory should be restored intact as it was January 1, 1938, prior to annexation by Germany, and that Austria should pay no reparations. The indefinite suspension of the four-power talks on the Austrian peace treaty was formally reported on May 24 to the Secretary General of the Council of Foreign Ministers by Samuel Reber, United States deputy and chairman of the next meeting. The way was held open however, for the calling of the next meeting when a justifiable basis for continued negotiation was found.


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