Feudal Europe, 800–1300: communal discourse and conflictual practices

1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Fischer

The discipline of international relations faces a new debate of fundamental significance. After the realist challenge to the pervasive idealism of the interwar years and the social scientific argument against realism in the late 1950s, it is now the turn of critical theorists to dispute the established paradigms of international politics, having been remarkably successful in several other fields of social inquiry. In essence, critical theorists claim that all social reality is subject to historical change, that a normative discourse of understandings and values entails corresponding practices, and that social theory must include interpretation and dialectical critique. In international relations, this approach particularly critiques the ahistorical, scientific, and materialist conceptions offered by neorealists. Traditional realists, by contrast, find a little more sympathy in the eyes of critical theorists because they join them in their rejection of social science and structural theory. With regard to liberal institutionalism, critical theorists are naturally sympathetic to its communitarian component while castigating its utilitarian strand as the accomplice of neorealism. Overall, the advent of critical theory will thus focus the field of international relations on its “interparadigm debate” with neorealism.

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-135
Author(s):  
Srini Sitaraman

What is reality? Is reality what we see? How do we tell what is real, and how do wedifferentiate “real” from “false” or uncover the truth in an objective fashion? The searchfor reality or understanding the dynamics of human interaction in an institutionalized settinghas resulted in a vibrant debate in international relations (IR) theory over the metatheoreticalfoundations of knowledge production. Positivists and realists claim that truth andreality can be and have been uncovered by thorough and patient research. Truth is, after all,“out there” somewhere in the real world, and it is the task of social scientists to uncover it.Critical social theorists, however, argue that social science is not akin to physical or evennatural sciences, for human behavior is dynamic and varies both spatially and temporally.“Reality” or “truth” can never be discovered or known completely because of the nature ofsocial activity. Furthermore, there are no fixed foundations for judging what is “real,”“true,” or “false.” Hence, the attention of critical social inquiry has focused predominantlyon the epistemological and ontological foundations of social scientific methods.By concentrating on epistemology and ontology, critical social theorists have shownthe structural weakness of positivist and realist theories. Furthermore, the inability of positivesocial science to go beyond surface structures to explore deep structures of knowledgealso has been exposed by critical social theorists. The unequivocal outcome of critical socialtheory is that knowledge, interest, and preference matter and, therefore, cannot be assumed.The critical social theorist does not focus on the cognitive manifestations of knowledge,interests, and preferences, but rather on how they are formed, created, or constructed.However, despite its ombudsman-like value and importance, critical social theoryhas yet to emerge as an effective alternative to positive social science. Critical social theoryhas remained true to its name and has continued to play the role of a harsh but valuablecritic. Keyman seeks to buck this trend by providing a basis for using critical socialtheory not just as an epistemological critique to challenge the extant theoretical hegemony,but also to deploy it as a “first-order theorizing tool”-an ambitious goal indeed. Hisbook is an attempt to bridge the theory-metatheory gap found in IR theory and, at the sametime, elevate critical social theory to the level of such first-order theories as the muchmaligned Waltzian theory of international relations. The challenge of deploying criticalsocial theory not just as a captious force, but rather as a constructive theory, is a difficultand slippery task. Critical social theory should be able to criticize and dismantle withoutrelying on foundational support (i.e., without relying on positivistic moments). In addition,it also should resist succumbing to the temptation of assuming the discourse of thehegemon, in which the “other” becomes the subject.Keyman attempts to traverse these intellectual minefields by emphasizing the need fordialogical interaction between discourse (object) and subject. The object and subject should ...


2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Bohman

One of the central ideas of both Critical Theory social theory and of pragmatist theories of knowledge is that epistemic and normative claims are embedded in some practical context. This “practical turn” of epistemology is especially relevant to the social sciences, whose main practical contribution, according to pragmatism, is to supply methods for identifying and solving problems. The problem of realizing the democratic ideal under modern social conditions is not only an instance of pragmatist inspired social science, pragmatists would also argue that it is the political context for practical inquiry today, now all the more pressing with the political problems of globalization. Despite weaknesses in the pragmatist idea of social science as the reflexive practical knowledge of praxis, a pragmatic interpretation of critical social inquiry is the best way to develop such practical knowledge in a distinctly critical or democratic manner. That is, the accent shifts from the epistemic superiority of the social scientist as expert to something based on the wider social distribution of relevant practical knowledge; the missing term for such a practical synthesis is what I call “multiperspectival theory.” As an example of this sort of practical inquiry, I discuss democratic experiments involving “minipublics” and argue that they can help us think about democracy in new, transnational contexts.


1988 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nicholson

The Economic and Social Research Council recently published a Report commissioned from a committee chaired by Professor Edwards, a psychiatrist, so that the Council, and the social science community in general, might know what was good and bad in British social sciences, and where the promising future research opportunities lie over the next decade. Boldly called ‘Horizons and Opportunities in the Social Sciences’, the Report condensed the wisdom of social scientists, both British and foreign, and concludes with a broadly but not uncritically favourable picture of the British scene.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Westra

This article supports claims that critical realism philosophy of science, as refounded in the hands of Roy Bhaskar, offers valuable knowledge enhancing insight into the advancement of Marx’s research program. However, it maintains that key principles set out by Bhaskar have not been adequately assimilated by those working with critical realism in the field of Marxist studies. When they are properly considered, they point to the necessity of reconstructing Marx’s corpus on a divergent basis from the conventional form it has assumed since the codification of “Marxism” by Karl Kautsky in the late nineteenth century as an overarching theory of history or historical materialism, wherein Marx’s economic studies in Capital are portrayed as but a subtheory. The article summarily breaks down three cardinal scientific principles elaborated by Bhaskar, which carry the most vital implications for Marxism. These are the bringing of ontology “back in” to theory construction, the robust case made for social science as a capital-S science, and the specification of retroduction as strategy for scientific discovery. It then explores the principles with regard to three abiding and interrelated questions of the Marxist research program: first is the very condition of intelligibility of economic theory; second is the question of the raison d’être for the dialectical architecture of Capital; third is the social scientific implications of the cognitive sequence in Marxism. In this endeavor the article introduces work in the Uno-Sekine tradition of Japanese Marxism. It shows how Uno’s reconstruction of Marxism is closely supported by Bhaskar’s fundamental criteria for science in a way that serves to strengthen Marx’s own scientific claims for his work.JEL Classification: B51, B400


Author(s):  
Milja Kurki

This chapter argues for an extension of how we think relationally via relational cosmology. It places relational cosmology in a conversation with varied relational perspectives in critical social theory and argues that specific kinds of extensions and dialogues emerge from this perspective. In particular, a conversation on how to think relationality without fixing its meaning is advanced. This chapter also discusses in detail how to extend beyond discussion of ‘human’ relationalities towards comprehending the wider ‘mesh’ of relations that matter but are hard to capture for situated knowers in the social sciences and IR. This key chapter seeks to provide the basis for a translation between relational cosmology, critical social theory, critical humanism and International Relations theory.


Author(s):  
J. Samuel Barkin ◽  
Laura Sjoberg

The chapter discusses various ways that constructivism might be defined, and finds in them a tendency to make constructivisms into at once more than they are (by imbuing them with “naturally” associated politics) and less (by divorcing them from their roots as social theory). The chapter builds an argument that what constructivisms have in common is the ontological assumption of the social construction of international politics as expressed in methodology for doing International Relations research. This assumption should not be understood as taking specific ontologies, let alone methods, methodologies, or politics, as definitional of constructivism. Work can reasonably be described as constructivist if it builds on an ontology of co-constitution and intersubjectivity in the context of a particular set of methodological claims underlying a research exercise about global politics. This brackets what work might be called constructivist but does not associate constructivism either with any specific ontology or with any specific methodology.


Author(s):  
J. Samuel Barkin ◽  
Laura Sjoberg

Is there a constructivist–critical theory synthesis? This chapter makes the case that such a synthesis can indeed be found, both in the practice and the politics of the discipline of International Relations. The chapter locates the synthesis both in broader social science debates about social construction and in disciplinary histories of International Relations that see both critical theory and constructivism on the same side of the so-called third debate. The chapter sees the synthesis being expressed implicitly, as a default category for work that does not fit into the realist/liberal synthesis or is outside the neopositivist mainstream. The chapter also sees the synthesis in explicit claims—of nonfoundationalism, of the rejection of metanarratives, or of the embrace of progressive politics. Finally, the chapter sees traces of a synthesis even when critical theory and constructivism are presented as paradigmatically distinct.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1135-1151
Author(s):  
Nick Couldry

This article starts out from the need for critical work on processes of datafication and their consequences for the constitution of social knowledge and the social world. Current social science work on datafication has been greatly shaped by the theoretical approach of Bruno Latour, as reflected in the work of Actor Network Theory and Science and Technology Studies (ANT/STS). The article asks whether this approach, given its philosophical underpinnings, provides sufficient resources for the critical work that is required in relation to datafication. Drawing on Latour’s own reflections about the flatness of the social, it concludes that it does not, since key questions, in particular about the nature of social order cannot be asked or answered within ANT. In the article’s final section, three approaches from earlier social theory are considered as possible supplements to ANT/STS for a social science serious about addressing the challenges that datafication poses for society.


2020 ◽  
pp. 030582982097168
Author(s):  
Michael P. A. Murphy

This forum addresses Laura Zanotti’s Ontological Entanglements, Agency, and Ethics in International Relations: Exploring the Crossroads, a landmark work for quantum International Relations (IR) that seeks to demonstrate the critical purchase of quantum thinking for exploring novel worldview. Interveners question the value added by the quantum turn in IR theory, both as it related to critical and broader debates. Zanotti’s particular intervention – drawing on a wide variety of themes in social theory, peace studies, feminist theory, metatheoretical debates in IR, international organisations, international development, and beyond – is approaches from the perspective of feminist theory, affect theory, temporality, philosophy of social science, and critical theory. In the spirit of exploring the crossroads, this forum brings together different lines of thinking that intersect through Ontological Entanglements but also extend onward, opening provocative questions for future scholarship in critical quantum IR.


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