The Biological Weapons Convention: An overview

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (318) ◽  
pp. 251-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jozef Goldblat

Since ancient times, the use in war of poison and pathogenic agents has been considered a treacherous practice. It was condemned by international declarations and treaties, notably by the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Efforts to strengthen this prohibition resulted in the conclusion, in 1925, of the Geneva Protocol which banned the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, usually referred to as chemical weapons, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The latter are now understood to include not only bacteria, but also other biological agents, such as viruses or rickettsiae which were unknown at the time the Geneva Protocol was signed. (On 1 January 1997, 132 States were party to this Protocol.) However, the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Attempts to achieve a complete ban were made in the 1930s in the framework of the League of Nations, but with no success.

1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (317) ◽  
pp. 208-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Herby

The Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, of 13 January 1993 (Chemical Weapons Convention - CWC) enters into force on 29 April 1997, following the deposit by Hungary on 31 October 1996 of the 65th instrument of ratification. This landmark Convention complements and reinforces the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons by also banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons — as well as their use — and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles. The 1925 Geneva Protocol was adopted following a dramatic appeal against chemical warfare by the ICRC at the end of the First World War. The Biological Weapons Convention, in force since 1975, has outlawed the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons.


1995 ◽  
Vol 35 (307) ◽  
pp. 391-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Parlow

The use of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, and more especially of poisoned weapons (chemical and biological weapons), was banned under the conceptual framework of both the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In the discussions leading to a ban on the use of chemical weapons, diplomats from around the world referred to their use as “barbaric and dishonourable” because of their effect on soldiers or the likely indiscriminate impact on civilians. It is a universal achievement that it is now impossible to conceive of a world that does not show concern for civilians caught up in war. As international attention to the protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts grows, it is accompanied by renewed debate regarding regulation of warring parties' conduct through humanitarian and human rights law.


Author(s):  
Boothby William H

Chapter 2 explains how from its roots in the middle part of the nineteenth century, weapons law has developed during the ensuing one hundred and sixty years into the more comprehensive but still incomplete body of law we have today. The evolution of early treaties such as the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868, certain Regulations and Declarations made in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Gas protocol of 1925 is explained by reference to the authoritative writings of contemporary experts and jurists. The significance of those early writings in inspiring the development of core principles that lie at the heart of this body of law is noted. The picture that emerges is of a body of law that responds, sometimes belatedly, to battlefield events. The emergence of more modern law in the form, for example, of arms control treaties addressing chemical weapons, biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions is charted.


Author(s):  
Boothby William H

Chapter 9 looks at a group of weapon technologies. The long-standing and customary prohibition of the use of poisons and of poisoned weapons is examined first. Then the discussion addresses efforts in 1899 to address the use of asphyxiating gases, pointing out that a prohibition on use was only achieved in 1925 with the adoption of the Geneva Protocol. While that protocol also addressed bacteriological methods of warfare, comprehensive arms control provision prohibiting all forms of biological weapon had to await the adoption in 1972 of the Biological Weapons Convention, whereas similar provision in relation to chemical weapons was not achieved until 1993. Both of these conventions are considered, and the status of the prohibition on use, and of related provisions, in both treaties is analysed. Novel technologies including incapacitating chemical agents, synthetic biology and the use of viruses are also considered.


Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg

The chapter deals with the Iraqi efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. It describes the various projects in each field, their history, the foreign assistance they got, the infrastructure the Iraqis built for them, their achievements and types of weapons the Iraqis produces and their arsenals, especially of the Chemical and Biological weapons. The efforts of the U. N. supervisory commissions (UNSCOM) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to disarm Iraq from those weapons and capabilities to renew the development and production of them by Iraq after 1991. The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds and the Iranian forces during the war between the two countries, and the possibility of using them against coalition forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. The Iraqi efforts to achieve a nuclear device in a crash program before the war in 1991.


Author(s):  
Sheena Chestnut Greitens

This chapter focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It examines the patterns that can be observed in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945, how nuclear weapons have changed world politics, and whether non-proliferation efforts have been successful. The chapter first provides an overview of WMD technology and its spread before discussing biological and chemical weapons. It then considers theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation and the evolution of non-proliferation efforts. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria.


Author(s):  
Mary S. Barton

In May 1925, the League of Nations convened a Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War in Geneva, Switzerland. Six weeks of negotiations resulted in a new Arms Traffic Convention (as well as the Geneva Protocol against the usage of chemical and biological weapons), which representatives from eighteen countries—including the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—signed on June 17. The United States led the way to that moment yet did not follow through on it afterward. The treaty, which lacked robust enforcement mechanisms, languished in national legislatures and never entered into force. Even so, it had a constructive legacy: the compilation and publication of statistics on gun-running. Intelligence based on open and closed sources collected for, and resulting from, the Arms Traffic Conference, indicated systematic violations of the European peace settlements and revealed a world awash in guns.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

Chemical and biological weapons represent two distinct types of munitions that share some common policy implications. While chemical weapons and biological weapons are different in terms of their development, manufacture, use, and the methods necessary to defend against them, they are commonly united in matters of policy as “weapons of mass destruction,” along with nuclear and radiological weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons have the potential to cause mass casualties, require some technical expertise to produce, and can be employed effectively by both nation states and non-state actors. U.S. policies in the early 20th century were informed by preexisting taboos against poison weapons and the American Expeditionary Forces’ experiences during World War I. The United States promoted restrictions in the use of chemical and biological weapons through World War II, but increased research and development work at the outset of the Cold War. In response to domestic and international pressures during the Vietnam War, the United States drastically curtailed its chemical and biological weapons programs and began supporting international arms control efforts such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. chemical and biological weapons policies significantly influence U.S. policies in the Middle East and the fight against terrorism.


1992 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meryl Nass

Is it possible to prevent biological, chemical, and toxin warfare from occurring? The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty banning the possession and hostile use of biological and toxin weapons, already exists; and a similar chemical weapons treaty is currently being negotiated. The older Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the “first use” of these weapons in war. It might seem that the threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction is nearly at an end.


Author(s):  
Tyler Green

Abstract A historical assessment of the use of chemical and biological weapons, Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and the abilities and authority of the United Nations, specifically the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism.


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