The 1941 mission of Frank Aiken to the United States: an American perspective

1980 ◽  
Vol 22 (86) ◽  
pp. 162-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nazi Germany ◽  
World War ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
American Perspective ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
American Minister

Éire was economically and militarily impotent, strategically significant, and the only European neutral behind allied lines in World War II. Although the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, refused to co-operate openly with his protectors in Britain and his friends in America or even to distinguish publicly between them and Nazi Germany, he wanted Anglo-American aid, and he wanted it without conditions. He wanted what the American minister at Dublin, David Gray, called a ‘free ride’On St Patrick’s Day, 1941, de Valera announced that he would send a special agent to purchase American food and weapons and expressed the hope that Ireland’s friends would help the mission. Acknowledging that the war was causing shortages, he repeated earlier claims that the belligerents, blockading each other, were blockading Éire, a land determined to avoid involvement in any ‘imperial adventure’

The United States and World War II in Europe

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve R. Waddell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nazi Germany ◽  
World War ◽  
American Military ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Imperial Japan

With the outbreak of war in Europe, a growing fear of and ultimately a concerted effort to defeat Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany defined American involvement. Competing Allied national and strategic interests resulted in serious debates, but the common desire to defeat the enemy proved stronger than any disagreements. President Franklin Roosevelt, understanding the isolationist sentiments of the American public and the dangers of Nazism and Imperial Japan perhaps better than most, carefully led the nation through the difficult period of 1939–1941, overseeing a gradual increase in American military preparedness and support for those standing up to Nazi Germany, as the German military forces achieved victory after victory. Following American entry into the war, strategic discussions in 1942–1943 often involved ambitious American military plans countered by British voices of moderation. The forces and supplies available made a direct invasion of northern France unfeasible. The American desire to launch an immediate invasion across the English Channel gave way to the Allied invasion of North Africa and subsequent assault on Sicily and the Italian peninsula. The Tehran Conference in November 1943 marked a transition, as the buildup of American forces in Europe and the overwhelming contribution of war materials enabled the United States to determine American-British strategy from late 1943 to the end of the war. The final year and a half of the war in Europe saw a major shift in strategic leadership, as the United States along with the Soviet Union assumed greater control over the final steps toward victory over Nazi Germany. By the end of World War II (May 1945 in Europe and September 1945 in Asia), the United States had not only assumed the leadership of the Western Allies, it had achieved superpower status with the greatest air force and navy in the world. It was also the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Even with the tensions with the Soviet Union and beginnings of a Cold War, most Americans felt the United States was the leader as the world entered the post-war era.

Britain and the United States Neutralize Spain, 1940–41

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-156
Author(s):  
Timothy W. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Civil War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Good Position ◽  
Decision Point ◽  
World War ◽  
Francisco Franco ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Military Support

This chapter explores Britain and the United States' success in keeping Spain from joining the Axis in 1940 to 1941. Spain nearly entered World War II on the Axis side in late 1940. Yet, at the most crucial decision point — in December of 1940 — Spain's dictator Francisco Franco rebuffed the Axis alliance offers. Franco's decision was due in large part to an Anglo-American effort — initiated and led by Britain — to use inducements to keep Spain sidelined. When Hitler and Franco were converging on an alliance, Spain desperately needed not just military support to fight, but also economic aid — to recover from the civil war, survive severe shortages of food, and secure other basic economic necessities. The concerted Anglo-American policy convinced Franco that Spain's economic needs could best be met through British and U.S. largesse, which could only be obtained if Spain remained nonbelligerent. The British and Americans agreed on the goal (to keep Spain nonbelligerent), on the way to achieve it (inducements), and most of all, about Spain's high strategic weight. This produced a powerful wedge strategy, because the duo was in a good position to influence Spain through coordinated inducements.

“First catch your hare”: Anglo-American Perspectives on Indochina during the Second World War

1983 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Sbrega
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
French Empire ◽  
The People ◽  
Colonial Authority ◽  
Complete Restoration ◽  
French Colonial ◽  
Anglo American

During World War II, Britain and the United States differed over the postwar status of Indochina. Although the United States made several strong statements about restoring the prewar possessions of the French Empire, the Americans, especially President Franklin D. Roosevelt, increasingly came to favour an international trusteeship guiding postwar Indochina to eventual independence. The British were not at first prepared to guarantee the complete restoration of the French Empire. With surprising slowness, the British did gradually sponsor the prompt return of French colonial authority in Indochina. British postwar planning had shown how dangerous a hostile or unfriendly France and French Empire could be to the security of the British Isles and British Empire. The British determination to reestablish the French connection coincided with a refusal by Roosevelt to enter any discussions about the postwar status of Indochina. The presidential silence only served to promote Anglo-French colonial interests. After Roosevelt's death, President Harry S. Truman did not challenge the return of French control in Indochina. Ironically, despite the earnest — but seldom expressed — American intentions to underwrite indigenous dreams of independence, the people of Indochina subsequently associated the United States with Western suppression of those dreams.

Bones of Contention: China’s World War II Military Graves in India, Burma, and Papua New Guinea

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linh D. Vu
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Papua New Guinea ◽  
New Guinea ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
Chinese State ◽  
International Status

Abstract Exploring the construction and maintenance of Nationalist Chinese soldiers’ graves overseas, this article sheds light on post-World War II commemorative politics. After having fought for the Allies against Japanese aggression in the China-Burma-India Theater, the Chinese expeditionary troops sporadically received posthumous care from Chinese veterans and diaspora groups. In the Southeast Asia Theater, the Chinese soldiers imprisoned in the Japanese-run camps in Rabaul were denied burial in the Allied war cemetery and recognition as military heroes. Analyzing archival documents from China, Taiwan, Britain, Australia, and the United States, I demonstrate how the afterlife of Chinese servicemen under foreign sovereignties mattered in the making of the modern Chinese state and its international status.

Do We Need a Postmodern Anthropology for Mission in a Postcolonial World?

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Rynkiewich
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Cultural Anthropology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Symbiotic Relationship ◽  
World War ◽  
Fields Of Study ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Abstract There was a time when mission studies benefitted from a symbiotic relationship with the social sciences. However, it appears that relationship has stagnated and now is waning. The argument is made here, in the case of cultural anthropology both in Europe and the United States, that a once mutually beneficial though sometimes strained relationship has suffered a parting of the ways in recent decades. First, the article reviews the relationships between missionaries and anthropologists before World War II when it was possible to be a ‘missionary anthropologist’ with a foot in both disciplines. In that period, the conversation went two ways with missionary anthropologists making important contributions to anthropology. Then, the article reviews some aspects of the development of the two disciplines after World War II when increasing professionalism in both disciplines and a postmodern turn in anthropology took the disciplines in different directions. Finally, the article asks whether or not the conversation, and thus the cross-fertilization, can be restarted, especially since the youngest generation of anthropologists has recognized the reality of local Christianities in their fields of study.

The German Problem: 1945–1950

1968 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Epstein
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
World War ◽  
Narrative History ◽  
German Question ◽  
The Future

Schwarz's study Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik is, in the opinion of this reviewer, the single most important book on the occupation studyperiod in Germany after World War II that has yet appeared. It is not an ordinary narrative history—indeed, it presupposes a good deal of prior knowledge—but is rather a topical analysis of the following problems: the various possible solutions to the German question in the years after 1945; the policies toward Germany of the four victorious powers—Russia, France, Britain, and the United States; the development of German attitudes on the future political orientation of one or two Germanies; and finally, the factors that led to the voluntary acceptance of Western integration by most West Germans even though this integration meant the partition of Germany.

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