Legal Analysis of the Security Arrangements between Israel and the PLO

1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 236-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Calvo Goller

Seen in the context of the Middle East peace process, the security aspects of the Israel/PLO Agreements constitute a small, but important step within this process. Formally, the security arrangements in the bilateral agreements have to be distinguished from the issue of security in terms of strategic needs and arms control dealt with in the multilateral negotiations. However, bilateral security arrangements will in the long run, influence and be influenced by the content of the multilateral negotiations in the field of security. It appears to have become customary in Middle East peace negotiations, that only once an agreement has been reached on a larger issue, do teams of experts deal with the details of security arrangements. This was the case in the negotiations of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, and of the Israel/PLO Agreements. The approach adopted by Israel in relation to Syria concerning the Golan Heights, is also similar in character.

2000 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 198-212 ◽  

In a few minutes I will leave for Norway where leaders will gather to honor the memory of one of the great heros of this century, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin. We will honor him by not only remembering his life, but by pursuing his vision of a peaceful Middle East.


Significance Diplomats from 26 countries attended, including US Secretary of State John Kerry and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini. Its originality lay in the absence of the two protagonists, Israel and the internationally recognised representative of the Palestinians, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), as well as in a clear French intention to put pressure on them and retake the initiative in the Middle East. Impacts Owing to vague expectations and minimal US commitment, the conference was not perceived as the major diplomatic breakthrough once hoped for. The meeting might restart Euro-Mediterranean and possibly French-Arab cooperation on the topic. In the absence of progress in peace negotiations, the PLO will look to more unilateral measures against Israel in international fora.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cemal Ozkahraman

When the third set of peace negotiations between Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerén Kurdistan, PKK) and the Turkish state were announced on March 21, 2013, there was a hope that they would lead to lasting peace in the Kurdish region of Turkey. However, these peace talks, like previous ones, failed. This article investigates whether traditional Turkish policy toward the Kurdish question impacted the peace process, and to what extent Kurdish autonomy in Syria and its increasing role in Middle East geopolitics contributed to the Turkish state’s unwillingness to pursue resolution for a lasting peace with the PKK. The article suggests that, in order to realize a lasting peace, skepticism must be diminished, and Turkey must consider its historical responsibility toward the Kurds.


Author(s):  
Amr Sabet

The saga of the Middle East ‘peace process’ and the fanfare that has surrounded it, obscured the fact that little has been subjected to detailed systematic and objective analysis. Nor has it been sufficiently put to the test of negotiation principles in a fashion that would shed light on its underlying nature and substance. This caveat hindered addressing important questions regarding the very structure of the process and its ability to deliver on its purported promises. It further raises questions as to whether one could speak of a real peace in the making, or whether the whole endeavor is merely used as cant. By cant is meant “a mode of expression, or a cast of thought, of which the effect--irrespective of the motive--is to create a misleading discrepancy between the natural meaning of words and their practical significance...” (Hugo, 1970: 19).


Author(s):  
Avi Shlaim

This chapter examines the landmark series of negotiations between Arabs and Israelis in the early 1990s, culminating in the Oslo accords of 1993. The U.S.-sponsored peace process between Israel and the Arabs was one of the salient strands in the international relations of the Middle East in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. On the Arab side, the principal participants were Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. This chapter analyses the emergence, development, and breakdown of the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the two principal parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict, from 1991 to 2001. It considers the conclusion of the Oslo accord, the implementation of the accord, Oslo II, the Camp David summit, and the return to violence. The chapter argues that the Oslo peace process failed because Israel, under the leadership of the Likud Party, reneged on its side of the deal.


2000 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 174
Author(s):  
L. Carl Brown ◽  
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Keyword(s):  

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Capitanchik

The Israeli General Election of 1996 Has Been Described as a ‘referendum’ on the Middle East peace process, the central issue in the campaign. However, important as it was, the outcome of the election was determined not so much by the issue of peace, as by a change in the electoral law providing for the direct election of the prime minister. On 29 May, for the first time, Israelis went to the polls to elect a prime minister as well as a new Knesset and the result was yet another upheaval in Israeli political life.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document