scholarly journals Friends – of a Kind: America and its Allies in the Second World War Mary E. Glantz, FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Foreign Policy (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 2005, $34.95). Pp. 253. ISBN 0 7006 1365 X. Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003, $55.00). Pp. 407. ISBN 0 8078 2736 3. Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and American Against the Axis Powers 1940–1945 (London and New York: Hodder Arnold, 2005, £25.00). Pp. 291. ISBN 0 340 72026 3. David Stone, War Summits: The Meetings that Shaped World War II and the Postwar World (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005, $29.95). Pp. 304. ISBN 1 57488 901 X.

2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-644
Author(s):  
MARTIN H. FOLLY

The Second World War continues to be an attractive subject for scholars and even more so for those writing for a general readership. One of the more traditional areas of focus has been the ‘Big Three’ – the alliance of the United States with Britain and the Soviet Union. Public interest in the three leaders – Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin – remains high, and their decisions continue to resonate in the post-Cold War era, as demonstrated by continued (and often ahistorical) references to the decisions made at the Yalta Conference. Consequently, while other aspects of Second World War historiography have pushed into new avenues of exploration, that which has looked at the Grand Alliance has followed fairly conventional lines – the new Soviet bloc materials have been trawled to answer old questions and using the frames of reference that developed during the Cold War. This has left much to be said about the nature of the relationship of the United States with its great allies and the dynamics and processes of that alliance, and overlooked full and rounded analysis of the role of that alliance as the instrument of Axis defeat.

2021 ◽  
pp. 593-602
Author(s):  
Anton N. Uchaev ◽  
◽  
Elena I. Demidova ◽  
Natalia A. Uchaeva ◽  
◽  
...  

The article analyzes the specificity of the Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s attitude to the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The study analyzes the frequency of the Prime Minister referencing the USSR in his diary from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945, as well as his reaction to a number of the most significant events of the Second World War associated with the Soviet Union: the German attack on the USSR, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Canada, the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the victory over Germany. In the course of work, both general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, inductive method, comparative method) and special methods (historical-chronological and content analysis) have been used to study the materials of the diary. The use of the historical-chronological method is due to the need to correlate information from the diary with the overall historical picture of the studied period, and the use of content analysis helps to create a more reliable picture of Canadian Prime Minister’s perception of the Soviet participation in World War II. The article has made allowances for the fact that Mackenzie King sought to create his own positive image in his diaries, planning their posthumous publication. But, since the USSR was not a key topic for the Prime Minister (as evidenced by keywords statistics), it can be stated that the leader of the Canadian liberals was quite frank, at least as frank as a person who, in his lifetime, was known as an extremely cautious politician could be. It is clear, that King was well aware of the significance of the events on the Eastern Front. But throughout the war he retained both a negatively neutral attitude towards the USSR (due to its communist nature) and his perception of the Soviet Union as part of Asia and thus a step below the Anglo-Saxon world, which had a higher level of culture and moral principles. The objective reality, i.e. absence of hostilities in Canada, its maneuvering between Great Britain and the United States, and priority of economic and domestic policy for King, explains that a lesser part of his attention was paid to the events in the USSR in comparison with processes associated with England and the United States.


Author(s):  
David M. Edelstein

This chapter traces the deterioration of Soviet-American relations at the end of World War II and into the beginning of the cold war. While the United States and the Soviet Union found common cause during World War II in defeating Hitler’s Germany, their relationship began to deteriorate as the eventual defeat of Germany became more certain. The chapter emphasizes that it was growing beliefs about malign Soviet intentions, rather than changes in Soviet capabilities, that fuelled the origins of the cold war. In particular, the chapter details crises in Iran, Turkey, and Germany that contributed to U.S. beliefs about long-term Soviet intentions. As uncertainty evaporated, the enmity of the cold war took hold.


Author(s):  
Kal Raustiala

The single most important feature of American history after 1945 was the United States’s assumption of hegemonic leadership. Europeans had noted America’s enormous potential since at least the nineteenth century. After the Civil War the United States had one of the largest economies in the world, but, as noted earlier in this book, in geopolitical terms it remained a surprisingly minor player. By 1900 the United States was playing a more significant political role. But it was only after 1945 that the nation’s potential on the world stage was fully realized. Victory in the Second World War left the United States in an enviable position. Unlike the Soviet Union, which endured devastating fighting on its territory and lost tens of millions of citizens, the United States had experienced only one major attack on its soil. Thanks to its actions in the war America had great influence in Europe. And the national economy emerged surprisingly vibrant from the years of conflagration, easily dominant over any conceivable rival or set of rivals. When the First World War ended the United States ultimately chose to return to its hemispheric perch. It declined to join the new League of Nations, and rather than maintaining engagement with the great powers of the day, America generally turned inward. The years following the Second World War were quite different. In addition to championing—and hosting—the new United Nations, the United States quickly established a panoply of important institutions aimed at maintaining and organizing international cooperation in both economic and security affairs. Rising tensions with the Soviet Union, apparent to many shortly after the war’s end, led the United States to remain militarily active in both Europe and Asia. The intensifying Cold War cemented this unprecedented approach to world politics. The prolonged occupations of Germany and Japan were straightforward examples of this newly active global role. In both cases the United States refashioned a conquered enemy into a democratic, free-market ally—a significant feat. The United States did not, however, seek a formal empire in the wake of its victory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 219 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Dr .Ayad Tariq Khudier Al-Alwani

      This research deals with the attitude of the Soviet Union of the war the Korean Semi –Continental during  the years 1950  - 1953. It also treats the historical matters of the Korean issue which is considered one of the most important forms of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States; especially that the strategic spot that distinguished the Korean Semi- Continental had stimulated the great countries such as China and Japan to control the Semi- Continental .Besides the attempts of both the United States and the Soviet Union to exend their leverage to the areas they had controlled after the Second World War; of what led to obstruction of appearance of a united state in the peninsula; therefore Korea had been divided into two parts and Latitude 38 had been put as a separate border between them.


2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-349
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Barilleaux

The single organizing fact of the Cold War was “the bomb.” In our present age of unipolarity, globalization, and the clash of civilizations, it is useful to remember that our current complexities exist only because the previous age of stark simplicity has passed into history. The decades from the end of World War II until the fall of Communism were years shaped by a nuclear standoff. The threat of nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union framed the politics and culture of the age. This framing was especially apparent in the 1950s and 1960s, before arms-control agreements lent an air of manageability to nuclear politics.


1987 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-161
Author(s):  
Dan Keohane

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in an intense and often deeply hostile contest for predominance in the international system. The dedication by each superpower of its most valued technological, engineering and economic resources first to acquiring and thereafter to ceaselessly enhancing a comprehensive inventory of nuclear arms, is an especially prominent and important manifestation of USA-USSR rivalry.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregg Herken

Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks fill in long-standing gaps in historians' understanding of Soviet nuclear espionage in the western United States during the Second World War and Cold War. Scholars are, in effect, finally able to see some of the most notorious spy cases in modern history from the Soviet side. The notebooks exonerate some individuals who were accused of spying—and whose careers were ruined as a result—while confirming the guilt of others. These revelations include an arguably definitive answer to a question that has been the centerpiece of Cold War controversy for more than half a century: whether the renowned American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer was, as alleged at the time, “an agent of the Soviet Union.” The new evidence indicates that he was not a spy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simo Mikkonen

This article discusses the abortive U.S. government effort to organize Soviet émigrés after World War II. After years of a lack of interest on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union, Soviet émigrés and émigré politics came to the fore with the onset of the Cold War. The U.S. government sought to use émigrés in political and psychological warfare against the Soviet bloc. The many studies that have looked at Cold War-era psychological warfare have largely ignored U.S. plans to enlist Soviet émigrés on the West's behalf. Attempts to create a political forum for anti-Bolshevik Soviet émigrés were broader than have been understood thus far, revealing important information about the postwar emigration from the Soviet Union, the émigrés' role in the Cold War in general, and the development of U.S. Cold War strategies in relation to the émigrés.


2018 ◽  
pp. 77-99
Author(s):  
Rósa Magnúsdóttir

Chapter 4 discusses the revival of Soviet-American cultural relations under Khrushchev in 1955 and the ensuing rediscovery of America. With the revival came an unsettling rediscovery of the American enemy: the America that Soviet delegations encountered in the 1950s was very different from the images the anti-American propaganda had presented. This chapter also revisits the veterans of the Elbe meeting. In 1955, the Elbe reunion was the only encounter where the Soviet Union compared favorably with the United States, and that was all thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. This reunion is also a testimony to the growing importance of the wartime alliance in Soviet ideology and how it was used to prove that the two superpowers were able to peacefully coexist.


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