scholarly journals The Army-Navy Contest for Control of Land-Based Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate, 1942–1948

2019 ◽  
pp. 270-295
Author(s):  
George H. Monahan
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War ◽  
Western Atlantic ◽  
War Department ◽  
Military Command ◽  
Post War ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military ◽  
Secretary Of War ◽  
The U.S

In this chapter, George H. Monahan discusses the success of the German U-boat offensive in the Western Atlantic after the U.S. entry into World War II, which led the War Department leadership to believe that the U.S. Navy was not employing adequate antisubmarine tactics. In the application of airpower to combat the submarine threat, the War Department and Army leadership believed that aggressive "hunter-killer" tactics would prove more effective than the Navy's preferred defensive tactic of conducting aerial patrols in the vicinity of convoys. Navy leaders, meanwhile, contended that its defensive tactics were the best method of protecting shipping. A bitter interservice conflict ensued as the War Department sought to initiate an Army Air Forces antisubmarine offensive over the Bay of Biscay. Claiming jurisdiction over all air operations at sea, the Navy leadership firmly opposed the War Department's initiative and insisted that Army Air Forces antisubmarine units operate according to the Navy's defensive doctrine. Secretary of War Henry Stimson's frustration over Admiral Ernest King's refusal to accede to the War Department antisubmarine initiative led the former to support a post-war reorganization of the military command apparatus, thereby ensuring Navy subordination to civilian leadership under an overarching Secretary of Defense.

“Self-Interest Well Understood”: The Origins & Lessons of Public Confidence in the Military

Daedalus ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 142 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew A. Hill ◽  
Leonard Wong ◽  
Stephen J. Gerras
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
World War ◽  
The Public ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
Physical Defense ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
High Regard ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

In recent decades, the U.S. military has enjoyed high levels of public confidence. We argue that the rise (and sustainment) of public confidence in the military reflects two phenomena. First, the public has a high regard for the military and its mission, arising from a shift to a professional (nonconscript) force that is perceived to be competent, fair, and accountable. Second, the public has little fear of military abuses in the domestic arena, owing chiefly to the reduced domestic presence of the military in the post – World War II era, with less emphasis on the physical defense of the homeland; and to the military's careful cultivation of an apolitical culture since Vietnam. We conclude with a brief discussion of the military's efforts to develop and encourage public-mindedness among its members, and the challenges to replicating the military approach in other institutional settings.

From Scotia to ‘Operation Tabarin’: developing British policy for Antarctica

Polar Record ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Dudeney ◽  
David W.H. Walton
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Second World War ◽  
World War ◽  
British Policy ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Antarctic ◽  
Second World

ABSTRACTThe roots of a British Antarctic policy can be traced, paradoxically, back to the establishment of a meteorological station by the Scottish Antarctic Expedition in the South Orkneys, in 1903, and the indifference of the British Government to its almost immediate transfer to the Argentine Government. It was from that modest physical presence upon Laurie Island that Argentina came increasingly to challenge British claims to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands Dependencies (FID), first in the late 1920s and then more extensively in the second world war. This challenge shaped British policy for the next forty years, with further complications caused by overlapping territorial claims made by Chile and the possible territorial ambitions of the USA. Britain's eventual response, at the height of World War II, was to establish permanent occupation of Antarctica from the southern summer of 1943–1944. This occupation was given the military codename Operation Tabarin. However, it was never a military operation as such, although monitoring the activities of enemy surface raiders and submarines provided a convenient cover story, as did scientific research once the operation became public. Whilst successive parties, rich in professional scientists, considerably expanded the pre-war survey and research of the Discovery Investigations Committee, their physical occupancy of the Antarctic islands and Peninsula was essentially a political statement, whereby the Admiralty and Colonial Office (CO) strove to protect British territorial rights, whilst the Foreign Office (FO) endeavoured to minimise disruption to Britain's long-standing economic and cultural ties with Argentina, and most critically, the shipment of war-time meat supplies. In meeting that immediate need, Tabarin also provided the basis from which Britain's subsequent post-war leadership in Antarctic affairs developed.

scholarly journals Jim Crow Democracy: The U.S. South and Racialized Policy-Making in the Aftermath of World War II

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 547-565
Author(s):  
Maarten Zwiers
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
White Supremacy ◽  
Jim Crow ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
Industrial Complex ◽  
World War ◽  
White Southerners ◽  
Military Industrial Complex ◽  
Post War ◽  
The U.S

Segregationist politicians from the U.S. South played key roles in devising plans for the reconstruction of Germany, the Marshall Plan and the drafting of displaced persons legislation. This article discusses how their Jim Crow ideology calibrated the global and domestic order that emerged from the ashes of World War II. Southern advocates of this ideology dealt with national and foreign issues from a regional perspective, which was based on the protection of agricultural interests and a nascent military-industrial complex, but above all, on the defence of white supremacy. In general, they followed a lenient course toward Germany after the country’s defeat in World War II, for various reasons. The shared experience of post-war reconstruction, containment of communism and feelings of kinship between the Germanic people and the Anglo-Saxons of the U.S. South were some of the motives why many white southerners did not endorse punitive measures against the former enemy. For them, an obvious connection existed between the local and the global, which strongly reverberated in the formation of U.S. foreign and domestic policy in the post-war world. The rebuilding of Germany and the fugitive question were shaped on the basis of a Jim Crow blueprint.

Welfare Policy and War in Japan

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Kasza
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Labour Force ◽  
Well Being ◽  
World War ◽  
Welfare Policies ◽  
Labour Unions ◽  
Total War ◽  
Massive Change ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Military

World War II marked a massive change in Japan’s public welfare policies. The demands of total war greatly increased the state’s responsibility for the well-being of its subjects. Both the military and a new Ministry of Health and Welfare generated expansive new programmes despite the absence of pressure from political parties or labour unions. Not only soldiers and their families but also members of the civilian labour force were targeted as vital ‘human resources’ for war. Among the most noteworthy policies were public health insurance, pensions, public assistance for the poor, housing, and pronatal measures. Many policies and institutional changes enacted during the war survived to provide the foundation for Japan’s post-war welfare state.

Legacy, 1926–1929

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Chemical Warfare ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Foreseeable Future ◽  
World War ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.

scholarly journals Review: Screening for vulnerability to psychological disorders in the military: an historical survey

2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
E Jones ◽  
K C Hyams ◽  
S Wessely
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Psychological Disorders ◽  
Target Population ◽  
Screening Methods ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Populations ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Military

Objectives: To evaluate attempts in the military to screen for vulnerability to psychological disorders from World War I to the present. Methods: An extensive literature review was conducted by hand-searching leading medical and psychological journals relating to World Wars I and II. Recent publications were surveyed electronically and UK archives investigated for British applications. Results: Despite the optimism shown in World War I and the concerted efforts of World War II, followup studies showed that screening programmes did not succeed in reducing the incidence of psychological casualties. Furthermore, they had a counter-productive effect on manpower, often rejecting men who would have made good soldiers. Continued experimentation with screening methods for psychiatric vulnerability failed to yield convincing results during the post-war period. Conclusions: Although well-measured variables, such as intelligence, have been shown to predict success in training and aptitude, no instrument has yet been identified which can accurately assess psychological vulnerability. Previous attempts have failed because of false-positives, false-negatives and reluctance in the target population because of stigma. Early findings suggest that psychological surveillance, if not screening, may yield valuable results when applied to military populations exposed to stress.

The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence During World War II

2008 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK GUGLIELMO
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Research Group ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Statistical Research ◽  
Office Of Strategic Services ◽  
The Military ◽  
Military Services ◽  
The U.S

Economists played a crucial role in military intelligence during World War II. Economists working at the Office of Strategic Services estimated enemy battle casualties, analyzed the intentions and capabilities of both enemies and allies, and helped to prepare for negotiations regarding the postwar settlement. Economists working at the Enemy Objectives Unit helped to select enemy targets for bombing. Finally, economists working at the Statistical Research Group worked on a variety of problems brought to them by the U.S. military services. As a consequence of their usefulness during the war, the military continued to employ economists after the war.

The Direction of Supply Activities in the War Department; An Administrative Survey, II

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-498
Author(s):  
John D. Millett
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
General Staff ◽  
War Department ◽  
Chief Of Staff ◽  
General Officers ◽  
Planning Development ◽  
The Military ◽  
Secretary Of War

Interestingly enough, in the extensive consideration given to War Department reorganization immediately after World War I, almost no attention was paid to the possible value of the S.O.S., A.E.F., experience. Three thousand miles behind the A.E.F., in Washington, it may have seemed that there was little to distinguish between the Services of Supply and the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff with its accumulation of hostile reaction.In August, 1919, the General Staff of the War Department presented its version of desirable legislation for the reconstitution of a peace-time Army. The measure provided for a General Staff Corps to consist of a Chief of Staff with the rank of General, five assistants to be detailed from the general officers of the line, five Brigadier Generals, and 220 other officers. The bill provided that the Chief of Staff should have “supervision of all agencies and functions of the military establishment” under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War; and it went on to provide that “the Chief of Staff shall be the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the war program.

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