Mediating Sovereignty: The Qing legation in London and its diplomatic representation of China, 1876–1901

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
JENNY HUANGFU DAY

Abstract In 1896, Sir Halliday Macartney, counsellor of the Qing London legation, detained the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen on legation grounds in an attempt to deport him back to China. Since then, the image of the legation as an ossified extension of a despotic government has dominated public imagination. This article proposes a new way of understanding the legation's action: it exemplifies the legal activism of Qing diplomats in recovering judicial sovereignty that had been compromised by the presence of extraterritoriality and colonialism. Legations represented a broad range of interests of China through diplomatic negotiations and legal mediations, and brought unresolved disputes between foreign ministers and the Zongli Yamen in Beijing to the attention of their home governments. This article analyses the mediation and collaboration performed by the London legation between the various levels of the Qing government and the British Foreign Office. It argues that Qing legations and their diplomatic representation abroad were essential to the construction and imagination of China as a sovereign state.

1981 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-164
Author(s):  
Michael Cullis

…This paper is based on my personal experience during the six years, from the beginning of 1945 until the end of 1950, when I was responsible for Austrian affairs at the British Foreign Office. That period included being what the film industry might call our ‘continuity man’ for the Treaty negotiations in their active phase, from 1947 to 1950. For it is worth emphasizing that, while eight years were to elapse between the start of the negotiations and the actual conclusion of the Treaty, virtually all the real negotiation took place in the first half of the period: after which, another four years and more were to pass without any substantial development over the Treaty itself, until this was with comparative suddenness resurrected, and signed, very much in the form in which it had been left in 1950. My account will therefore give due weight to the initial years when the Treaty was under intensive negotiation, involving as this did several hundreds of meetings at various levels, from Foreign Ministers to experts and specialists, nearly all of which I took part in. (They included a special 4-power Treaty Commission in Vienna, which by a nice coincidence started work here exactly 33 years ago today [16 May, 19801.)


Author(s):  
Asle Toje

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...


Author(s):  
YI MENG CHENG

Abstract A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.


2014 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
pp. 101-123

Confidential note for the British Foreign Office on the framing of the new Constitution of Nepal, c.1958, never sent‘Explanatory memorandum on the Constitution of Nepal’, c.1958Confidential notes on Nepal, April 1958


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-172
Author(s):  
Phyllis Pieper Hamilton

On December 17, 1999 the President of the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration Tribunal, Sir Robert Jennings, presented the representatives of those Governments with the Tribunal's Unanimous Decision (Award) determining the international maritime boundary between Eritrea and Yemen in the Red Sea. In an Award ceremony hosted by the British Foreign Office, Foreign Minister for Eritrea, Haile Weldensae and the Ambassador to London from Yemen, Dr. Hussein Abdullah El-Amri, were presented with the decision regarding the boundary.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-563
Author(s):  
Josip Glaurdić

Could the Western foreign policy makers have done anything to prevent the violence accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia? The answer to that question largely depends on their level of awareness of what was happening in the South Slavic federation in the run-up to war. This article analyzes a string of newly declassified documents of the British Foreign Office related to the February 1991 visit of a high-level British political delegation to Yugoslavia, together with interviews with some of the meetings’ protagonists. These declassified documents and interviews offer a unique snapshot in the development of the Yugoslav crisis and Britain’s policy in the region. They give us a clear picture of the goals and strategies of the principal Yugoslav players and show us what the West knew about the true nature of the Yugoslav crisis and when. The article’s conclusions are clear. Yugoslavia’s breakup and impending violence did not require great foresight. Their cause was known well in advance because it was preannounced—it was the plan of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević to impose a centralized Yugoslavia upon the other republics or, if that failed, to use force to create a Greater Serbia on Yugoslavia’s ruins. Crucially, British policy at the time did nothing to dissuade Milošević from his plan and likely contributed to his confidence in using violence to pursue the creation of a new and enlarged Serbian state.


History ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 58 (193) ◽  
pp. 218-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. CRAMPTON

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