Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asle Toje
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Present State ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Sun ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
German Parliament

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...

IV. The Foreign Policy of Prince von Bülow, 1898–1909

1932 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-93
Author(s):  
Ian F. D. Morrow
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Social Democrats ◽  
Parliamentary Government ◽  
Definite Answer ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Social ◽  
Foreign Office

On 21 June, 1897, the German Ambassador at Rome, Herr von Bülow, found on his table in the Palazzo Caffarelli a telegram summoning him to Kiel. On his arrival there he was greeted on board the Hohenzollern by the Emperor William II with the words: “My dear Bernhard, I'm sorry for you and even more for the Contessina (for this is what the Empress Frederick and her children always called my wife) but you must go to the front. The Man from Baden has betrayed me.” In conversation William II proceeded to explain that Marschall von Bieberstein—the “Man from Baden”—had forfeited the Imperial confidence by intriguing with the Social Democrats and the Centre to introduce parliamentary government into Germany. In consequence, the Emperor added, he proposed to appoint Bülow Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in succession to Marschall von Bieberstein. Bülow was too clever to accept the proffered office at once and contented himself by pleading that, “until I had thoroughly informed myself about our international situation by studying the documents of the Foreign Office, I could not possibly give a definite answer as to whether I could conscientiously accept the post offered to me or not. Besides, I would have to collect my thoughts before I made the final decision, not through any kind of timidity, but because I felt my responsibility towards the country and the throne.”

The Owl of Minerva Flies Only at Dusk?

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-563
Author(s):  
Josip Glaurdić
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Clear Picture ◽  
The West ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Run Up ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
High Level

Could the Western foreign policy makers have done anything to prevent the violence accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia? The answer to that question largely depends on their level of awareness of what was happening in the South Slavic federation in the run-up to war. This article analyzes a string of newly declassified documents of the British Foreign Office related to the February 1991 visit of a high-level British political delegation to Yugoslavia, together with interviews with some of the meetings’ protagonists. These declassified documents and interviews offer a unique snapshot in the development of the Yugoslav crisis and Britain’s policy in the region. They give us a clear picture of the goals and strategies of the principal Yugoslav players and show us what the West knew about the true nature of the Yugoslav crisis and when. The article’s conclusions are clear. Yugoslavia’s breakup and impending violence did not require great foresight. Their cause was known well in advance because it was preannounced—it was the plan of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević to impose a centralized Yugoslavia upon the other republics or, if that failed, to use force to create a Greater Serbia on Yugoslavia’s ruins. Crucially, British policy at the time did nothing to dissuade Milošević from his plan and likely contributed to his confidence in using violence to pursue the creation of a new and enlarged Serbian state.

The Personnel of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 1851–1929

1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Nightingale
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Government Action ◽  
The People ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
The Great War

The connection between public opinion and public policy is slighter in foreign affairs than in any other sphere of politics. In normal times, international relations have little palpable impact upon the life of the people, and are obscured by more vivid domestic issues until war or some sudden crisis throws a high light on their significance. Even since the Great War, although public realization of the importance of foreign affairs has begun to be aroused in the late belligerent countries—in England at any rate—direct contact between popular opinion and government action is still both sporadic and uncertain.What is true of the British nation is almost equally true of its representative assembly. Parliament has but little power over foreign affairs. Some of the most momentous changes in the country's relations with other Powers have, in the present century, been accomplished without reference to the House of Commons, and often without even its knowledge. Like the people themselves, the people's representatives exercise only an inconsiderable control over that branch of public affairs which is at present of more vital concern than any other.Most British foreign secretaries, indeed, regard their actions as matters of exclusively executive concern. A cabinet of twenty ministers, already overworked in their own departments, is not, however, a body which can conduct the country's foreign relations. On his own subject, the Foreign Secretary dominates his ministerial colleagues. Experience shows that he can avoid consultation with all the cabinet save two or three of the principal ministers.

‘I am going through a mental hell’: Political crisis and the Admiralty, August – December 1931

1995 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 377-397
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Young Men ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
National Government ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Eventual Outcome

Austen Chamberlain did not play a significant role in the events leading up to the political crisis or the decision to form a National Government on 24 August 1931. The eventual outcome of those developments, however, delivered a bitter blow to his self-esteem and marked a major watershed in his career. Had the Conservatives won the 1929 election, Chamberlain believed Baldwin would have returned him to the Foreign Office as he had promised. He continued to nurture this expectation throughout the period in Opposition. Even after being struck forcibly by the ‘violent animus against the “Old Gang”’ and the very specific attacks upon his foreign policy in Egypt and China at the Caxton Hall meeting in October 1930, he still consoled himself with the thought that none of his colleagues were excluded from criticism; that the critics consisted mainly of reactionary, disreputable or disgruntled groups (often all three) without ‘many young men of a decent type’; and that such grousing was symptomatic of the frustration engendered by Baldwin's lack of leadership and a natural impatience for youth to have its chance. As a result, he remained content to believe that not only did he still have much to contribute in foreign affairs but that there was no one else with a comparable claim to the portfolio.

The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 1899

1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 682-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clifton J. Child
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
British Guiana ◽  
The Press ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Day By Day

In his note on “The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute,” (this JOURNAL, Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 523–530), Judge Otto Schoenrich publishes a memorandum by the late Severo Mallet-Prevost which, if it were the only evidence upon which the fairness of the arbitration of 1899 could be judged, would bring the justice of the award seriously into question. Fortunately, however, it is not necessary to rely either upon the recollections of Mr. Mallet-Prevost or upon the construction placed upon these and other facts relating to the boundary dispute by Judge Schoenrich in order to learn the truth of how the Tribunal came to make its award. There are the voluminous files of the British Foreign Office on the arbitration to which reference may be made and there is the verbatim record of the Tribunal, taken down by six shorthand writers, printed day by day as the Tribunal sat, and then issued in 54 parts. There are also the files —often most informative—of contemporary newspapers (for the arbitration took place at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the watchful eye of the press).

Blaine, Garfield and Latin America: A New Look

1979 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Allan Peskin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Civil War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
New Look

IF, as has been suggested, a country without a foreign policy is a happy country, then the United States must have reached the peak of its felicity between the Civil War and the turn of the century. Of all the Secretaries of State in that otherwise obscure progression from William Seward to John Hay only one has managed to escape oblivion and capture the imagination of diplomatic historians. That exception is James G. Blaine. Secretary of State on two separate occasions and under three different presidents, Blaine brought to his office not only his personal dynamism but also an apparently well thought-out conception of foreign affairs. Unlike his contemporaries, who seemed content merely to react to events, Blaine appeared to have a policy. The genesis of that policy has been a source of controversy ever since.

Advise and Consent: Parliament and Foreign Policy Under the Later Stuarts

1975 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-54
Author(s):  
Phyllis S. Lacks
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Roman Catholic ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Sun ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Parliamentary Debates ◽  
Catholic Faith ◽  
King Of France ◽  
Charles Ii

This essay examines the role of Parliament in the formation and conduct of foreign policy after the Restoration. My principal interest has been to see how the Members of the House of Commons viewed that role. I have, therefore, focussed on the parliamentary debates rather than the diplomatic correspondence in order to observe the changes and limits of the parliamentary position.These limits can be observed initially in a view of the prerogatives of the Crown. Charles II was a francophile king. He loved the country of his mother; he openly admired the absolutism of his cousin, the Sun King; he secretly cherished the Roman Catholic faith which he associated with successful Kingship. Like his model, the King of France, Charles interested himself actively in foreign affairs. Although not remarkable for diligence and industry in many aspects of government, he was a regular attender at the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The membership of this group fluctuated at the royal will, but always included the two Secretaries of State. Sir Henry Bennet, later earl of Arlington, as Secretary of State for Southern Europe, was virtually Minister for Foreign Affairs for about a dozen years. The King, acting with the Secretaries in Committee, instructed diplomats, who negotiated treaties independently of Parliament. The Triple Alliance of 1668, for example, although publicly known, was concluded while Parliament was not in session. Occasionally, Charles II acted without even these intimate advisors. The classic example is the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670 whose real provisions were kept even from some members of the Foreign Committee.

Dollar Diplomacy in the Light of the Guatemalan Loan Project, 1909-1913

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. H. Dinwoodie
Keyword(s):  
Financial Structure ◽  
State Department ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Central American ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
National Economic ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
American Policy ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Strategic Interest

While historians have shown unusual agreement in their critical assessment of the results of Philander Knox's Central American policy, they have frequently disagreed on the reasons for this failure, as well as on the goals of the Secretary of State. An examination of one of Knox's loan projects — the Guatemalan refunding scheme — throws light on these two issues. The record of this futile four-year attempt to reorganize the country's financial structure reveals a State Department approach relying eventually on the use of coercive diplomatic methods. These techniques were resourceful, but ineffectual, and contributed to an unproductive and acrimonious diversion with the British Foreign Office. The negotiations suggest that the Secretary and other Department officers sought goals broader in nature than national economic or strategic interest. The extent of their objectives may have contributed to the unsatisfactory outcome of the case.

scholarly journals Theorizing a More-than-Human Diplomacy: Assembling the British Foreign Office, 1839-1874

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Dittmer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Communication Technologies ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
Select Committee ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
New States ◽  
British Foreign Office

This article emphasizes the more-than-human nature of foreign policy formation and diplomatic practice, as found in an examination of nineteenth-century Parliament Select Committee testimony regarding the intersection of everyday bureaucratic practice and the material context of the British Foreign Office. These records indicate both how the changing world of diplomacy at this time (including new states and communication technologies) materially impacted the Foreign Office, as well as the affective atmosphere experienced by its employees, through an excess of paper. Debates over how the new Foreign Office ought to be built reveal concerns about the circulation of paper, bodies, light and air in a drive for efficiency. These historical materialities speak to our understanding of contemporary changes occurring within the world of diplomacy, including the rise of digital technologies and the new skills needed among diplomats, as well as inform our understanding of the exercise of power within assemblages.

The Present Status of Neutrality

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright
Keyword(s):  
Present Status ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
League Of Nations ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office

President Wilson asserted in 1917 that “neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its people.” In March, 1920, at its second session, the League of Nations Council affirmed that “the conception of neutrality of the members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to cooperate in enforcing respect for their engagements.” In 1929 the British Foreign Office officially declared that “as between members of the League there can be no neutral rights because there can be no neutrals.” And in 1932 Secretary of State Stimson declared in reference to the Pact of Paris that “hereafter when two nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must be wrongdoers—violators of the general treaty. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of a duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as law-breakers.”

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