Tense and the New B-Theory of Language

Philosophy ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 71 (275) ◽  
pp. 5-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lane Craig

New B-Theorists of language, while conceding the untranslatability of tensed sentences by tenseless sentences, deny that the ineliminability of tense implies the reality of tensed facts. Thus, New BTheorist Nathan Oaklander explains,For a variety of reasons, ... recent defenders of the tenseless view have come to embrace the thesis that tensed sentences cannot be translated by tenseless ones without loss of meaning. Nevertheless, recent detensers have denied that the ineliminability of tensed language and thought entails the reality of temporal properties. ... Tensed discourse is indeed necessary for timely action, but tensed facts are not, since the truth conditions of tensed sentences can be expressed in a tenseless meta-language that describes unchanging temporal relations between and among events.

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-63
Author(s):  
Gilberto Gomes

External negation of conditionals occurs in sentences beginning with ‘It is not true that if’ or similar phrases, and it is not rare in natural language. A conditional may also be denied by another with the same antecedent and opposite consequent. Most often, when the denied conditional is implicative, the denying one is concessive, and vice versa. Here I argue that, in natural language pragmatics, ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ entails ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’, but ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ does not entail ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’. ‘If $A, B$’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ deny each other, but are contraries, not contradictories. Truth conditions that are relevant in human reasoning and discourse often depend not only on semantic but also on pragmatic factors. Examples are provided showing that sentences having the forms ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ may have different pragmatic truth conditions. The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, therefore, does not apply to natural language use of conditionals. Three squares of opposition provide a representation the aforementioned relations.


Author(s):  
James Higginbotham

This chapter outlines the problem of framing a theory of the temporal indicators of natural language in all their complexity and, in particular, of understanding the interaction of linguistic and contextual elements. It describes how the phenomenon of sequence of tense shows that tense logic is too limited, since it excludes the cross-reference typical of bound variables; it suggests instead that the tenses express temporal relations between events conceived as in Davidson. The particular discussion leads to the general question of the form of truth conditions for sentences in an indexical language. The discussion advocates conditional truth conditions, in which an antecedent clause spells out the import of the indexical elements. It goes on to describe two notions of a model for a language with such truth conditions, the notions varying as to whether the satisfaction of such antecedents is incorporated, and thus diverging in their conceptions of logical consequence.


Author(s):  
Rosalind Carey

In what follows, I give (following Burton Dreben) a dialectical reading of his dismissal of metaphysics and of Wittgenstein's objections to Russell in 1913. I argue that Wittgenstein must be read as advocating no particular theory or doctrine — that is, philosophy is an activity and not a body of truths. Furthermore, this insistence is thoroughgoing. Put differently, a dialectical reading must be applied to one's own thought and talk. Characteristically, this sort of dialectical philosophy begins with the question, Is there any definiteness to what I am doing in my own thinking and speaking? Such a question undercuts the easy assumption that what we are doing may be expressed in a body of meaningful statements. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein does not advocate any particular theory of language. A common reading of Wittgenstein is that he aims to prevent us from misusing language. This view assumes that, for Wittgenstein, the notion of a correct, acceptable or meaningful use of language may be taken for granted. In my view, Wittgenstein does not take the notions of use of language and grammar and its misuse for granted. For Wittgenstein grammar underdetermines what it is to use or misuse language. I argue that an ethical critique is implicit in Wittgenstein's objections to any attempt to speak a priori about language and thought.


1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (46) ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Julio Cabrera Álvarez

The notion of "literal meaning" can be considered to be a unifying category, "projected" onto the natural differentiation of uses of language. This precludes the usual ontological expressions, in the material mode of speech, such as "There exists a meaning, common to many occurrences of a term ", and the like. Although a certain theory of language allows the employment of such an unifying cathegory, this is not necessary for determining truth-conditions for sentences in which the term appears. These conditions can be determined, in fact, for each "cotext "; that is to say for each linguistic environment oí the tenn. This is an even morc skeptical approach than Searle's criticisms against tendencies in the contemporary philosophy of language in which he attempts to determine truth-conditions independently from contextual considerations. [J.C.A.]


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-229
Author(s):  
Thanh Ngo

This paper provides a comparative account of the interpretation of temporal relations in Vietnamese and English narrative, using a bi-directional corpus of 3,082 clauses of narrative passages originally written in Vietnamese and their English translations and 3,124 clauses of narrative passages originally written in English and their Vietnamese translations. It is shown that the principles for the interpretation of temporal relations between situations in narrative are similar for both English and Vietnamese despite the fact that English has a well-developed tense system, while Vietnamese is a widely-known tenseless language. The principles are based on the temporal properties of situation aspect and the discourse relations between the clauses, which are elicited from pragmatic inferences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1270-1281
Author(s):  
Leah Fostick ◽  
Riki Taitelbaum-Swead ◽  
Shulamith Kreitler ◽  
Shelly Zokraut ◽  
Miriam Billig

Purpose Difficulty in understanding spoken speech is a common complaint among aging adults, even when hearing impairment is absent. Correlational studies point to a relationship between age, auditory temporal processing (ATP), and speech perception but cannot demonstrate causality unlike training studies. In the current study, we test (a) the causal relationship between a spatial–temporal ATP task (temporal order judgment [TOJ]) and speech perception among aging adults using a training design and (b) whether improvement in aging adult speech perception is accompanied by improved self-efficacy. Method Eighty-two participants aged 60–83 years were randomly assigned to a group receiving (a) ATP training (TOJ) over 14 days, (b) non-ATP training (intensity discrimination) over 14 days, or (c) no training. Results The data showed that TOJ training elicited improvement in all speech perception tests, which was accompanied by increased self-efficacy. Neither improvement in speech perception nor self-efficacy was evident following non-ATP training or no training. Conclusions There was no generalization of the improvement resulting from TOJ training to intensity discrimination or generalization of improvement resulting from intensity discrimination training to speech perception. These findings imply that the effect of TOJ training on speech perception is specific and such improvement is not simply the product of generally improved auditory perception. It provides support for the idea that temporal properties of speech are indeed crucial for speech perception. Clinically, the findings suggest that aging adults can be trained to improve their speech perception, specifically through computer-based auditory training, and this may improve perceived self-efficacy.


1989 ◽  
Vol 34 (7) ◽  
pp. 686-687
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Pulman

1968 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Ehmer ◽  
Barbara J. Ehmer ◽  
John G. Seamon ◽  
H. Harvey Cohen
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