Africa After Kissinger

Worldview ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 22-27
Author(s):  
Daniel I. Fine

Henry Kissinger's main contribution in Southern Africa appears to have been more in the realm of technique than of principle. Critics of the Kissinger era of American foreign policy will find little reason in Africa to stop their criticism. This is not to say there was no achievement. Perhaps that technique, which was refined in the Middle East before its export to Africa, will eventually prepare the way for principle in the Carter Administration. And perhaps not. Much depends on whether Kissinger's fast-moving diplomacy somehow preempted policy based on principle. That may be the price he had to pay South Africa's Vorster for making the "Kissinger Agreement" an immediate reality.

Worldview ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 12-15
Author(s):  
Leo J. Wollemborg

After almost two years of the Carter administration the commitment to human rights, which represents a key aspect of its policies, has become a topic for much discussion and interest but seems still to be inadequately understood. The main reason for this failure, I feel, is that very few earnest efforts have been made to determine the actual scope and significance of the administration's approach as it emerges from the way it operates and from the way it developed out of the principles of freedom and morality that have inspired the best traditions and beliefs of the American people.Long before Mr. Carter announced his candidacy Richard N. Gardner, our present ambassador to Italy, had become one of his closest advisors on foreign affairs, with special regard to human rights. During recent conversations in Rome, Ambassador Gardner recalled that “an active commitment to the promotion of human rights everywhere in the world is not a novel feature in American foreign policy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-551
Author(s):  
André Lecours

The formulation of a policy that will satisfy several values and interests more or less compatible is a classic problem of political decision making. This phenomenon by which there can be, in a foreign policy issue for example, several divergent values and interests was named value-complexity by Alexander George. When facing a value complexity problem, a decision maker must choose some values and some interests over others. The choice he makes will not necessarily be the one made by other decision makers. This can result in a serious impediment to the decision making process. The American foreign policy towards the Middle East faced, for the major part of the Cold War era, a value-complexity problem because it looked to reconcile four hard-to reconcile values and interests. The Reagan government was confronted rather acutely with this problem in the making of its Iranian policies. The administration was split in at least two factions over Iran : one who thought primarily of containing the Soviet Union in the Middle East region and the other for whom the political stability of moderate regimes threatened by revolutionnary Iran should be the most important priority. The existence of these factions, consequence of value-complexity, produced the making and the implementation of two distinct Iranian policies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nilay Saiya

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, it attempts to explain why dispensationalist Christians were successful at influencing American foreign policy during the administration of George W. Bush, particularly towards the Middle East. Specifically, I connect this success to their ties to Washington neo-conservatives, the personal faith of Bush himself and his links to conservative Christians, and their broad cultural appeal and grassroots strength. Second, it will present two brief case studies on the influence that dispensationalism has had on US policy towards Israel and Iraq during the administration of George W. Bush.


Worldview ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 18 (11) ◽  
pp. 11-16
Author(s):  
Ross K. Baker

In a time when idiocies such as the domino theory comprise a substantial part of American foreign policy one has to look hard for evidence that authentic national interest is anywhere being invoked as a rationale for external relations. That the Republic of South Africa seems to be a world power demonstrating innovation in diplomacy and putting shibboleths in their rightful place says something about the genera] bankruptcy of Western statecraft. While Ford and Kissinger flail about seeking justifications for American failures and misalliances, a moldy, outcast regime in Pretoria has embarked upon a path of diplomatic initiative which has effectively breached the wall of isolation that has surrounded it for two decades. The motives of the regime of John Vorster may be sinister and base, but there appears to be a far more sophisticated perception of long-term interests in Pretoria than in Washington.


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