Do mental models provide an adequate account of syllogistic reasoning performance?

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Newstead
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Adequate Account

scholarly journals Mental Models in Deductive Reasoning

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan A. García-Madruga ◽  
Francisco Gutiérrez ◽  
Nuria Carriedo ◽  
Sergio Moreno ◽  
Philip N. Johnson-Laird
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Deductive Reasoning ◽  
Semantic Content ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Linguistic Structure ◽  
The Third ◽  
As If

We report research investigating the role of mental models in deduction. The first study deals with conjunctive inferences (from one conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from one disjunction and the same two conditionals). The second study examines reasoning from multiple conditionals such as: If e then b; If a then b; If b then c; What follows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning from different sorts of conditional assertions, including conditionals based on if then, only if, and unless. The paper also presents research on figural effects in syllogistic reasoning, on the effects of structure and believability in reasoning from double conditionals, and on reasoning from factual, counterfactual, and semifactual conditionals. The findings of these studies support the model theory, pose some difficulties for rule theories, and show the influence on reasoning of the linguistic structure and the semantic content of problems.

Ninth Bartlett Memorial Lecture. Thinking as a Skill

1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. N. Johnson-Laird
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Memorial Lecture ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
High Level ◽  
Mental Logic

There are two conflicting views about the nature of thought: it is invariably rational or invariably irrational. Bartlett argued that thinking is a high level skill, and this idea suggests an obvious third possibility: thought is sometimes rational and sometimes irrational. This view is defended in the present paper, which argues that the doctrine of logical infallibility is either falsified by the results of some experiments on syllogistic reasoning or else empirically vacuous. There is no need to postulate a mental logic of the sort that Piaget and others have proposed. The rapid implicit inferences of daily life depend on the ability to interpret sentences by constructing mental models of the states of affairs that they describe. Deliberate deductions depend on the further ability to search for alternative models that violate putative conclusions. All that you need to know to assess validity is the fundamental semantic principle of deduction: an inference is valid if, and only if, its conclusion is true in every situation in which its premises are true and there is no way of interpreting the premises so as to render the conclusion false. This principle guides the construction of all logics though it is not explicitly stated in any of them. The paper concludes by examining the ways in which people differ in their ability to reason, the practical need to improve this ability, and some of the pedagogical implications of the present studies.

Categorical Reasoning from Multiple Diagrams

2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell J. Roberts ◽  
Elizabeth D. A. Sykes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Multistep Process ◽  
Categorical Reasoning ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Syllogistic reasoning from categorical premise pairs is generally taken to be a multistep process. Quantifiers ( all, no, some, some …not) must be interpreted, representations constructed, and conclusions identified from these. Explanations of performance have been proposed in which errors may occur at any of these stages. The current paper contrasts (a) representation explanations of performance, in which errors occur because not all possible representations are constructed, and/or mistakes are made when doing so (e.g., mental models theory), and (b) conclusion identification explanations, in which errors occur even when information has been correctly and exhaustively represented, due to systematic difficulties that people may have when identifying particular conclusions, or in identifying conclusions in particular circumstances. Three experiments are reported, in which people identified valid conclusions from diagrams analogous to Euler circles, so that the first two stages of reasoning from premise pairs were effectively removed. Despite this, several phenomena associated with reasoning from premise pairs persisted, and it is suggested that whereas representation explanations may account for some of these phenomena, conclusion identification explanations, which have never previously been considered, are required for others.

Figural Effects in a Syllogistic Evaluation Paradigm

2007 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward J.N. Stupple ◽  
Linden J. Ball
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Inspection Time ◽  
Natural Mode ◽  
Integrated Models ◽  
Processing Effort ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First In First Out

Abstract. Robust biases have been found in syllogistic reasoning that relate to the figure of premises and to the directionality of terms in given conclusions. Mental models theorists (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991 ) have explained figural bias by assuming that reasoners can more readily form integrated models of premises when their middle terms are contiguous than when they are not. Biases associated with the direction of conclusion terms have been interpreted as reflecting a natural mode of reading off conclusions from models according to a “first-in, first-out principle.” We report an experiment investigating the impact of systematic figural and conclusion-direction manipulations on the processing effort directed at syllogistic components, as indexed through a novel inspection-time method. The study yielded reliable support for mental-models predictions concerning the nature and locus of figural and directionality effects in syllogistic reasoning. We argue that other accounts of syllogistic reasoning seem less able to accommodate the full breadth of inspection-time findings observed.

The Effects of Externalization on Syllogistic Reasoning

1984 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Lee ◽  
Jane Oakhill
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Recognition Test ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Correct Conclusion

An experiment is reported that investigated the effects of externalization of mental models in syllogistic reasoning. Although there was no evidence that the requirement to “externalize” mental models of syllogisms improved reasoning, an unexpected recognition test demonstrated that subjects’ memory for the meaning of the premises was improved by externalization. In particular, where the correct conclusion had been deduced using the externalization procedure, responses in the recognition test reflected an appreciation of the relations between the end terms of the premises.

Problem Difficulty and Response Format in Syllogistic Reasoning

1995 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 945-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
David K. Hardman ◽  
Stephen J. Payne
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Multiple Choice ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Superior Performance ◽  
Response Format ◽  
Problem Difficulty ◽  
Multiple Model ◽  
Evaluation Task ◽  
Initial Hypothesis ◽  
The Subject

It was hypothesized that the perceived irrelevance of the proposition “Some X are not Y” is a factor contributing to the difficulty of nearly all the determinate syllogisms classed as multiple model by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), according to mental models theory. Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis by showing that subjects frequently correctly evaluate valid “Some … not” conclusions but rarely produce them, even when they have evaluated them elsewhere. Explanations of these findings based on the use of superficial strategies were ruled out. Experiment 2 further supported the hypothesis by showing that performance increased across the no-conclusion, multiple-choice, and evaluation task formats, and that this effect generalized to problems containing the quantifier “only”. However, the initial hypothesis was rejected in light of Experiment 3, which found no difference between multiple-choice and no-conclusion formats when the number of allowable conclusions was controlled for. Nevertheless, superior performance remained in the evaluation format, and it is suggested that offered conclusions may be used as a goal for the reasoning process. This interpretation is supported by the finding (Experiments 1 and 3) that subjects appear to search only for alternative conclusions that maintain the subject-predicate structure of the offered conclusion.

Mental Models vs Integrated Models: Explanations of Syllogistic Reasoning

1996 ◽  
Vol 82 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1377-1378 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurizio Cardaci ◽  
Amelia Gangemi ◽  
Giuseppa Pendolino ◽  
Santo Di Nuovo
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Multiple Choice ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Integrated Models ◽  
Multiple Choice Questionnaire

To compare mental versus integrated models explanations of syllogistic reasoning, we administered a multiple-choice questionnaire containing 19 pairs of syllogistic premises with valid conclusions (given in a C-A order) to 72 psychology undergraduates. Association between our integrated models classification and the empirical difficulty of items was strong.

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