Shared intentionality shapes humans' technical know-how

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrike Moll ◽  
Ryan Nichols ◽  
Ellyn Pueschel
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Philosophical Psychology ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Know How ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
Technological Culture ◽  
The Social ◽  
Technical Rationality

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a “non-social cognitive structure” (sect. 1, para. 1) and they offer an account that aims “to escape from the social dimension” (sect. 1, para. 2) of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which is defined by shared intentionality (Kern & Moll 2017, Philosophical Psychology30(3):319–37; Tomasello 2019a, Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press).

scholarly journals Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis

2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1480) ◽  
pp. 639-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrike Moll ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Social Intelligence ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Primate Cognition ◽  
Social Competition ◽  
Social Intelligence Hypothesis ◽  
The Social

Nicholas Humphrey's social intelligence hypothesis proposed that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great apes with those of young human children in several domains of activity involving cooperation and communication with others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive representation.

Developmental Pragmatics

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Rosenthal Rollins
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Young Child ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Communicative Intention ◽  
The Social ◽  
Early Interaction

This chapter traces the development of communicative intention, conversation, and narrative in early interaction from infancy to early childhood. True communicative intention commences once the infant acquires the social cognitive ability to share attention and intention with another. The developing child’s pragmatic understanding is reflective of his/her underlying motivations for cooperation and shared intentionality. As children begin to understand others’ mental states, they can take others’ perspectives and understand what knowledge is shared and with whom, moving from joint perceptual focus to more decontextualized communicative intentions. With adult assistance, the young child is able to engage in increasingly more sophisticated conversational exchanges and co-constructed narratives which influence the child’s autonomous capabilities.

scholarly journals The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Osiurak ◽  
Emanuelle Reynaud
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Human Populations ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Technological Culture ◽  
Technical Reasoning

Abstract Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not the sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy.

Conclusions

2021 ◽  
pp. 229-236
Author(s):  
Mattia Riccardi
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Philosophical Psychology ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Social ◽  
The One ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

This chapter offers a concluding perspective by considering how Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology compares to the belief–desire psychology widely adopted by contemporary philosophers, on the one hand, and by contrasting (some of) Nietzsche’s most distinctive claims with (some of) those put forward by Kant and Hegel, on the other hand. The comparison with Kant and Hegel focuses in particular on the different claims these three thinkers put forward concerning the social dimension of the human mind, appreciation of that dimension being among the most original and substantial achievements of post-Kantian philosophy. Viewing Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology from that angle helps us to better appreciate its distinctive contribution to that tradition.

How is the moral stance related to the intentional stance and group thinking?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
History Of ◽  
Group Thinking ◽  
Moral Stance

Abstract The natural history of our moral stance told here in this commentary reveals the close nexus of morality and basic social-cognitive capacities. Big mysteries about morality thus transform into smaller and more manageable ones. Here, I raise questions regarding the conceptual, ontogenetic, and evolutionary relations of the moral stance to the intentional and group stances and to shared intentionality.

Social Cognition in Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-249
Author(s):  
Ronja Weiblen ◽  
Melanie Jonas ◽  
Sören Krach ◽  
Ulrike M. Krämer
Keyword(s):  
Tourette Syndrome ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Decision Making System ◽  
Social Decision Making ◽  
Work Done

Abstract. Research on the neural mechanisms underlying Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) has mostly concentrated on abnormalities in basal ganglia circuits. Recent alternative accounts, however, focused more on social and affective aspects. Individuals with GTS show peculiarities in their social and affective domain, including echophenomena, coprolalia, and nonobscene socially inappropriate behavior. This article reviews the experimental and theoretical work done on the social symptoms of GTS. We discuss the role of different social cognitive and affective functions and associated brain networks, namely, the social-decision-making system, theory-of-mind functions, and the so-called “mirror-neuron” system. Although GTS affects social interactions in many ways, and although the syndrome includes aberrant social behavior, the underlying cognitive, affective, and neural processes remain to be investigated.

Collective Human Agency in the Context of Organizational Participation

2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Georg Weber ◽  
Hans Jeppe Jeppesen
Keyword(s):  
Collective Efficacy ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Work Motivation ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Employee Participation ◽  
Ecological Approach ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Organizational Decision Making ◽  
Organizational Participation ◽  
The Social

Abstract. Connecting the social cognitive approach of human agency by Bandura (1997) and activity theory by Leontiev (1978) , this paper proposes a new theoretical framework for analyzing and understanding employee participation in organizational decision-making. Focusing on the social cognitive concepts of self-reactiveness, self-reflectiveness, intentionality, and forethought, commonalities, complementarities, and differences between both theories are explained. Efficacy in agency is conceived as a cognitive foundation of work motivation, whereas the mediation of societal requirements and resources through practical activity is conceptualized as an ecological approach to motivation. Additionally, we discuss to which degree collective objectifications can be understood as material indicators of employees’ collective efficacy. By way of example, we explore whether an integrated application of concepts from both theories promotes a clearer understanding of mechanisms connected to the practice of employee participation.

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