R.P. Barnidge Jr, Non-State Actors and Terrorism: Applying the Law of State Responsibility and the Due Diligence Principle, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008, xvi + 244 pp., UK£ 45 / US$ 90. ISBN 978-90-6704-259-8.

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (03) ◽  
pp. 401
Author(s):  
James Upcher
2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Barnidge

AbstractThis article explores the interface of state responsibility, non-state actors, and the due diligence principle. It begins by examining the various principles of responsibility under international law. After doing so, it closely considers the deliberations of the International Law Commission on the topic of state responsibility. In light of these developments, attention is then paid to exactly what has been expected of states with regard to the activities of non-state actors during the last century. This overview focuses on the due diligence principle, a principle which, it is argued, can be restrictively or expansively interpreted, as the particular facts and circumstances require, to hold states responsible for their actions or omissions related to non-state actors.


Author(s):  
Helmut Philipp Aust ◽  
Prisca Feihle

This chapter sheds light on the role that due diligence played throughout the drafting history of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). It argues that the narrative that due diligence developed as a notion in the realm of the so-called ‘secondary rules’ of the law of state responsibility—before then later migrating into the domain of ‘primary rules’—needs to be qualified to some extent. An exegesis of the mostly overlooked work of the first Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility of the ILC, F. V. García-Amador, shows that due diligence was already a central notion of this field before the ILC took the turn towards redefining state responsibility as comprising only ‘secondary rules’. The chapter demonstrates that, despite the ILC decision to define the notion of state responsibility as objective, not all traces of subjectivity—to which the category of due diligence belongs—disappeared from the work of the ILC.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 331-362
Author(s):  
Antal Berkes

Abstract The League of Nations set up The Hague codification conference that focused, among three specific agendas, on the responsibility of states for damage caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners. Scholarship has dominantly ignored or considered the work of the League of Nations in the law of state responsibility as a failure, starting the story of the codification with the International Law Commission. This article proposes to rethink the dominant view and claims that the League of Nations’ codification process not only initiated, but substantially contributed to the codification of the law of state responsibility, leading to lasting methods, concepts, principles and norms that have been integrated in the contemporary canon of the rules of state responsibility.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARKO MILANOVIĆ

AbstractThis article comments on Jörn Griebel and Milan Plücken's recent analysis in the Leiden Journal of International Law of the approach of the International Court of Justice to state responsibility in its judgment in the Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia) case. The article also provides more general remarks on the law of state responsibility as it pertains to acts of non-state actors. In that regard, it discusses attribution based on de facto organ status and attribution based on direction and control, as well as whether, as a matter of policy, the law of state responsibility meets the needs of the modern world.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter traces the development of the law of belligerent occupation in order to identify trends relevant to the regulation of internationalized armed conflicts. It observes that despite the general grounding of this body of law in a state-centric paradigm, several isolated developments have contemplated the possibility of non-state actors becoming belligerent occupants of a portion of state territory. Moreover, the chapter highlights that the law of belligerent occupation has undergone a fundamental transformation as part of a general trend of individualization and humanization of international law. Therefore, it is no longer simply a brake on inter-state relations and a protector of states’ interests and institutions. Instead, the law has gradually brought individuals’ interests to the fore, putting persons before institutions and individuals before states. Overall, the chapter uncovers the historical reasons that support an extensive view of the applicability of the law of occupation to modern internationalized armed conflicts.


Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

The chapter discusses the philosophical foundations of the current regulation of the use of force. The chapter argues that, in correspondence with the emergence of a sphere of substantive rules protecting common interests of humankind, international law is also gradually developing a system of protection against egregious breaches of these interests. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of the law and practice governing the action of the UN Security Council as well as the law of state responsibility concerning individual and collective reactions to serious breaches of common interests. This system is based on positive obligations imposed upon individual states as well as UN organs, and it appears to be still rudimentary and inefficient. However, the chapter suggests that the mere existence of this system, these shortcomings notwithstanding, has the effect of promoting the further development of the law in search for more appropriate mechanisms of protection.


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