Natural Law, Consent, and Political Obligation

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-92
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Medieval Period ◽  
Close Inspection ◽  
Modern Period ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Consent Theory

There is a story about the connection between the rise of consent theories of political obligation and the fall of natural law theories of political obligation that is popular among political philosophers but nevertheless false. The story is, to put it crudely, that the rise of consent theory in the modern period coincided with, and came as a result of, the fall of the natural law theory that dominated during the medieval period. Neat though it is, the story errs doubly, for it supposes both that consent did not play a key role in natural law theories of political authority offered in the medieval period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the view of Aquinas, perhaps the paradigmatic natural law theorist) and that natural law theory did not play a key role in the consent theories of political authority offered in the modern period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the views of Hobbes and Locke, perhaps the paradigmatic consent theorists).

scholarly journals GROTIUS, DESCARTES E O PROBLEMA DO CETICISMO NO SÉCULO XVII: AS ORIGENS FILOSÓFICAS DO DEBATE JUSNATURALISMO VS. POSITIVISMO LEGAL

2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (120) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Marcelo Araújo
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Rene Descartes ◽  
17Th Century ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Historical Understanding ◽  
Hugo Grotius ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Natural Law Theory

O objetivo deste texto é contribuir para uma compreensão da história do debate entre jusnaturalismo e positivismo legal. Esse debate teve sua origem no século XVII, mais especificamente no contexto do ceticismo moderno acerca dos fundamentos da legitimidade do exercício da autoridade política. As respostas de Hugo Grotius e René Descartes ao problema do ceticismo, como se pretende mostrar, contribuíram para a emergência do debate entre jusnaturalismo e positivismo legal.Abstract: This paper aims to develop a historical understanding of the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism. This debate has its roots in the 17th century, particularly in the context of the modern skepticism about the justification for the exercise of political authority. I intend to show that the answer given by both Hugo Grotius and René Descartes against the skeptical attack contributed to the emergence of the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism.

Bound by the Good

2018 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 241-260
Author(s):  
Leonard Ferry ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Good ◽  
World Order ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Globalizing World ◽  
The Common ◽  
What Matters

Political authority is not eliminable, even if in a globalizing world order the particulars of its exercise might be undergoing a transformation. What matters to political philosophy is whether or not its existence and exercise can be justified. In this paper I begin by contrasting two paradigmatic approaches to justifications of political authority and political obligation: political naturalism and political voluntarism. Having set the stage for the debate, I connect Aquinas’s account of political authority with the former—though one will not find a full-fledged version of that account in this paper (it appears elsewhere). More importantly, I connect Aquinas’s naturalist defense of political obligation to a non-instrumental account of the common good, though the bulk of the paper deals with what I argue are failed attempts to offer non-naturalist accounts of the common good as alternative natural law defenses of political authority.

What the Sovereign Can’t Do

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-198
Author(s):  
Michael Sevel
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Legal Validity ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Oxford University Press

One of the central claims of Larry May’s Limiting Leviathan (Oxford University Press, 2013) is that Hobbes’s theory of law is best understood as a kind of “procedural natural law” theory akin to the one developed by Lon Fuller in the mid-twentieth century. May’s interpretation of Hobbes suggests at least two different views of the role of equity as a constraint on legal validity; neither of them bears any important affinities with Fuller’s theory. May however makes a stronger case that Hobbes and Fuller share broadly similar views about how and why citizens have an obligation to obey the law; the affinities between the two are therefore found in their theories of political obligation rather than in their theories of law.

On the Artifactual—and Natural— Character of Legal Institutions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Legal Realism ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
Theory Of Law

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.

scholarly journals God, New Natural Law Theory, and Human Rights

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 613
Author(s):  
Christopher Tollefsen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Creative Activity ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Full Theory ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Epistemological Dimension

Critics of the “New” Natural Law (NNL) theory have raised questions about the role of the divine in that theory. This paper considers that role in regard to its account of human rights: can the NNL account of human rights be sustained without a more or less explicit advertence to “the question of God’s existence or nature or will”? It might seem that Finnis’s “elaborate sketch” includes a full theory of human rights even prior to the introduction of his reflections on the divine in the concluding chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights. But in this essay, I argue that an adequate account of human rights cannot, in fact, be sustained without some role for God’s creative activity in two dimensions, the ontological and the motivational. These dimensions must be distinguished from the epistemological dimension of human rights, that is, the question of whether epistemological access to truths about human rights is possible without reference to God’s existence, nature, or will. The NNL view is that such access is possible. However, I will argue, the epistemological cannot be entirely cabined off from the relevant ontological and motivational issues and the NNL framework can accommodate this fact without difficulty.

On American Values, Unalienable Rights, and Human Rights: Some Reflections on the Pompeo Commission

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Risse
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Economic Rights ◽  
Declaration Of Independence ◽  
American Values ◽  
Natural Law Theory ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The U.S

AbstractIn July 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo launched a Commission on Unalienable Rights, charged with a reexamination of the scope and nature of human rights–based claims. From his statements, it seems that Pompeo hopes the commission will substantiate—by appeal to the U.S. Declaration of Independence and to natural law theory—three key conservative ideas: (1) that there is too much human rights proliferation, and once we get things right, social and economic rights as well as gender emancipation and reproductive rights will no longer register as human rights; (2) that religious liberties should be strengthened under the human rights umbrella; and (3) that the unalienable rights that should guide American foreign policy neither need nor benefit from any international oversight. I aim to show that despite Pompeo's framing, the Declaration of Independence, per se, is of no help with any of this, whereas evoking natural law is only helpful in ways that reveal its own limitations as a foundation for both human rights and foreign policy in our interconnected age.

Reformist Consent and Political Obligation

1991 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 676-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Plausible Model ◽  
Voluntary Character ◽  
Voluntary Choice ◽  
Consent Theory

It is commonly held that theories of political obligation based on consent, whether express or tacit, cannot account for most people's obligations; that political obligations generally stem from being born into specific societies rather than from voluntary choice. In recent years, consent theorists have turned to ‘reformist’ consent, arguing that consent theory could be rescued if political institutions were reformed to allow the possibility of widespread consent. Various possible reforms are examined and shown to be inadequate. The most obvious mechanism, ‘consent-or-leave’, is disqualified because it is coercive. Other mechanisms would be unable to induce widespread consent while preserving consent's essential voluntary character. I refer to the most plausible model as ‘Hobbes's choice’, though because it must unacceptably limit non-consentors' ability to defend themselves, it too is unsatisfactory.

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