Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Third Law

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.

The Social Contract in Leviathan and the Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame

1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory

The familiar problem of whether Hobbesian men in the state of nature would ever abide by an agreement to obey a Sovereign is a version of the puzzle now known as ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’. The present paper has the following aims: (1) To establish that the game-theory approach is a legitimate way to study Hobbes. (2) To see whether a proposed ‘solution’ to the paradox of Prisoner's Dilemma applies to this example. The paradox is that individually rational self-interested calculations sum to an outcome that is suboptimal not only for society but also for every single member of it. The solution is the Supergame which consists of indefinitely repeated plays of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma game. (3) To compare the results of the above with the similar conclusions reached by a different route by recent arguments in sociobiology.

Designing Practices, Institutions, and Processes

2018 ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Barry Hoffmaster ◽  
Cliff Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Third ◽  
Ethical Design ◽  
Design Solutions

Ethics is embedded in the practices and institutions of society. Three examples illustrate the communal importance of ethical design. First is the distinction between Fights, Games, and Debates as successively more ethical and more intelligent institutional designs for handling conflict. The second is the Prisoner’s Dilemma in game theory, whose best solution is to step outside the game and change the surrounding institutional design. The third is an account of the ethical and effective institutional design solutions for various situations, especially of mediation for those that invoke the notion of ‘polycentric’ problems.

Hobbes's State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.

The Circumstances of Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Better Than

A new account of the Circumstances of Justice, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between the parties of a society, is developed in terms of convention. A standard account of the Circumstances of Justice widely attributed to Hume is criticized, partly on the grounds that Hobbes’ State of Nature and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are situations where the standard account conditions obtain and justice is impossible. These criticisms help to motivate the new game-theoretic account. Parties are in Generic Circumstances of Justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve by all acting so as to contribute to a cooperative surplus, and (ii) each contributing party risks being let down if this party contributes and the others fail to contribute. These Generic Circumstances reflect Hume’s original account better than the standard account attributed to Hume.

The Symmetry Enigma in Hobbes

Dialogue ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Do So

Gregory Kavka has recently highlighted, and attempted resolution of, a possible problem with Hobbes's views on state-of-nature co-operation. The problem, having to do with whether it is rational to abide by one's agreements in what appear to be prisoner's dilemma (PD) or PD-like situations, can provisionally be summarized in this way: A covenant of mutual trust is an agreement in which both parties are required to discharge their covenantal obligation, in sequence, at some time after the contract is made (WM,3,14,120–121,124). Hobbes seems to affirm that it is not rational in the state of nature for covenant-parties who have to perform first—first-parties—to keep their agreements, although it is rational for second-parties to do so if first-parties have already performed. These views on the rationality of contract-keeping generate the symmetry enigma: precisely what is the asymmetry between the situations of first-parties and second-parties in the state of nature that makes it irrational for first-parties to do the cooperative thing but rational for second-parties to do so?

scholarly journals The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Final State ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Initial States ◽  
Quantum Strategy ◽  
Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

scholarly journals Cooperative n-person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandra L. Grinikh ◽  
◽  
Leon A. Petrosyan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pairwise Interaction ◽  
Network Interaction ◽  
The Game Theory

In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.

Puzzles: Noisy Prisoners, Manhattan Locations, and More

1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Nalebuff
Keyword(s):  
Category Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Location Problem ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Optimal Location ◽  
The Third ◽  
Economic Interpretation ◽  
Mathematical Problems

Each “Puzzles” will begin with a few speed problems. These puzzles have answers provided in the same issue. Puzzles 1 and 2 will give you a chance to get up to speed. Then, we continue with longer puzzles taken from two very broadly defined categories: strategy puzzles and theory puzzles. Strategy puzzles will give the readers an opportunity to compete against each other in problems of coordination and competition. The third puzzle, a noisy prisoner's dilemma tournament, falls dead center in this category. Theory puzzles are meant to offer mathematical problems that have an economic interpretation. The fourth puzzle, an optimal location problem, is in this category.

Hobbes, Conatus and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

1998 ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Juhani Pietarinen
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Sovereign Power ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Made In

I want to show the importance of the notion of conatus (endeavor) for Hobbes' political philosophy. According to Hobbes, all motion of bodies consists of elementary motions he called 'endeavors.' They are motions 'made in less space and time than can be given,' and they obey the law of persistence or inertia. A body strives to preserve its state and resist the causal power of other bodies. I call this the conatus-principle. Hobbes' argument for social contract and sovereign is based essentially on this model. He proves that the natural conatus makes people (i) strive to preserve their lives and therefore to get out of the destructive state of nature; (ii) commit to mutual contracts; (iii) keep the contracts unless some external cause otherwise determines; and (iv) establish a permanent sovereign power that Hobbes calls 'an artificial eternity of life.' All this is determined by the fundamental laws of nature, essentially, by the conatus-principle. I also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature does not represent all of the essential features of Hobbes' argument.

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