IGRA UVERAVANJA U VELIKIM GRUPAMA

U tekstu istražujem primenu teorije igara na političke fenomene u velikim grupama (više od dva igrača). Fokusiram se na problem kolektivnog delanja u okviru igre uveravanja (assurance game). Nakon izlaganja opšteg oblika sa dva igrača, pokazujem kako igra izgleda kada u njoj učestvuje više igrača, sa naglaskom na tvrdnju kako igra može da pomogne u razumevanju situacija u kojima učešće jedne osobe u nekoj kolektivnoj radnji zavisi od očekivanja da će u njoj učestvovati druge osobe. Identifikujem četiri ključna elementa za rešenje ove igre – pivot, tip učesnika, životni optimizam i vrsta kolektivnih normi. Politički primeri na kojima pokazujem značaj ovih koncepata su glasanje u skupštini, učešće na građanskim protestima, izborno glasanje za male stranke i pristupanje pokretu otpora. Uočavamo da je za svaku igru dominantniji neki drugi faktor koji doprinosi uspehu kolektivnog delanja i rešenju igre.

E-Perfromance Calculator for Employees in Private Firm

PAS is a basic HRD framework organized and utilized for the general progression and advancement of laborers similarly as affiliations PAS is being used to survey whether agents as various measurements play out their doled out jobs as indicated by the wants for their directors and set benchmarks. PAS is being used to survey whether laborers at various measurement play out their doled out businesses as per the wants for their chiefs and set standards. The information delivered from such execution assessment designer generally help the organization to complete certain definitive and developmental decisional concerning assurance, game plan, progression, prizes, getting ready and end. Father is a key in the hands of people to consider their own one of a kind aptitudes and issues related to their execution. The PA methodology enables manufacturing an imaginative affiliation fit for dealing with its issues and achieving concentrated on business targets.

More than meets the eye – and less: Comments on The Internationalists

These comments address three themes concerning Oona A Hathaway’s and Scott J Shapiro’s The Internationalists (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017), a great contribution to scholarship about international relations, international law and international legal theory. I first explore further some game theoretical themes, how the Peace Pact arguably contributed to avoid war by creating institutions – such as international courts – that helped stabilise an assurance game among states by providing trustworthy information and commitments, in turn influencing practices and beliefs concerning mutual non-aggression. Second, I suggest that the authors should not claim more than that the Peace Pact was one cause of the massive shift in reduced warfare. Further arguments are needed to show that this treaty was the trigger that ‘began a cascade’. Third, I suggest that the lessons for the future are limited, as we explore how to preserve and improve on the New World Order of the Pact, rather than backsliding into the Old World Order.

The Hare Question in Assurance Games: Practical Problems and Insights From Robotic Surgery

We examine in this article a frequently overlooked, if not ignored, premise underlying the canonical assurance game model: Hunters could potentially bag more than a single hare (or two) in place of the prized stag. Whether a risk-dominant equilibrium is necessarily inefficient or inferior to one that is assumed to be payoff-dominant is the question we seek to address. In doing so, we suggest plausible variations of the model with different game-theoretic realizations. Single-play illustrations drawn from robotic surgery underscore their practical implications for health care economics and management. The robotic technology revolution amplifies the rational and interactive choices available to players under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Like the canonical model, our illustrations involve insulated, self-interested actions arising from the presence or absence of trust and coordination among players. They differ from the canonical model by allowing for multiple, potentially cooperative equilibrium payoffs. Any cooperative action can be considered optimal if players coordinated on it, taking fully into account the quantifiable and multiplicable value of their second best strategies. Nonetheless, we suggest that any dominant solution/s should accommodate best evidence in health care to provide patients with the most suitable treatments and services. There lies the challenge in reconciling theory and practice in health economics. JEL Classifications: C70, C71, I11, I12

Let Me Help You Help Me

This chapter develops the view that interpersonal trust cannot be fully understood by the lights of rational decision theory or social norms and preferences. Trust is a dilemma because the person deciding whether to trust must reconcile the conflicting demands of own well-being with the demands of prosociality. This chapter considers three types of social situation of (inter)dependence: the dictator game, which is played unilaterally, the assurance game, which is played bilaterally and simultaneously, and the trust game proper, which is played bilaterally and sequentially. Findings show that the dictator game, which models the situation of the person being trusted, is ill-suited to isolate social preferences. Empirical results may over- or underestimate the willingness to share. A simulation shows that individuals’ social preferences rarely predict the distribution of wealth. Analysis of the assurance game (or “stag hunt”) and the trust game proper yield similar results.