Xi Jinping Overhauls the People’s Liberation Army

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 68-78
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

The overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army will move it away from its Soviet-style command and control structures towards the American model, which is believed to be more adapted to the new security environment and facilitates long distance power projection to protect China’s far-flung national interest abroad. The Communist Party’s organisational presence is reaffirmed to ensure the loyalty of the military as the Party considers it the ultimate source of its power and final defence of its rule.

2014 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Zhiyue BO

Since he became commander-in-chief in November 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted altogether 11 generals in three batches. The promotion of the third batch came in the shadow of expelling Xu Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member, from the Party. In the future, Xi Jinping will have to strike a balance between the anti-corruption campaign in the military and the establishment of a core support group in the People's Liberation Army.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 939-942
Author(s):  
Victor V Apollonov

Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a meeting with delegates of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) during the last session of the National People's Congress (NPC), demanded the introduction of scientific discoveries and innovative technologies in the army. Xi Jinping noted that new technologies are the key to modernizing the Armed Forces. The Chinese leader discussed with the military how to achieve the goals set in the field of national defense and army development and the implementation of the 13th five-year plan for the development of the armed forces. It is safe to say that Laser Weapons (LW) are on the agenda of China/1/


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1891
Author(s):  
Todor Kalinov

Management and Command253 are two different words and terms, but military structures use them as synonyms. Military commanders’ authorities are almost equal in meaning to civilian managers’ privileges and power. Comparison between military command and the civilian management system structure, organization, and way of work shows almost full identity and overlapping. The highest in scale and size military systems are national ministries of defense and multinational military alliances and coalitions. Military systems at this level combine military command structures with civilian political leadership and support elements. Therefore, they incorporate both military command and civilian management organizations without any complications, because their nature originated from same source and have similar framework and content. Management of organizations requires communication in order to plan, coordinate, lead, control, and conduct all routine or extraordinary activities. Immediate long-distance communications originated from telegraphy, which was firstly applied in 19th century. Later, long-distance communications included telephony, aerial transmitting, satellite, and last but not least internet data exchange. They allowed immediate exchange of letters, voice and images, bringing to new capabilities of the managers. Their sophisticated technical base brought to new area of the military command and civilian management structures. These area covered technical and operational parts of communications, and created engineer sub-field of science, that has become one of the most popular educations, worldwide. Communications were excluded from the military command and moved to separate field, named Computers and Communications. A historic overview and analysis of the command and management structures and requirements shows their relationships, common origin, and mission. They have significant differences: management and control are based on humanities, natural and social sciences, while communications are mainly based on engineering and technology. These differences do not create enough conditions for defragmentation of communications from the management structures. They exist together in symbiosis and management structures need communications in order to exist and multiply their effectiveness and efficiency. Future defragmentation between military command and communications will bring risks of worse coordination, need for more human resources, and worse end states. These risks are extremely negative for nations and should be avoided by wide appliance of the education and science among nowadays and future leaders, managers, and commanders.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Nan LI

The fear of political vulnerability stemming from an over-reliance on the military for containing COVID-19 led the civilian leadership to deploy the level and type of military support that were deliberately measured and technically specialised; the timings of this support were also carefully planned. The concern about COVID-19 causing significant infections among PLA (People’s Liberation Army) ranks that may hamper PLA response to the perceived external security challenges also proved to be premature.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 299-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellis Joffe

It is axiomatic among observers that in the transition to the post-Deng era, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will play a pivotal role. This is understandable. Until now, the army has been a central force in Chinese politics owing to the unique Party-army relationship that has existed since the founding of the Communist regime. Although this relationship will change in the near future, the importance of the military will not: they will remain indispensable backers of the new leadership. This is because they command the forces which may be used to determine the outcome of an elite power struggle, displace rebellious local figures, put down a mass uprising or even carry out a coup.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 40-52
Author(s):  
Nan LI

Appointing new Central Military Commission (CMC) members and chiefs of People’s Liberation Army services and theatres is to (i) ensure political loyalty by appointing people Xi Jinping knows well and trusts personally; (ii) promote functional and technical expertise-based professionalism; (iii) enhance CMC chair’s political control by reducing CMC size and increasing proportion of political officers in CMC; and (iv) enforce age requirements.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 315-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Teufel Dreyer

In early 1975, in a speech to the cadres of the headquarters of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Deng Xiaoping delivered his blueprint for the military of the future. The radical restructuring of the military and its officer corps that it entailed was purportedly proposed by Mao Zedong himself. However, the fact that the speech was not made public until 1983, allegedly because it had been suppressed by the Gang of Four, makes it more likely that the architect of the reorganization, with its far-reaching implications for the PLA's officer corps, was Deng himself. Two decades later, at the close of the Deng era, it is important to examine the thrust of this document in assessing trends for the officer corps of the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 24-37
Author(s):  
Nan LI

Restructuring has empowered Xi to control the People’s Liberation Army by dismantling general departments and requiring new Central Military Commission agencies to report to him directly; by separating monitoring agencies from performing agencies to enhance "checks and oversight"; and by dividing powers for "construction" and for "operations" between services and theatres. Restructuring has also divested regional headquarters of responsibility of running army units. This enables theatres to become genuinely multi-service, laying the basis for joint operations.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 10-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This article examines the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It argues that while the PLA remains politically loyal to the CCP, there is evidence of important changes in the institutional relationship between the two institutions. The partyarmy relationship is no longer as intertwined and symbiotic as it has historically been; rather, this article argues that there is evidence of a 'bifurcation' between the two. The catalysts for this change have been the professionalization and relative depoliticization of the military, as well as the leadership transition in the CCP. These changes raise important and central issues for the future of Chinese politics.*


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