Covid-19 as a Non-Military Threat: Implementation of State Defense for Civil Servants in Indonesia

Indonesia is one of the countries affected by the Covid-19 pandemic and its spread is still ongoing. The Covid-19 pandemic has affected government policy making and services both at the central and regional levels. The government is required to continue to take various steps to adapt to developments caused by this pandemic. The purpose of this study includes the efforts of the Civil Servants as one of the elements of the National Defense Reserve Component in dealing with Covid-19 as a non-military threat. The method used in this research is qualitative with research design using literature study. The research data were taken from journals, books, previous research, scientific articles, literature and news from official websites and the research subject was the Civil Servants. The results of the research are that the Civil Servants as a government apparatus should be a pioneer and take part at the forefront of every effort to defend the country, according to their respective fields and responsibilities. In the implementation of defending the state in the daily work of the Civil Servants in the form of love for the homeland, being aware of the nation and state, namely Pancasila as the ideology of the State, willing to sacrifice for the nation and the State, having the initial ability to defend the State.

Westerners Underestimate Global Inequality

Most global inequality is between-countries, but inequality perceptions have mostly been investigated within-country. Five studies (total N = 2149, four preregistered) show that Westerners (U.S. American, British, and French participants) believe that developing and middle-income countries’ GDP per capita is much closer to developed countries’ than it actually is, and that people in developing and middle-income countries have higher rates of car ownership, larger houses, and eat out more frequently than they actually do, meaning that Westerners underestimate global inequality. This misperception is underpinned by a convergence illusion: the belief that since the 1990s, poorer countries have closed the economic gap with richer countries to a larger extent than they have. Further, overestimating GDP per capita is negatively correlated with support for aid to the target country and positively correlated with a country’s perceived military threat. We discuss implications for inequality perception and for global economic justice.

NAVAL SHIP STABILITY GUIDELINES: DEVELOPING A SHARED VISION FOR NAVAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT

Surface combatants are required to operate in conditions of high military threat and be capable of deployment to any area of conflict or crisis at any time. This requirement calls for the vessel and crew to be capable of safely contending with the full range of environmental conditions that may be encountered while pursuing their primary objective. Achieving and maintaining this capability is strongly influenced by the application of naval stability standards, many of which have a common origin, based on experiences from the World War II and before. Although such standards have apparently served the navies admirably over many years, there are many reasons to question their limitations and applicability in the context of modern ship design and procurement. This paper presents the efforts to date of the Naval Stability Standards Working Group to investigate the relationship between existing intact stability standards and capsize risk with respect to frigate forms.

Military force structures in small states: Providing for relevant and credible military capability

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

Military force structures in small states: Providing for relevant and credible military capability

<p>Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability. The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.</p>

Acceptance of Swedish Protection by J. Radziwill in 1655: Contemporaries’ Assessments and Hetman’ Motives

The article highlights the perception and assessments of contemporaries of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Janusz Radziwill's acceptance of Swedish protection in 1655 and examines the reasons for such a step by the Hetman through the prism of his own vision and understanding of the then difficult situation of the principality and ways out. It is determined that after the attack of Swedish troops on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the summer of 1655, the situation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania deteriorated sharply, as its territory became the epicenter of military confrontation (at the same time the war with the Moscow state). In such a situation, J. Radziwill and part of the political elite considered the adoption of Swedish protection to be an effective means of saving the principality. It is established that his step provoked the accusation of contemporaries of betraying the Commonwealth and King Jan Casimir. It was found that the important reason for J. Radziwill's acceptance of Swedish protection was the lack of support from Warsaw in the face of a military threat to the principality from Sweden and Muscovy, and thus the impossibility of fighting them at the same time. The factor that prompted the hetman to take such a step was the capture of Vilna by Russian troops and the capitulation of the crown army near Uyscem in late July 1655. On the one hand, Lithuania's acceptance of the protection of the Swedish monarch threatened the integrity of the Commonwealth, which according to the results of the Union of Lublin in 1569 was proclaimed a state of two components – the Crown and Lithuania. However, on the other hand, given the fact that Lithuania was left alone with the military aggression of Muscovy and Sweden, it was an attempt to save the principality and strengthen its political influence.

PERTAHANAN NEGARA, REALITAS SOSIAL KEAGAMAAN, DAN ANCAMAN NON MILITER DI YOGYAKARTA

The concept and strategy of national security of Indonesia includes the resilience of all areas of the country against military and non-military threats. From a sociological perspective, non-military threats exist in a dynamic social and environmental world and are constantly changing in form. Non-military threats have a broader dimension, including ideological, social, economic, cultural, political, information technology and public safety. Various facts about regional conditions and socio-religious dynamics in the Special Region of Yogyakarta are indicators that show a source of problems as a potential non-military threat. The following article on the results of field research using qualitative methods contains interpretive descriptions of the various non-military threats in Indonesia that originate from socio-religious facts, by taking a case study in Yogyakarta

Depictions of Egypt in the Book of Hosea and Their Implications for Dating the Book

Traditionally, the oracles contained in the book of Hosea, at least in their earliest forms, have been dated prior to the fall of the Northern Kingdom at the hands of the Assyrians. In a previous essay, I argued that there is evidence that would suggest that at least some of the oracles date a few decades later, to the reign of the Assyrian King Sennacherib. On the basis of Hosea’s presentation of Egypt both as a potential source of help and as a military threat, the present essay argues that Hosea’s oracles make more sense in the final decade of the eighth century, after Samaria’s fall, than before the Assyrian conquest of the Northern Kingdom, as most scholars have traditionally assumed.

Examining the Capacity of Indonesia’s Defense Entities on Countering Radicalism

Radicalism for the last few decades has hampered the people and national security building of Indonesia. Contemporary global and regional constellations develop an unprecedented scale of impact radicalism as well as its tractability. The formal categorization of radicalism as an ideology based-non-military threat reflects an imperative mandate for Indonesian defense entities to review and formulate relevant and comprehensive alleviation strategies to address the radicalism. However, this urgency does not appear to have been embodied in at least two points in our opinion: the perception among associated institutions barely aware of the significance of synergy and coordination and second, a minor portion of the countering of radicalism in the frame of the roadmap for Indonesia's national defense development. This research examines the perceptions of relevant defense stakeholders in Indonesia regarding radicalism and its current approach as well as the formulation of strategies that have been implemented or designed to maintain the existence of Indonesian nationalism. We collected information and data through both documentation studies and interviews with representative officials from the relevant ministries, military, and state agencies and then compiled it descriptively. By examining the perceptions of each research object as well as the construction of the strategy that has been rolled out, we conclude the Indonesian defense entities have yet significant, comprehensive, and sustainable strategies addressing the threat of radicalism.

THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMY (TNI) IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

<p>Terrorism that occurs both in the world and in Indonesia is a crime that cannot be classified as an ordinary crime, academically categorized as an extraordinary crime. Actions of terrorism in Indonesia can already be classified as a military threat, namely threats that use armed force, are organized and are considered to have capabilities that endanger state sovereignty. The role of The Indonesian National Army task in overcoming these acts of terrorism has not been effective. The research objective is to provide government input on the importance of The Indonesian National Army role in overcoming the threat of terrorism. Research using qualitative methods is aimed at understanding social phenomena from the perspective of the participants. The results achieved were that legally, the military could also be deployed to combat terrorism both from the aspect of domestic law and in the provisions of international law.</p>