On the Beginnings of the Communal Movement in the Holy Land: The Commune of Tyre

Traditio ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 443-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Eberhard Mayer

In a revolutionary paper read in the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities in 1965, the foremost expert on the history of the crusaders' states, Joshua Prawer, has completely altered our outlook on, and considerably enlarged our knowledge of, the medieval communes established in the Holy Land during the time of the crusaders. This is not the place to discuss the merits of Prawer's paper in all details, especially as I have done this briefly elsewhere. Let it suffice here to say that by placing the history of the communes in the general context of the institutional history of the Latin Orient rather than by viewing them as isolated phenomena, as had been done by the late and regretted John L. La Monte, Prawer demonstrated ably and beyond any doubt that in the constitutional history of the Latin Kingdom and of the crusaders' states in general there were definite traces of Estates, elements of a development towards a Ständestaat This transition from a strong monarchy to a representative system of Estates, which is so familiar in European history, is hard to detect in the history of the Latin Orient because the reconquest of the Holy Land by the Muslims cut short this line of constitutional development. Thus, although the weakness of the monarchy in the thirteenth century was clearly seen, a true representative system never came into being in the East. But Prawer showed that the crusaders' states were well on their way towards such a goal and that from about A.D. 1240 the masters of the knightly orders and the administrative heads of the exempted Italian merchant colonies, as well as representatives of the urban brotherhoods (fraries), took part in the proceedings of the Haute Cour, the highest body of legislation and jurisdiction, although they did not formally vote. Under the procedure followed in the Haute Cour, the nobility debated separately and afterwards notified the representatives of the orders, the merchants, and the urban Frankish population of their decisions. But it is obvious that the latter by their mere presence must have influenced the proceedings because it was the orders, the merchants, and the bourgeois who controlled the military establishment and the economy. The fraternities, like any reasonably organized group, became part and parcel of the institutional framework of the state. In all likelihood Prawer's final conclusion is correct: had the crusaders' states survived for another hundred years, these representatives would have been transformed from advisory groups into well established and separate Estates with full power to vote in the Haute Cour.

Traditio ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 317-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. J. Forey

The most outstanding event in the history of the military orders at the end of the thirteenth and start of the fourteenth centuries was, of course, the dissolution of the Temple. This was not, however, an isolated happening. Although the accusations which led to the abolition of that order had been publicly voiced only shortly before the Templars‘ arrest, the proceedings against the Temple took place at a time when criticism of the military orders in general was mounting, and this growth of hostile opinion no doubt facilitated Philip IV's attack on the Templars. Ever since their foundation the military orders had been subjected to some criticism, but much early censure had been of a kind which might be directed against any religious establishment, especially by members of the secular clergy who found that their authority and resources were being impaired by the privileges which the military orders and other religious institutions enjoyed: it was not primarily concerned with the orders’ contribution to the struggle against the infidel. But as the fortunes of the crusading states declined, the military orders became increasingly criticised for their inadequacies as defenders of Christendom. Defeat in the Holy Land had to be explained by faults on the Christian side rather than in terms of Muslim superiority, and the military orders were an obvious target for attack. The authors of the numerous crusading proposals which were put forward in the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries were inevitably influenced by this growing criticism, and many crusading plans therefore included suggestions concerning the military orders. Those who drew up proposals did not themselves provide a reasoned or detailed account of the orders' faults or attempt to judge to what extent these failings contributed to Christian defeats, but the criticisms on which they based their plans were clearly not altogether groundless: although some strictures were ill-informed or excessive, the policies which the orders themselves pursued certainly provided a starting-point for the growth of hostile opinion. Yet some writers did not seek merely to remedy existing defects in the orders; they sought also to discuss what the role of the military order should be in the struggle against the infidel, and thus viewed the subject in a rather wider context.


1973 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham F. Lowenthal

Several years ago, in a general essay on Dominican politics, I wrote a few pages about the political role of the Dominican Armed Forces. I argued that “the history of the past few years in the Dominican Republic may best be viewed as a constant struggle among changing alliances, not in terms of confrontation between civilian authority and the military establishment” (Lowenthal, 1969: 40). I suggested that “far from being a professional institution dedicated to certain principles that impel its occasional entry into politics, the Dominican Armed Forces have never had any significant function beyond politics, except for plunder” (Lowenthal, 1969: 40). Painting a picture of constant struggle within the Dominican Armed Forces, for power and a chance at the spoils, I played down the importance, for understanding the political role of Dominican military officers, of institutional and ideological considerations.


1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (4II) ◽  
pp. 281-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Shafqat

Democracy as a system of governance and interest representation demands respect for dissent and opposition. It recognises the principle of majority rule and guarantees protection of minorities. Democracy also builds faith in electoral contestation to gain public office and gives legitimacy to political parties as primary instruments for acquisition and transfer of power from one set of individuals to another. Unfortunately, despite the significance of the above elements, no serious studies have been undertaken on Pakistan’s experimentation with democracy. Given a history of weak party system and prolonged military rule, most of the studies focus on the military, political parties, constitutional history, or in a descriptive way, attribute the failure of democracy to the inadequacies of the politicians [Ahmed (1987); Rizvi (1987); Callard (1957) and Afzal (1976)]. It is only recently that some theoretically meaningful and rigorous empirical writings have appeared on elections, procedures and practices of electoral contestation and on problems of transition from authoritarian regimes towards democracy [Waseem (1989); Wilder (1995); Talyor (1992); Rais (1997) and Shafqat (1997)].


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Shazia Sultan ◽  
Tahira Jabeen

This paper deals with the troublesome history of Pakistan Judiciary in comparative perspective. The judicial restraint showed by the superior courts in the initial phase of Pakistan’s emergence and its failure in the enactment of extra-constitutional deeds of Military Generals and executive heads that troubled the smooth political and constitutional progress has been highlighted. The paper throws light on the struggle of the Judiciary for its independent status in the defiance of the military establishment in 2007 that catapulted the Judiciary as main stakeholder in the governmental power structure of the state. The key role played by Supreme Court in the defense of democratic norms, rule of law, corruption free politics and transparent governance has also ben focused.  Overstepping of judiciary in executive matters in Justice Saqib Nisar is also the part of this investigation. Nonetheless empowering the public representative to legislate on the matter of the tenure extension of the COAS (Chief of Army Staff) has also been discussed along with the decision of special court and then High court in the treason case of Musharraf that raise is the part of this paper. The paper concludes that hurdles in the way to independent judiciary desperately needed to be removed for the dispensation of justice.


Author(s):  
Alem Kebede

The history of the military in Ethiopia is a social history. There is no surprise here. Military institutions are social constructs whose structure and functions in each society can only be understood contextually. Because the Ethiopian military has emerged as a relatively independent institution after World War II, its nature, and role in the political order, has been impacted by structural conditions—including the interplay between tradition and modernity, the rise of the middle class, authoritarian culture and political makeup, interethnic tensions, chronic economic problems, and geopolitical conditions. Nevertheless, while being constrained by these factors and processes, the military, like other political actors in the country, has not acted as a passive spectacle; instead, members of the military have played an essential role in the perpetuation and unmaking of political regimes. Within the three administrations that have surfaced during the last nine decades, the role of the Ethiopian military in the political order has ranged from soft to active intervention. However, in all these regimes, military power has invariably undermined people power. The most extreme of all the regimes was the military establishment of 1974–1991. Under this palpably authoritarian government, to the extent that the distinction between military and civilian rule was blurred, the army was involved in politics more than its due share. During the imperial era (1930–1974), on the other hand, the emperor, who cherished his power (with no pretense for democratic governance) more than his outspoken commitment to the idea of progress, made the military subservient to his bidding while forcing it to remain politically indifferent. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime (1991–present) shared similar attributes with the imperial government in its recognition (at least theoretically) of the distinction between military and civilian rule. Here too the military was the strong arm of the incumbent. Despite its fervent claim for political and cultural pluralism, the EPRDF used the military to defend its “democratic” authoritarian interests. The lesson to be learned from this social history of the military is clear: Ethiopia needs a proper military–civil relationship, along with institutional mechanisms that counterweight against the military’s detrimental intervention in political affairs, for it to materialize the potential of its people and create a well-ordered, just society.


1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-494
Author(s):  
Robert Strausz-Hupe

Millions of men stand under arms to defend democracy Their weapons are fashioned by scientific technology which, now as always before, has placed its highest ingenuity at the service of its most important client: the military establishment. The state, the schools and the mass media do not shirk the task of indoctrination: they have employed every available technical device in order to spread awareness of the dangers which threaten democracy as well as national survival. Yet the flame of the martial spirit flickers but feebly in the heart of Western man, more feebly indeed than in any epoch of the West's dangerous history. Citizens respond dutifully to the call to arms. They cannot do otherwise in the face of the comprehensive controls and sanctions available to the state. Individual men among them are still capable of high feats of heroism at war, as high as those performed by warriors in ages past. Yet no one can deny that the democracies are loath to fight and that abiding popular aversion to war has forced democratic statesmen into a long series of diplomatic retreats. Science that has done so much to defend the democracies against aggression has also taught them that there is no defense against aggression and that its latest tools might prove as deleterious to the victor as to the defeated. More important still, science has taught men to value life as their highest possession and to abhor death, to abhor death not so much as the ineluctable fate of all living things but as the break in a process of expanding knowledge and possession of the physical environment. There is little in the history of our times to show that modern man is more averse to violence than were his forebears. There is some evidence showing that he views and handles violence with an impersonal detachment that would have shocked his ancestors inured to the precariousness and brutality of a prescientific civilization. Modern man, like all men before him, eschews violence that begets retribution, seeks to avoid pain and cherishes the good things upon earth. What sets him apart from preceding generations is his belief in his perfectibility upon earth and the dreadful and absurd finality of death.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 214-231
Author(s):  
Marco Bais

In 1307 Het‘um of Koṙikos, a close relative of the Armenian king of Cilicia, composed and presented to Pope Clement V an account on the geography and history of Asian lands, the Flos historiarum terre Orientis. This work was intended as a project for a new crusade, aimed at recovering the Holy Land with the help of Cilician Armenians and the military support of the Mongols. In Het‘um’s view, Armenians are central to this plan, since they are on good terms with the Mongols and they know how to negotiate with them. Het‘um’s representation of Armenia and Armenians aims at showing this pivotal role to his European audience. The Armenia mentioned in the first two books of the Flos historiarum is Greater Armenia, and it is portrayed as the place where the Mongols’ homeland (Asya Profunda) meets the Christian Near East (Asya Major), while Cilician Armenians are not only the mediators between Mongols and the Christian West, but also between Western and Eastern Christianity.


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