scholarly journals ARAIM Integrity Support Message Parameter Validation by Online Ground Monitoring

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samer Khanafseh ◽  
Mathieu Joerger ◽  
Fang-Cheng Chan ◽  
Boris Pervan
Keyword(s):  
Service Provider ◽  
Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Provider Performance ◽  
Prior Probabilities ◽  
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Ground Monitoring ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Monitoring Architecture ◽  
Advanced Receiver

In this paper we introduce a ground monitoring architecture to validate the Integrity Support Message (ISM) parameters to be used by aircraft for Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM). This work focuses on two critical ISM parameters: Psat, which designates the prior probabilities of satellite faults, and bmax, which is a range domain bound on small faults that may occur at probabilities higher than Psat. We show that the choices of bmax and Psat are not independent. The paper first establishes the relationship between bmax, Psat, Time to Integrity Alert (TIA) and constellation service provider performance commitments. We then provide an example ground monitor design that detects inter-frequency bias faults and code-carrier divergence faults. We show that the performance of the monitor can be used to validate specific bmax and Psat values for ARAIM.

scholarly journals Analyses of the sensitivity of multi-constellation advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring vertical protection level availability to error parameters and a failure model over China

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 168781401877619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xueen Zheng ◽  
Ye Liu ◽  
Guochao Fan ◽  
Jing Zhao ◽  
Chengdong Xu
Keyword(s):  
Satellite System ◽  
Protection Level ◽  
Integrity Monitoring ◽  
System Service ◽  
Service Stations ◽  
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Global Navigation Satellite ◽  
Range Error ◽  
Monitoring Algorithm ◽  
Advanced Receiver

The availability of advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring for vertical guidance down to altitudes of 200 ft (LPV-200) is discussed using real satellite orbit/ephemeris data collected at eight international global navigation satellite system service stations across China. Analyses were conducted for the availability of multi-constellation advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring and multi-fault advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring, and the sensitivity of availability in response to changes in error model parameters (i.e. user range accuracy, user range error, Bias-Nom and Bias-Max) was used to compute the vertical protection level. The results demonstrated that advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring availability based on multiple constellations met the requirements of LPV-200 despite multiple-fault detections that reduced the availability of the advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring algorithm; the advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring availability thresholds of the user range error and Bias-Nom used for accuracy were more relevant to geographic information than the user range accuracy and Bias-Max used for integrity at the eight international global navigation satellite system service stations. Finally, the possibility of using the advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring algorithm for a Category III navigation standard is discussed using two sets of predicted errors, revealing that the algorithm could be used in 79% of China.

An Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) Ground Monitor Design to Estimate Satellite Orbits and Clocks

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (5) ◽  
pp. 1087-1105
Author(s):  
Yawei Zhai ◽  
Jaymin Patel ◽  
Xingqun Zhan ◽  
Mathieu Joerger ◽  
Boris Pervan
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Errors ◽  
Satellite Orbit ◽  
Global Navigation Satellite Systems ◽  
Estimation Accuracy ◽  
Satellite Orbits ◽  
Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Satellite Systems ◽  
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Advanced Receiver

This paper describes a method to determine global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) satellite orbits and clocks for advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (ARAIM). The orbit and clock estimates will be used as a reference truth to monitor signal-in-space integrity parameters of the ARAIM integrity support message (ISM). Unlike publicly available orbit and clock products, which aim to maximise estimation accuracy, a straightforward and transparent approach is employed to facilitate integrity evaluation. The proposed monitor is comprised of a worldwide network of sparsely distributed reference stations and will employ parametric satellite orbit models. Two separate analyses, covariance analysis and model fidelity evaluation, are carried out to assess the impact of measurement errors and orbit model uncertainty on the estimated orbits and clocks, respectively. The results indicate that a standard deviation of 30 cm can be achieved for the estimated orbit/clock error, which is adequate for ISM validation.

scholarly journals Characteristics of BDS Signal-in-Space User Ranging Errors and Their Effect on Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring Performance

Sensors ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (12) ◽  
pp. 4475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhipeng Wang ◽  
Wei Shao ◽  
Rui Li ◽  
Dan Song ◽  
Tinglin Li
Keyword(s):  
Standard Deviation ◽  
Satellite System ◽  
Statistical Characteristics ◽  
Earth Orbit ◽  
Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Synchronous Orbit ◽  
Ranging Errors ◽  
Advanced Receiver

Signal-In-Space User Range Errors (SIS UREs) are assumed to be overbounded by a normal distribution with a standard deviation represented by the User Range Accuracy (URA). The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) broadcast URA is not compatible with the historical SIS URE performance that affects the Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) False Alert Probability (Pfa) and availability evaluation. This study compares the BDS broadcast and precise ephemeris from 1 March 2013 to 1 March 2017 to obtain SIS UREs. Through analyzing the statistical characteristics of the SIS UREs, we obtain the standard deviation σURE for the accuracy and continuity and σURA used for the integrity of the SIS UREs. The results show that the broadcast σURA of 2 m cannot completely overbound SIS UREs for all BDS satellites, but the σURA of 2.4 m can. Then, we use the σURA of 2.4 m to evaluate the ARAIM Pfa and availability. The results show that the Pfa may increase to 2 × 10−5 and exceed its limit by an order of magnitude. We also consider the differences between the SIS UREs of Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), Inclined Geo-Synchronous Orbit (IGSO), and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). The results indicate that all Pfa values calculated by the computed σURE are less than the Pfa in the Integrity Support Message (ISM) for the worst-performing GEO satellite. The approximately 55% Pfa calculated by the computed σURE is less than the Pfa in ISM for the worst-performing IGSO satellite. Most Pfa values calculated by the computed σURE is less than the Pfa in the ISM for the worst-performing MEO satellite. For BDS satellites, the Pfa is mainly affected by σURE. When the σURA of 2.4 m is used to evaluate the availability, the computed availability is lower than the availability calculated by the broadcast σURA/σURE and the greatest degradation can reach 25%.

External Ground Monitoring v. Receiver Monitoring

1991 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Johannessen
Keyword(s):  
Data Stream ◽  
Civil Aviation ◽  
Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Warning Messages ◽  
Control Centre ◽  
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring ◽  
Failure Conditions ◽  
Ground Monitoring ◽  
Very High ◽  
Two Alternatives

The transmissions from GPS and GLONASS navigation satellites include information about the state of those transmissions as perceived by the control centre. In the case of GPS, for example, this information is contained in the data stream in Subframe 1 Word 3. However, with some of the failure conditions that can arise there is a delay of the order of half an hour before this message is altered to signal that a failure exists. A situation can therefore arise when the satellite signals that all is well, whereas in fact it is not. The very high levels of integrity which civil aviation require before satellite navigation can be used with confidence therefore means that the warning messages from the satellite must be augmented by some other form of monitoring. Two alternatives exist: (1) to have a monitor at some fixed and surveyed ground location which broadcasts a warning to the navigating aircraft when there is a malfunction (ground monitoring), or (2) to arrange for the navigating receiver to perform its own internal monitoring, known as receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM). Each alternative is beneficial in its own way.

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