Commentary: The Yugoslavia Tribunal and the Common Core of Humanitarian Law Applicable to all Armed Conflicts

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Boelaert-Suominen

This article discusses the contribution made by the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal to the articulation of the body of international humanitarian law that applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or internal. The Tadić Jurisdiction Decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber in 1995 set the stage for a substantial “rapprochement” of the regulatory content of war crimes committed in international and internal armed conflict, using Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the main vehicle. The first judgements have contributed greatly to the expansion of the body of “Geneva law” applicable to all armed conflicts. More recently, the Tribunal has started to examine cases of armed conflicts per se, in which perpetrators have been charged with violation of the “Hague law”, i.e., the law relating to the conduct of hostilities. The end result of this development will be elaboration of a common core of Geneva law and Hague law applicable to all armed conflicts that have reached the threshold of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-188
Author(s):  
Sabin Guțan

Abstract The issue of the existence of the internal armed conflict concerns both legal factors and political factors (recognition of the existence of the internal armed conflict). From a legal point of view, to declare a violent social phenomenon as internal armed conflict, we must resort to the specific rules of international humanitarian law: Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to these conventions of 1977. However, these regulations, while describing the general parameters of the existence of an internal armed conflict, do not establish clear legal criteria for delimiting the internal armed conflict of internal tensions and disturbances or other forms of non-armed conflicts. This regulatory shortcoming has led to the emergence in the jurisprudence of some states, but also in the international one, of criteria for the existence of the internal armed conflict


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 357-363

States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have an obligation to take measures necessary to suppress all acts contrary to their provisions. Moreover, States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory, and other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, such as on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. In accordance with these obligations and the limits they impose, States may adopt certain measures during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts to promote reconciliation and peace, one of which is amnesties. International humanitarian law (IHL) contains rules pertaining to the granting and scope of amnesties. Specifically, Article 6(5) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) provides that, at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. Importantly, under customary IHL (as identified in Rule 159 of the ICRC customary IHL study), this excludes persons suspected of, accused of, or sentenced for war crimes in NIACs.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 121-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

Article 75 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions lays down with admirable clarity and concision thateven in time of war, or rather especially in time of war, justice must be dispassionate. How does international humanitarian lawpromote this end? What can theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, an independent humanitarian institution, do in the harsh reality of an armed conflict towards maintaining respect for the fundamental judicial guarantees protecting persons accused of crimes, some of them particularly abhorrent?This article will first consider the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols in relation to judicial procedure in time of armed conflicts. Thereafter it will examine the legal bases legitimizing international scrutiny of penal proceedings instituted against persons protected by humanitarian law. The next and principal part of the article will indicate how ICRC delegates appointed to monitor trials as observers do their job. In conclusion the article will try to evaluate this little-known aspect of the ICRC's work of protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (911) ◽  
pp. 869-949

This is the fifth report on international humanitarian law (IHL) and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (International Conference). Similar reports were submitted to the International Conferences held in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The aim of all these reports is to provide an overview of some of the challenges posed by contemporary armed conflicts for IHL; generate broader reflection on those challenges; and outline current or prospective ICRC action, positions, and areas of interest.


1994 ◽  
Vol 34 (302) ◽  
pp. 450-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

In its Final Declaration of 1 September 1993, the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims inter alia urged all States to make every effort to:“Consider or reconsider, in order to enhance the universal character of international humanitarian law, becoming party or confirming their succession, where appropriate, to the relevant treaties concluded since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular:—the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol I);—the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II);—the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its three Protocols;—The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”.


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.


Author(s):  
W Ochieng

Since the Geneva Conventions, the architecture of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has been founded upon a distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Today, this claim stands to be revisited since international and non-international armed conflicts are no longer strict organising frameworks for the categorisation of rules of armed conflicts. This is seen in that over fifty years ago, when the four Geneva Conventions were negotiated, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were the cornerstones of international law and while their force today is still apparent, the interdependence of states, and global concerns such as terrorism and the commission of widespread human rights violations have eroded the traditional inviolability of borders. The dichotomy in humanitarian law is as implausible today as it is also fundamentally unworkable given the current conditions of conflicts. This dualist conception is no longer adequate to deal with current features of armed conflict, which do not fit neatly into the two categories and frequently contain mixed elements which thus make the task of classification highly complex. The codification of customary rules of international humanitarian law has narrowed the grounds on which the distinctions are predicated. In addition, the two regimes apply simultaneously on multiple situations. Moreover, the question of contemporary armed conflicts raises serious doubts as to whether the traditional understanding of international law still suffices to explain the complexities of modern day armed conflicts. This essay seeks to offer a different perspective on armed conflicts by suggesting a systematic rethinking of the categorisation of conflict. It argues that some of the dilemmas of contemporary conflicts may be attenuated by a new conceptualisation of this bipolar distinction namely a need for a unitary conception of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Paul Strauch ◽  
Beatrice Walton

Abstract This article considers the international legal obligations relevant to States when withdrawing from situations of armed conflict. While a growing literature has focused on precisely when armed conflicts come to a legal end, as well as obligations triggered by the cessation of active hostilities, comparatively little attention has been paid to the legal implications of withdrawals from armed conflict and the contours of the obligations relevant to States in doing so. Following in the wake of just war scholarship endeavouring to distil jus ex bello principles, this article examines States’ obligations when ending their participation in armed conflicts from the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL). It shows that while it is generally understood that IHL ceases to apply at the end of armed conflict, this is in reality a significant simplification; a number of obligations actually endure. Such rules act as exceptions to the general temporal scope of IHL and continue to govern withdrawing States, in effect straddling the in bello and post bellum phases of armed conflict. The article then develops three key end-of-participation obligations: obligations governing detention and transfer of persons, obligations imposed by Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions, and obligations relating to accountability and the consequences of conflict.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-296
Author(s):  
Ilana Rothkopf

Abstract Do fighters associated with non-state armed groups have the combatant’s privilege in armed conflict? Non-state armed groups are commonplace in contemporary armed conflicts. However, international humanitarian law (IHL), particularly the law that pertains to combatant’s privilege and prisoner of war status, was designed with state actors in mind. This article assesses the conditions under which the members of non-state armed groups have combatant’s privilege. Throughout, it uses the case of Kurdish fighters in Syria as an example of the timeliness of this question and its ramifications for conflict actors. This article notes, with support from the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, and other sources of IHL, that IHL does not foresee a combatant’s privilege for armed groups in a non-international armed conflict. It contends, however, that the international community should agree to a generalisable rule for the treatment of fighters as combatants regardless of conflict type, if these fighters demonstrate the capability and willingness to adhere to IHL. Such a rule would reduce the need to assess both conflict type and the status of individual fighters should they be captured, and more importantly, it would incentivise continued compliance with IHL.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Gal

Humanitarian assistance is essential for the survival of the civilian population and peoplehors de combatin the theatre of war. Its regulation under the laws of armed conflict tries to achieve a balance between humanitarian goals and state sovereignty. This balance, reflected in the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, is not as relevant to contemporary armed conflicts, most of which involve non-state armed groups. Even those provisions relating to humanitarian assistance in conflicts involving non-state armed groups fail to address properly the key features of these groups, and especially their territorial aspect. This article proposes a different approach, which takes into consideration and gives weight to the control exercised by non-state armed groups over a given territory. Accordingly, it is suggested that provisions regulating humanitarian relief operations in occupied territories should apply to territories controlled by armed groups. This approach views international humanitarian law first and foremost as an effective, realistic and practical branch of law. Moreover, it has tremendous humanitarian advantages and reflects the aims and purposes of the law, while considering the factual framework of these conflicts.


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