Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: Challenges for World Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN

Governments perceive UN human rights conventions and the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as separate legal regimes. WTO jurisprudence, by contrast, interprets WTO rules as parts of international law and may soon be confronted with legal claims that WTO obligations are to be construed with due regard to the human rights obligations of WTO members. The diverse constitutional traditions of WTO members, and their political opposition to linking WTO law to human rights, make it unlikely that WTO members will respond to the UN proposals for a ‘human rights approach to trade’ by adopting a WTO Declaration clarifying that WTO rules are flexible enough to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the human rights obligations of WTO members (section 1). Following the invitation by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy to form ‘cosmopolitan constituencies’ in support of global public goods (like a rules-based world trading system), this article makes concrete proposals for the initiative by the International Law Association (ILA) to elaborate an ILA Declaration clarifying the complex interrelationships between trade law, human rights and WTO jurisprudence (section 2). As many human rights arguments presented in trade disputes in the EC Court and in the European Court of Human Rights could likewise be raised in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, the article examines whether the ‘constitutional methodologies’ applied by European courts offer lessons for further ‘constitutionalizing’ trade governance in the WTO in conformity with the human rights obligations of all WTO members.

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARWEL DAVIES

The World Trade Organization provides a forum for the settlement of trade disputes arising between its 148 Members. Should consultations fail, the parties may choose to initiate formal proceedings in Geneva, and must do so in preference to taking unilateral action. The dispute settlement rules are presently under review with a view to their clarification and improvement, making this a natural time to ask whether the appropriate strategy has been identified. This article focuses on the functions of compensation in the overall context of WTO remedies. Particular attention is given to the prospects for new disciplines and increased practice connected with the granting of both trade compensation and financial compensation. Also considered is the extent to which financial compensation can and should be linked to reparation in the sense of correcting the injury caused by WTO violations. The discussion is informed by the general international law position, by proposals made during the on-going review process and by emerging dispute settlement practice.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron ◽  
Kevin R. Gray

Unlike the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT), the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)1 covers a much wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now embraces services, intellectual property, procurement, investment and agriculture. Moreover, the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements, Panel reports and understandings of the parties. All trade obligations are subsumed under the umbrella of the WTO, of which all parties are members. Member States have to accept the obligations contained in all the WTO covered agreements: they cannot pick and choose.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
Patricia Yurie Dias

RESUMOO trabalho analisa o papel complementar dos regulamentos e padrões privados dos Estados e das entidades não estatais às regras da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) com o intuito de gerar maior segurança e qualidade para os produtos no âmbito do comércio internacional. A OMC visa promover a liberalização e eliminação da discriminação do comércio internacional. Dessa forma, por meio do estudo de alguns casos submetidos ao Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC, em que pese a maioria dos casos submetidos ao OSC terem tido desfechos distintos, constatou-se que os padrões privados podem complementar as regras da OMC, desde que não sejam medidas protecionistas  disfarçadas de barreiras não tarifárias ao comércio internacional.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Internacional; Jurisdição Internacional; Padrões privados; Comércio Internacional; OMC.ABSTRACTThe paper examines the complementary role of the private regulations and standards of States and non-state entities to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to promote safety and quality for products in the scope of international trade. The WTO aims to promote the liberalization and elimination of discrimination in international trade. Thus, through the study of some cases submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), despite the fact that most cases submitted to the DSB had different conclusions, it was found that private standards can complement the rules of the WTO, if they are not protectionist measures disguised as non-tariff barriers to international trade.KEYWORDS: International Law; International Jurisdiction; Private Standards; International Trade; WTO.


Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon

The present chapter concludes the work. It sums up the key findings of the study while discussing the results emerging from a comparative analysis of the three categories of disputes examined throughout the book. The chapter then revisits the central arguments put forth in the book and articulates the lessons to be learned for the study of the goals, operation, and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), and of international courts more broadly. It also discusses some of the insights to be offered with respect to possible institutional changes or reforms of the WTO DSS, with a view to ensuring the system’s future effectiveness. The chapter closes with several observations that go beyond effectiveness, pertaining to the costs and unintended consequences attendant on more effective and empowered international adjudication.


Author(s):  
Rambod Behboodi

SummaryThe disputes between Canada and Brazil over subsidies to the regional aircraft industry were the first cases under Part II (covering prohibited subsidies) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (SCM Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PROEX case, involved the scope of the concept of “special and differential treatment” under Article 27 of the SCM Agreement, and the interpretation of the first paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies as set out in Annex I to the SCM Agreement. The Canada — Aircraft case involved, for the first time, Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines what practices constitute a subsidy, and Article 3, which prohibits subsidies “contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance.” The case also dealt with important procedural issues relating to WTO dispute settlement. The author reviews critically these decisions with respect to both substantive and procedural issues.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-406
Author(s):  
WILLIAM J. DAVEY

John Jackson bestrode the world of international trade law like a Colossus. His 1969 treatise on World Trade and the Law of GATT was called the bible of GATT law. His 1977 casebook on Legal Problems of International Economic Relations created a new law school course and introduced thousands of students around the globe to international trade law. It was the leading international trade law casebook for decades, and his students went on to positions of responsibility throughout the world in governments, international organizations, and private practice. His analysis of GATT infirmities convinced certain influential governments to push for a new international trade organization, which eventually saw life as the World Trade Organization. It was a great honor for me to have been associated with John for over thirty years. Indeed, his 1985 invitation to join as a co-author of the casebook after my first year in law teaching undoubtedly saved me many years of drudgery as a corporate/securities law scholar. Thus, I am pleased to offer some thoughts on John's influence on dispute settlement under GATT and the WTO.


Eudaimonia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 137-146
Author(s):  
Monique Libardi ◽  
Patricia Glym

International trade law, followed by the development of legal mechanisms for regulation of multilateral trading system, from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – GATT (1948–94), Uruguay Round (1986–94) to World Trade Organization – WTO (1995) dispute settlement system is the current scenario of the world economy transactions. This paper aims to analyze whether Brazilian activism in the world trading system may be identified in the WTO Dispute Settlement dealing with the concept of direct effect on international law. Since 1995, Brazil has been an assiduous claimant at the WTO and at the South American Common Market (MERCOSUR) dispute mechanism. However, explaining Brazilian participation at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) requires a collision between the Brazilian private sector and the political relevance that trade disputes have acquired.


Author(s):  
Charlotte E. Blattner

This chapter explores the breadth and scope of options available to states that want to indirectly protect animals across the border, in particular under the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The flurry of academic discussion at the intersection of animal and trade law was sparked by the Appellate Body’s Seals report in 2014, but it failed to cut deep enough to link to the doctrine of jurisdiction under general international law, and efforts to enter negotiations to more thoroughly protect animals in trade never materialized. The author advances the discussion and fills a gap in scholarship by examining whether and how states can use trade law to indirectly protect animals abroad through import prohibitions, taxes and tariffs, as well as labels. An analysis of the legality of trade-restrictive measures that indirectly protect animals under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) precedes a discussion of justifications for violating the agreement.


Author(s):  
Christiane Gerstetter

This chapter analyses how the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement bodies legitimize their decisions and by implication also the WTO Dispute Settlement System as well as the WTO as an institution more broadly. The author argues there are two relevant dimensions for understanding how judges legitimize judicial decisions: the substantive outcomes of cases, that is who wins and loses and what interpretations are adopted, and the way a judicial decision is justified. She concludes that the WTO dispute settlement bodies act strategically in order to win the acceptance of the member states, and ultimately legitimize this dispute settlement system as a judicial entity.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ◽  
NIALL MEAGHER ◽  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
TATIANA YANGUAS

AbstractThe World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process allows a defending Member a ‘reasonable period of time’ (RPT) to implement any findings that its contested measures are inconsistent with WTO law. If agreement on this RPT cannot be reached, Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides for the possibility of arbitration on the length of the RPT. The DSU provides limited guidelines on the RPT, stating only that it should not normally exceed 15 months. In practice, Arbitrators have developed the standard that the RPT should reflect the shortest possible period under the domestic legal system of the defending Member to make the changes necessary to comply with the WTO rulings. Our research confirms that in practice Arbitrators have determined this period by ‘splitting the difference’ approximately between the periods suggested by the complaining and defending Member. In addition, the process appears to reward defending Members that request an RPT that exceeds the 15-month guideline in Article 21.3(c).


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