scholarly journals The Phoenix of Colonial War: Race, the Laws of War, and the ‘Horror on the Rhine’

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 847-875 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROTEM GILADI

AbstractThe article explores the demise of the ‘colonial war’ category through the employment of French colonial troops, under the 1918 armistice, to occupy the German Rhineland.It traces the prevalence of – and the anxieties underpinning –antebellumdoctrine on using ‘Barbarous Forces’ in ‘European’ war. It then records the silence ofpostbellumscholars on the ‘horror on the Rhine’ – orchestrated allegations of rape framed in racialized terms of humanity and the requirements of the law of civilized warfare. Among possible explanations for this silence, the article follows recent literature that considers this scandal as the embodiment of crises in masculinity, white domination, and European civilization.These crises, like the scandal itself, expressedantebellumjurisprudential anxieties about the capacity – and implications – of black soldiers being ‘drilled white’. They also deprivedpostbellumlawyers of the vocabulary necessary to address what they signified: breakdown of the laws of war; evident, self-inflicted European barbarity; and the collapse of international law itself, embodied by the VersaillesDiktattreating Germany – as Smuts warned, ‘as we would not treat akaffirnation’ – as a colonial ‘object’, as Schmitt lamented.Last, the article traces the resurgence of ‘colonial war’. It reveals how, at the moment of collapse, in the very instrument embodying it, the category found a new life. Article 22(5) of the League of Nations Covenant (the Covenant) reasserted control over the colonial object, furnishing international lawyers with a new vocabulary to address the employment of colonial troops – yet, now, as part of the ‘law of peace’. Reclassified, both rule and category re-emerged, were codified, and institutionalized imperial governance.

1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. P. Trainin

The history of war knows no such brigandage, fanaticism, or such craftiness as the German fascist usurpers practiced from the moment of their attack upon the peoples of other states. The rules and customs relating to the conduct of war, recognized by all civilized peoples, were rejected and trampled under foot by these usurpers. These rules and customs relating to the conduct of war, put together in the course of many centuries, have received the title “the law of war” and constitute an inseparable part of international law.


1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 476-495
Author(s):  
Julius Stone

Judges whose daily tasks are to interpret the law of their own State frequently find difficulties in expressing the exact nature and hierarchical value of the rules of international law, which from time to time they are required in some sense to apply.Perhaps the classical example of this in countries applying the English common law is that of prize courts and the law which they should apply. Under international law belligerent States, by whom maritime captures (prizes) may be made, have a duty to create some forum before which issues can be tried as to the lawfulness of such captures and its consequences. As Lord Parker observed inThe Zamoraas to the title in the property seized, “from the moment of seizure the rights of all parties are governed by international law”. In the final ruling in that case, the Privy Council held that the neutral property at issue had been unlawfully requisitioned, even though such requisition was authorised by a British Executive Order-in-Council, because that Order-in-Council itself was inconsistent with the rules of international law governing requisition of neutral property.


Author(s):  
Daphné Richemond-Barak

This chapter focuses on the laws of war, a legal framework applicable to a broad array of war-time tunnel-related issues, including their legal status, the type of weapons that may be used inside tunnels, and precautions that must be taken vis-à-vis civilians during anti-tunnel operations. This chapter argues that the law does not prohibit the use of tunnels and other underground structures in times of war. Underground warfare—in any of its many forms—does not amount to perfidy, which would have made it illegal under international law. Tunnels, however, often amount to military objectives and, as such, must be kept separate from civilians and civilian infrastructure. Ultimately this chapter demonstrates that, despite the law’s silence, underground warfare does raise unique issues under IHL. It also offers a conceptual framework for analyzing tunnels and assessing the legality of anti-tunnel operations in war.


1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 783-796 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen

Collective security is the main purpose of the United Nations, just as it was the main purpose of its predecessor, the League of Nations. What does collective security mean? Under general international law the principle of self-help prevails. The protection of the legal interests of the states against violations on the part of other states is left to the individual state whose right has been violated. General international law authorizes the state, i.e., the individual member of the international community, to resort, in case of a violation of its rights, to reprisals or war against that state which is responsible for the violation. Reprisals and war are enforcement actions. Insofar as they are reactions against violations of the law, and authorized by it, they have the character of sanctions. We speak of collective security when the protection of the rights of the states, the reaction against the violation of the law, assumes the character of a collective enforcement action.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL E. NEWELL

Abstract:The laws of war and international human rights law (IHRL) overlap, often with competing obligations. When two or more areas of the law overlap, political agents attempt to address these areas of ambiguity with interstitial rules. However, a lack of consensus on interstitial rules can destabilise the law, leading to increased contestation of legal norms and principles. Such is the case for international law in counterterrorism. Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks (9/11), international agreements and US domestic practices placed counterterrorism within the framework of law enforcement. After 9/11, the Bush Administration replaced law enforcement with armed conflict and the laws of war as the dominant paradigm for counterterrorism, but this decision, among other legal justifications in the War on Terror, has been contested by the international legal community. As IHRL still applies in law enforcement operations, international law in counterterrorism now sits within a contested overlap of IHRL and the laws of war. The contestation of US policies in the War on Terror, including the use of drone strikes in particular, is a product of this unresolved overlap and the lack of clear interstitial rules. Lacking these rules, US counterterrorism policies risk undermining the rule of law.


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef L. Kunz

Once more, as he did sixteen years ago, this writer wants to raise his voice in order to point at the actual chaotic status of the laws of war, at the grave inherent dangers, and at the urgent necessity for the revision of this part of international law. The problem involves the very survival of our Western Christian civilization, if not of mankind. Under these circumstances it becomes the duty of an international lawyer to treat this subject, notwithstanding its “unpopularity” since 1920. It was Grotius who, under the impression of the “total war” of thirty years urged upon men the necessity of the “temperamenta belli.” It is amazing to see that the men of this generation, living under a more terrible total war, turn their backs upon the laws of war. This neglect is the outcome of different and often contradictory ideologies: indifference, apathy, over-optimistic wishful thinking, political wishes to keep one’s hands free in the next war, and pessimistic fatalism. All the arguments for this neglect are untenable, are in contradiction with the law as well as the facts; and yet, strong drives by writers and statesmen have nearly succeeded in putting over men a veil of voluntary blindness in adopting a policy of the ostrich which may lead to disaster, to the return of new and more terrible “dark ages.” A full exposé would need a book, not an article. But while no full picture can be given here, it will be attempted to give, at least, a complete sketch, dealing with the law and the facts, with the arguments pro and con.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 486-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse S. Reeves

Judged by its inability to agree upon a convention on territorial waters, as the substance of things hoped for, the Conference for the Codification of International Law was a failure. Good may come of the Conference. It may have been a necessary preliminary stage in a very long and difficult process. Nevertheless, the fact remains that its purpose was to agree upon a convention upon territorial waters and it failed of its purpose. Usually the cause of the ill-success of a conference is lack of preparation. This failure cannot be ascribed to lack of preparation. It is unnecessary to rehearse the antecedent steps. Several years had been devoted to preparation. Governments had agreed that the subject of territorial waters was suitable and ripe for codification. In addition to the work done by the Committee of Experts and by the Preparatory Committee, the governments had answered voluminous questionnaires and had made observations upon detailed schedules of points from which had been prepared the bases of discussion. All of this work had been completed and in print months before the Conference met. Apparently nothing was left undone by the agencies of the League of Nations in order that the various governments might have ample opportunity for examination and study of the questions involved. And, it may be added, the observations of the governments were for the most part responsive and illuminating.


Author(s):  
Stephen C Neff

This chapter presents a brief history of international law. It proceeds chronologically, beginning with an overview of the ancient world, followed by a more detailed discussion of the great era of natural law in the European Middle Ages. The classical period (1600–1815) witnessed the emergence of a dualistic view of international law, with the law of nature and the law of nations co-existing (more or less amicably). In the nineteenth century—the least-known part of international law—doctrinaire positivism was the prevailing viewpoint, though not the exclusive one. For the inter-war years, developments both inside and outside the League of Nations are considered. The chapter concludes with some historically oriented comments on international law during the post-1945 period.


Author(s):  
Bridge MG

This chapter looks at the passing of property and the risks involved. The passing of property (or ownership) to the buyer is of vital interest in both domestic law and the international law of sale. The law of sale, as codified by the Sale of Goods Act, is a combination of contract and conveyance. The latter part — the conveyance — is the passing of property. In the Act itself, the passing of property is important in defining the moment when risk is transferred. The significance of risk is that, when transferred to the buyer, it determines the contractual rights of the seller and buyer if there occurs a casualty to the goods for which neither party bears contractual responsibility. However, as the chapter shows, this connection between the property and risk is not as important in the law of international sale as it is in the law of domestic sale.


Author(s):  
Evan J. Criddle

This chapter explores how fiduciary principles have shaped international law from colonial times to the present. Fiduciary principles are evident not only in the text of the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter, but also in various subfields of international law, including the law governing U.N. missions, military occupation, the legal status and duties of states, and the role and responsibilities of diplomatic officers. In each of these contexts, the international community has affirmed that certain offices and institutions attract fiduciary duties under international law. Nonetheless, the international community has struggled to develop credible mechanisms for enforcing these fiduciary duties.


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