NATO as the UN Security Council's Instrument: Question Marks From the Perspective of International Law?

1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-421
Author(s):  
Niels Blokker ◽  
Sam Muller

In the previous contribution, Dekker and Myjer maintain that, from the viewpoint of international law, there are at least two problematic issues with regard to NATO's actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first issue concerns the way in which the Security Council has, in a legal sense, shaped its authority over NATO's actions. The second issue is the question of whether NATO is entitled, under its own constitution, to execute such actions. The contribution of Dekker and Myjer was prompted by NATO's air strikes in defence of Sarajevo, which took place in August and September 1995. Their criticism also applies to the current actions that NATO is undertaking in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, as they later elaborated in the periodical Transaktie. First and foremost, it must be noted that Dekker and Myjer deserve full credit for pointing out these legal aspects of these recent NATO actions. That being said, their two main points of criticism are debatable and, in our opinion, paint a less than consistent picture of the possibilities that the UN and NATO have to offer, in particular the possibilities that may or may not be provided by those organizations' constitutions to flexibly respond to the demands posed at the present time, as well as the room to manoeuvre that is available under the changed international balance of power.

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera Gowlland-Debbas

The relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council may be approached from the perspective of the United Nations Charter and the way it delimits competences between two principal UN organs and regulates the exercise of their concurrent powers. The Court, however, has a dual, ambivalent role. It is not only the principal judicial organ of the United Nations under Article 92 of the Charter; it is also an autonomous adjudicative body with the function, under Article 38 of its Statute, of applying international law to such disputes between states as are brought before it. Viewed in the light of Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, the relationship between the judicial and political organs raises some fundamental questions of general international law that go beyond UN constitutional issues.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (4 ENGLISH ONLINE VERSION) ◽  
pp. 39-50
Author(s):  
Malwina Ewa Kołodziejczak

Normative acts applicable in the Republic of Poland do not lack a multitude of formulations of terms such as: war, state of war or time of war. The lack of legally binding definitions and the inconsistency of the use of identical definitions lead to different, often contradictory interpretations of particular situations, which may have different legal consequences. Only a precise and detailed definition of these concepts, preferably by incorporating them into national or international law, would dispel many doubts and close the way to sometimes contradictory interpretations, which is particularly important for security and defence concepts and issues. Therefore, in this paper the author will present definitions and regulations resulting from Polish legal acts, relating to war, war time and the state of war.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wood

This article first considers whether there is any general theory of interpretation in international law. After revisiting the way in which Security Council resolutions are drafted, it reviews developments in regard to the interpretation of Security Council resolutions, including controversies, case-law, and writings. Also considered is the relevance to the subject of the Dutch and United Kingdom Iraq inquiries. The conclusions re-examine, and largely confirm, the approach taken in an article published in 1998.


Author(s):  
Richard Caplan

States – Western ones, at least – have given increased weight to human rights and humanitarian norms as matters of international concern, with the authorization of legally binding enforcement measures to tackle humanitarian crises under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These concerns were also developed outside the UN Security Council framework, following Tony Blair’s Chicago speech and the contemporaneous NATO action over Kosovo. This gave rise to international commissions and resulted, among other things, in the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. The adoption of this doctrine coincided with a period in which there appeared to be a general decline in mass atrocities. Yet R2P had little real effect – it cannot be shown to have caused the fall in mass atrocities, only to have echoed it. Thus, the promise of R2P and an age of humanitarianism failed to emerge, even if the way was paved for future development.


Author(s):  
Shai Dothan

There is a consensus about the existence of an international right to vote in democratic elections. Yet states disagree about the limits of this right when it comes to the case of prisoners’ disenfranchisement. Some states allow all prisoners to vote, some disenfranchise all prisoners, and others allow only some prisoners to vote. This chapter argues that national courts view the international right to vote in three fundamentally different ways: some view it as an inalienable right that cannot be taken away, some view it merely as a privilege that doesn’t belong to the citizens, and others view it as a revocable right that can be taken away under certain conditions. The differences in the way states conceive the right to vote imply that attempts by the European Court of Human Rights to follow the policies of the majority of European states by using the Emerging Consensus doctrine are problematic.


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