Kant as Seen by Hegel

1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 93-109
Author(s):  
W. H. Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Special Care ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Show Evidence ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Main Ideas ◽  
The Impact

Few major philosophers show evidence of having studied the works of their predecessors with special care, even in cases where they were subject to particular influences which they were ready to acknowledge. Hume knew that he was working in the tradition of ‘some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing’—‘Mr Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, Dr Mandeville, Mr Hutchinson, Dr Butler, &c.’ But there is not much sign in the Treatise or elsewhere in Hume's writings of any close acquaintance with the works of these authors; the presumption must be that he had read them at some time and extracted the main ideas, but was not in the habit of returning to their texts. He had something more important to do, namely to work at philosophical problems of his own. Similarly Kant, though he said that the Critique of Pure Reason was not meant to be ‘a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general’, had clearly felt the impact of the thought of some important past philosophers, but equally had never spent much time in finding out just what these philosophers had to say. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Hume all get fairly frequent mention in his pages. But Kant takes his knowledge of Plato and Aristotle from J. J. Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae, a six-volume compilation which first appeared in 1742, or from doubtful sources such as Mendelssohn's doctored translation of the Phaedo, and though he doubtless knew the more recent authors at first hand clearly felt no need to study them in any depth. This was true even of writers to whom he attributed a particular importance, such as Leibniz and Hume. The references to Hume in the Critique and Prolegomena are all disappointingly general, and though the summary of Leibniz's philosophy in the section called ‘The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection’ has a certain force, it is not documented with references to Leibnizian texts. Kant knows that there is a difference between the views of the historical Leibniz and those which constituted the ‘Leibnizian-Wolffian system’ of his successors. But he is not very curious about the difference, or inclined to explore it.

Kant as Seen by Hegel

1982 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 93-109
Author(s):  
W. H. Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Special Care ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Show Evidence ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Main Ideas ◽  
The Impact

Few major philosophers show evidence of having studied the works of their predecessors with special care, even in cases where they were subject to particular influences which they were ready to acknowledge. Hume knew that he was working in the tradition of ‘some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing’—‘Mr Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, Dr Mandeville, Mr Hutchinson, Dr Butler, &c.’ But there is not much sign in the Treatise or elsewhere in Hume's writings of any close acquaintance with the works of these authors; the presumption must be that he had read them at some time and extracted the main ideas, but was not in the habit of returning to their texts. He had something more important to do, namely to work at philosophical problems of his own. Similarly Kant, though he said that the Critique of Pure Reason was not meant to be ‘a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general’, had clearly felt the impact of the thought of some important past philosophers, but equally had never spent much time in finding out just what these philosophers had to say. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and Hume all get fairly frequent mention in his pages. But Kant takes his knowledge of Plato and Aristotle from J. J. Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae, a six-volume compilation which first appeared in 1742, or from doubtful sources such as Mendelssohn's doctored translation of the Phaedo, and though he doubtless knew the more recent authors at first hand clearly felt no need to study them in any depth. This was true even of writers to whom he attributed a particular importance, such as Leibniz and Hume. The references to Hume in the Critique and Prolegomena are all disappointingly general, and though the summary of Leibniz's philosophy in the section called ‘The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection’ has a certain force, it is not documented with references to Leibnizian texts. Kant knows that there is a difference between the views of the historical Leibniz and those which constituted the ‘Leibnizian-Wolffian system’ of his successors. But he is not very curious about the difference, or inclined to explore it.

scholarly journals Epistemologia Kanta jako rozwiązanie sporu empiryzmu z racjonalizmem

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland
Keyword(s):  
Turning Point ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Pure Intuition ◽  
History Of ◽  
Main Ideas

The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.

On the Reality of Existence and Identity

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Hacking
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Identity Relation ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Real Relation ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

“The confusion of a logical with a real predicate,” according to the Critique of Pure Reason, “is almost beyond correction” (A598/B626). Kant did not assert that existence is no predicate, but that it is only a “logical” one, and not a “real” one. Much the same thing has been said about identity, although Kant himself thought it is real and not logical. We have long lacked a rigorous criterion to distinguish real from logical predicates, and hence have not been able to say why the difference matters. This paper has two objects. First it provides a demarcation between real and logical predicates that confirms Kant's dictum that existence is only “logical.” Secondly it states the theory of a “logical” (but not “real”) relation of identity. Perhaps this is not the only identity relation. I show only that once it has been precisely defined in the right setting, there are definite answers to a number of disputed questions about identity. Maybe there are other concepts of identity for which different answers are to be given, but I shall not discuss that disagreeable prospect here. A third application concerns the ontological argument.

scholarly journals The Problem of the Relationship between Apperception, Self-Consciousness and Consciousness in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 24-53
Author(s):  
I. E. Andriianov
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Synthetic Activity ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Prime Task ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Relationship

Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the above-mentioned faculties which are intimately connected with Kant’s formulation of the key tasks of transcendental philosophy. The prime task is to discover the categories of understanding and to prove the legitimacy of their use, a task that is further complicated by the difference between the editions of the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the argumentation in the section on the deduction of categories and Kant’s concept of apperception. Accordingly, the author seeks to clarify the purpose of each of the above-mentioned faculties and to establish their inter-relationship. To this end the author analyses the functional roles of consciousness, self-consciousness and apperception in solving the main tasks of the first Critique. It turns out that consciousness is a reflexive cognitive capacity which provides access to representations in our soul and allows us to distinguish them and to connect them. Self-consciousness is the mode of the functioning of consciousness which makes it possible to study three objects of consciousness: internal and external representations of the subject, the synthetic activity of understanding and our soul. Apperception is the Latin synonym of the concept of Selbstbewußtsein and is aimed at studying the unity of our representations. Because Kant distinguishes multiple kinds of unity, there are different names for apperception. Kant uses the concept of Apperzeption as a synonym of self-consciousness because his concept of consciousness follows the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.

scholarly journals Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics and Metaphysics

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Callanan
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Critical Periods ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
The Difference ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Prize Essay

AbstractThe difference between the method of metaphysics and the method of mathematics was an issue of central concern for Kant in both the Pre-Critical and Critical periods. I will argue that when Kant speaks of the ‘philosophical method’ in the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he frequently has in mind not his own methodology but rather the method of conceptual analysis associated with rationalism. The particular target is Moses Mendelssohn’s picture of analysis contained in his submission for the 1763 Prize Essay competition. By the time of the first Critique, I argue, Kant wants to maintain his own longstanding commitment to the distinctness of the methods of metaphysics and mathematics. However, Kant wants to use this same analysis of the source of the distinction to diagnose the origins of the dogmatism that is engendered by the method of the rationalists.

scholarly journals HEIDEGGER’S READINGS OF KANT: APPROPRIATION OF TIME AND SPACE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICITY OF DA-SEIN AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-90
Author(s):  
Syed Alam Shah
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Basic Question ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Public ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Time Space ◽  
Human Reality ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Being There

Heidegger’s reading of Kant is deciphered to have illuminated his own project concerning the basic question of Ontology, Time, Space and History [Temporality, Spatiality and Historicity] embodying the novel description of Human reality in terms of Mit-Dasein and Mit-welt [Subjectivity with the public face]. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason led Heidegger develop his own project of Existential Phenomenology contrary to Husserilian Phenomenology. We will discuss the Kantian Heidegger following the two main issues: one, Heidegger appreciates Kant on his identifying and exploring the difference of ontic/ontological. Two, Kant prioritizes time over space. Heidegger would explore the subject of ontic/ontological difference in the sense that ontic knowledge is the knowledge of particular beings, whereas ontological knowledge is described as the a priori condition inferring the ontic knowledge. In this sense ontological knowledge pertains to question of being rather than beings. This is how Heidegger’s Kant interpretation would differ from the Neo-Kantianism of Marburg School which argued that Critique of Pure Reason is a work of epistemology. In contrast to this position, Heidegger held that Critique is a unique work of transcendental philosophy; it is theory of ontological knowledge but not ontic knowledge. Ontic knowledge of beings must conform to Being of beings [ontological foundation]. Heidegger holds that this should be Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”. However, Heidegger would appropriate the Kantian notion of time in the form of temporality of Dasein. Being manifests itself on beings through Being-there [Human reality] who purely understands Being. For Heidegger, temporality of Dasein is the foundation of ontological knowledge indeed.

scholarly journals Randomised controlled trial of the impact of haemodiafiltration on uraemic neuropathy: FINESSE study protocol

BMJ Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. e023736
Author(s):  
Brendan Smyth ◽  
Arun V Krishnan ◽  
Martin Gallagher ◽  
Matthew Kiernan ◽  
Paul Snelling ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Controlled Trial ◽  
Randomised Trial ◽  
Cumulative Exposure ◽  
Open Label ◽  
Middle Molecules ◽  
Show Evidence ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Randomised Controlled ◽  
End Stage ◽  
The Impact

IntroductionThe majority of patients undergoing haemodialysis (HD) show evidence of uraemic neuropathy, a condition with no known disease-modifying treatments. The pathogenesis of uraemic neuropathy is poorly understood, but may be related to cumulative exposure to middle molecules or other solutes such as potassium. It is not known whether haemodiafiltration (HDF) reduces the progression of uraemic neuropathy.Methods and analysisFiltration In the Neuropathy of End-Stage kidney disease Symptom Evolution (FINESSE) is a multicentre, randomised, open-label, blinded endpoint assessment, controlled trial designed to assess the impact of HDF versus HD on uraemic neuropathy. Maintenance HD patients will be randomised in a 1:1 ratio to receive HDF or HD with high-flux membranes for 4 years. The primary endpoint is the difference in the mean change in Total Neuropathy Score (TNS)—a measure of peripheral neuropathy combining symptoms, signs and nerve conduction velocity—over the study period. Secondary outcomes include change at annual timepoints in the TNS and the Neuropathy Symptom Score; and in morbidity, mortality and safety events.Ethics and disseminationThe FINESSE trial has been approved by the Ethics Review Committee of the Sydney South West Area Health Service (HREC/09/RPAH/268) and of Adventist HealthCare Limited (2012–027). When published in a peer-reviewed journal, it will be the largest and longest reported randomised trial aimed at reducing the incidence and severity of uraemic neuropathy. It will advance the understanding of the natural history of uraemic neuropathy and the influence of convective therapies on both neurophysiological and clinical outcomes. It will also allow refinement of current hypotheses surrounding the pathogenesis of uraemic neuropathy and, most importantly, may lead to improvements in the lives of the many patients affected by this debilitating condition.Trial registration numberACTRN12609000615280.

Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin de Boer
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Mode ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Priori Knowledge

Abstract In this article I aim to clarify the nature of Kant’s transformation of rationalist metaphysics into a science by focusing on his conception of transcendental reflection. The aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued, consists primarily in liberating the productive strand of former general metaphysics - its reflection on the a priori elements of all knowledge - from the uncritical application of these elements to all things (within general metaphysics itself) and to things that can only be thought (in special metaphysics). After considering Kant’s conception of metaphysics and his various uses of the term ‘transcendental’ I closely examine his account of logical and transcendental reflection in the section entitled ‘On the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection’. Whereas commentators generally attribute the activity called transcendental reflection to Kant alone, I contend, first, that Kant regarded philosophy as such to rely on a mode of transcendental reflection and, second, that the critical mode of transcendental reflection enacted in the Critique itself yields insight into the reason why our a priori knowledge is limited to the realm of possible objects. This is illustrated by outlining the difference between Kant’s and Leibniz’ employment of the concepts of reflection.

scholarly journals An Overlooked Argument for the Categories: Kant’s Interlude of Justification in the Prolegomena

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 878
Author(s):  
Adriano Perin
Keyword(s):  
Synthetic Methods ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Western Philosophical Tradition ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

The deduction of the categories lies undoubtedly at the very heart of Kant's theoretical philosophy and, for this reason, it is one of items in the philosophical canon that is greatly discussed and least agreed upon. In the modern and contemporary Western philosophical tradition as well as in Kant’s literature, the loci classici for its consideration are the 1781 and 1787 editions of the Critique of pure reason. In this paper, I aim at presenting and discussing an argument that Kant advances in the Prolegomena and which is virtually ignored in the approach of the deduction of the categories. At first, an inquiry into the distinction between analytic and synthetic methods is carried out. After that, the difference between judgments of perception and judgments of experience is taken into account. Finally, the Prolegomena’s argument for the categories is brought into discussion. *** Um Argumento Negligenciado para as Categorias: O Interlúdio Kantiano de Justificação nos Prolegômenos ***É indiscutível que a dedução das categorias compreende o núcleo da filosofia teórica kantiana. Por esse motivo, tal empreendimento figura entre os elementos do cânone filosófico que recebem maior discussão e menos consenso. Os loci classici para a sua consideração, tanto na tradição filosófica ocidental moderna e contemporânea quanto na literatura kantiana, são as edições de 1781 e 1787 da Crítica da razão pura. Neste trabalho, objetivo apresentar e discutir um argumento que Kant desenvolve nos Prolegômenos e que é praticamente ignorado na abordagem da dedução das categorias. Inicialmente, empreende-se uma investigação sobre a distinção entre os métodos analítico e sintético. Na sequência, considera-se a distinção entre juízos de percepção e juízos de experiência. Por último, discute-se o argumento para as categorias que é dado nos Prolegômenos.Palavras-chave: Método Analítico. Método Sintético. Juízos de Percepção. Juízos de Experiência. Dedução das Categorias.

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