A Simple Graphical Method for Quantification of Disaster Management Surge Capacity Using Computer Simulation and Process-control Tools

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Michael Franc ◽  
Pier Luigi Ingrassia ◽  
Manuela Verde ◽  
Davide Colombo ◽  
Francesco Della Corte

AbstractIntroductionSurge capacity, or the ability to manage an extraordinary volume of patients, is fundamental for hospital management of mass-casualty incidents. However, quantification of surge capacity is difficult and no universal standard for its measurement has emerged, nor has a standardized statistical method been advocated. As mass-casualty incidents are rare, simulation may represent a viable alternative to measure surge capacity.Hypothesis/ProblemThe objective of the current study was to develop a statistical method for the quantification of surge capacity using a combination of computer simulation and simple process-control statistical tools. Length-of-stay (LOS) and patient volume (PV) were used as metrics. The use of this method was then demonstrated on a subsequent computer simulation of an emergency department (ED) response to a mass-casualty incident.MethodsIn the derivation phase, 357 participants in five countries performed 62 computer simulations of an ED response to a mass-casualty incident. Benchmarks for ED response were derived from these simulations, including LOS and PV metrics for triage, bed assignment, physician assessment, and disposition. In the application phase, 13 students of the European Master in Disaster Medicine (EMDM) program completed the same simulation scenario, and the results were compared to the standards obtained in the derivation phase.ResultsPatient-volume metrics included number of patients to be triaged, assigned to rooms, assessed by a physician, and disposed. Length-of-stay metrics included median time to triage, room assignment, physician assessment, and disposition. Simple graphical methods were used to compare the application phase group to the derived benchmarks using process-control statistical tools. The group in the application phase failed to meet the indicated standard for LOS from admission to disposition decision.ConclusionsThis study demonstrates how simulation software can be used to derive values for objective benchmarks of ED surge capacity using PV and LOS metrics. These objective metrics can then be applied to other simulation groups using simple graphical process-control tools to provide a numeric measure of surge capacity. Repeated use in simulations of actual EDs may represent a potential means of objectively quantifying disaster management surge capacity. It is hoped that the described statistical method, which is simple and reusable, will be useful for investigators in this field to apply to their own research.FrancJM, IngrassiaPL, VerdeM, ColomboD, Della CorteF. A simple graphical method for quantification of disaster management surge capacity using computer simulation and process-control tools. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2015;30(1):1-7.

1985 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 517 ◽  
Author(s):  
RD Kelley ◽  
KC Harrison ◽  
SM Lyon ◽  
LC Baldwin ◽  
CR Hansen

2016 ◽  
Vol 89 (1061) ◽  
pp. 20150984 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferco H Berger ◽  
Markus Körner ◽  
Mark P Bernstein ◽  
Aaron D Sodickson ◽  
Ludo F Beenen ◽  
...  

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Zane ◽  
Paul Biddinger ◽  
Lyndsley Ide ◽  
Sally Phillips ◽  
Donna Hurd ◽  
...  

AbstractIntroduction:With limited available hospital beds in most urban areas, there are very few options when trying to relocate patients already within the hospital to make room for incoming patients from a mass-casualty incident (MCI) or epidemic (a patient surge). This study investigates the possibility and process for utilizing shuttered (closed or former) hospitals to accept medically stable, ambulatory patients transferred from a tertiary medical facility.Methods:Two recently closed, acute care hospitals were evaluated critically to determine if they could be made ready to accept inpatients within 3–7 days of a MCI. This surge facility ideally would be able to support 200–300 patients/beds. Two generic scenarios were used for planning: (1) a patient surge (including one caused by conventional war or terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or a disaster caused by natural hazards) requiring transfer of ambulatory, medically-stable inpatients to another facility in an effort to increase capacity at existing hospitals; and (2) a bio-event or epidemic where a shuttered hospital could be used as an isolation facility.Results:Both recently closed hospitals had significant, but different challenges to reopening, although with careful planning and resource allocation it would be possible to reopen them within 3–7 days. Planning was the most conclusive recommendation. It does not appear possible to reopen shuttered hospitals with major structural deterioration or a complete lack of current mission (i.e., no current utilities). Staffing would represent the most challenging issue as a surge facility would represent an incremental additional need for existing and scarce human resources.Conclusions:With careful planning, a shuttered hospital could be reopened and ready to accept patients within 3–7 days of a MCI or epidemic.


2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Davis ◽  
Jennifer C. Poste ◽  
Toni Hicks ◽  
Deanna Polk ◽  
Thérèse E. Rymer ◽  
...  

AbstractIntroduction:Traditional strategies to determine hospital bed surge capacity have relied on cross-sectional hospital census data, which underestimate the true surge capacity in the event of a mass-casualtyincident.Objective:To determine hospital bed surge capacity for the County more accurately using physician and nurse manager assessments for the disposition of all in-patients at multiple facilities.Methods:Overnight- and day-shift nurse managers from each in-patient unit at four different hospitals were approached to make assessments for each patient as to their predicted disposition at 2, 24, and 72 hours post-event in the case of a mass-casualty incident, including transfer to a hypothetical, onsite nursing facility. Physicians at the two academic institutions also were approached for comparison. Age, gender, and admission diagnosis also were recorded for each patient.Results:A total of 1,741 assessments of 788 patients by 82 nurse managers aabnd 25 physicians from the four institutions were included. Nurse managers assessed approximately one-third of all patients as dischargeable at 24 hours and approximately one-half at 72 hours; one-quarter of the patients were assessed as being transferable to a hypothetical, on-site nursing facility at both time points. Physicians were more likely than werenurse managers to send patients to such a facility or discharge them, but less likely to transfer patients outof the intensive care unit (ICU). Inter-facility variability was explained by differences in the distribution of patient diagnoses.Conclusions:A large proportion of in-patients can be discharged within 24 and 72 hours in the event of a mass-casualty incident (MCI). Additional beds can be made available if an on-site nursing facility is made available. Both physicians and nurse managers should be included on the team that makes patient dispositions in the event of a MCI.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-29
Author(s):  
Jasmine L. Jacobs-Wingo ◽  
Heather A. Cook ◽  
William H. Lang

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trevor NT Hall ◽  
Andrew McDonald ◽  
Kobi Peleg

AbstractObjectiveWe aimed to identify and seek agreement on factors that may influence decision-making related to the distribution of patients during a mass casualty incident.MethodsA qualitative thematic analysis of a literature review identified 56 unique factors related to the distribution of patients in a mass casualty incident. A modified Delphi study was conducted and used purposive sampling to identify peer reviewers that had either (1) a peer-reviewed publication within the area of disaster management or (2) disaster management experience. In round one, peer reviewers ranked the 56 factors and identified an additional 8 factors that resulted in 64 factors being ranked during the two-round Delphi study. The criteria for agreement were defined as a median score greater than or equal to 7 (on a 9-point Likert scale) and a percentage distribution of 75% or greater of ratings being in the highest tertile.ResultsFifty-four disaster management peer reviewers, with hospital and prehospital practice settings most represented, assessed a total of 64 factors, of which 29 factors (45%) met the criteria for agreement.ConclusionsAgreement from this formative study suggests that certain factors are influential to decision-making related to the distribution of patients during a mass casualty incident. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2018;12:101–108)


2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pinchas Halpern ◽  
Scott A. Goldberg ◽  
Jimmy G. Keng ◽  
Kristi L. Koenig

AbstractIntroductionThe Emergency Department (ED) is the triage, stabilization and disposition unit of the hospital during a mass-casualty incident (MCI). With most EDs already functioning at or over capacity, efficient management of an MCI requires optimization of all ED components. While the operational aspects of MCI management have been well described, the architectural/structural principles have not. Further, there are limited reports of the testing of ED design components in actual MCI events. The objective of this study is to outline the important infrastructural design components for optimization of ED response to an MCI, as developed, implemented, and repeatedly tested in one urban medical center.ReportIn the authors’ experience, the most important aspects of ED design for MCI have included external infrastructure and promoting rapid lockdown of the facility for security purposes; an ambulance bay permitting efficient vehicle flow and casualty discharge; strategic placement of the triage location; patient tracking techniques; planning adequate surge capacity for both patients and staff; sufficient command, control, communications, computers, and information; well-positioned and functional decontamination facilities; adequate, well-located and easily distributed medical supplies; and appropriately built and functioning essential services.DiscussionDesigning the ED to cope well with a large casualty surge during a disaster is not easy, and it may not be feasible for all EDs to implement all the necessary components. However, many of the components of an appropriate infrastructural design add minimal cost to the normal expenditures of building an ED.ConclusionThis study highlights the role of design and infrastructure in MCI preparedness in order to assist planners in improving their ED capabilities. Structural optimization calls for a paradigm shift in the concept of structural and operational ED design, but may be necessary in order to maximize surge capacity, department resilience, and patient and staff safety.Halpern P, Goldberg SA, Keng JG, Koenig KL. Principles of Emergency Department facility design for optimal management of mass-casualty incidents.Prehosp Disaster Med.2012;27(2):1-9.


2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (S1) ◽  
pp. S59-S67 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Hick ◽  
Joseph A. Barbera ◽  
Gabor D. Kelen

ABSTRACTHealth care facility surge capacity has received significant planning attention recently, but there is no commonly accepted framework for detailed, phased surge capacity categorization and implementation. This article proposes a taxonomy within surge capacity of conventional capacity (implemented in major mass casualty incidents and representing care as usually provided at the institution), contingency capacity (using adaptations to medical care spaces, staffing constraints, and supply shortages without significant impact on delivered medical care), and crisis capacity (implemented in catastrophic situations with a significant impact on standard of care). Suggested measurements used to gauge a quantifiable component of surge capacity and adaptive strategies for staff and supply challenges are proposed. The use of refined definitions of surge capacity as it relates to space, staffing, and supply concerns during a mass casualty incident may aid phased implementation of surge capacity plans at health care facilities and enhance the consistency of terminology and data collection between facilities and regions. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S59–S67)


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 426-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jet-Chau Wen ◽  
Chia-Chou Tsai ◽  
Mei-Hsuan Chen ◽  
Wei-Ta Chang

AbstractObjectiveOn April 27, 2011, a train derailed and crashed in Taiwan, causing a mass casualty incident (MCI) that was similar to a previous event and with similar consequences. In both disasters, the emergency operating centers (EOCs) could not effectively integrate associated agencies to deal with the incident. The coordination and utilization of resources were inefficient, which caused difficulty in command structure operation and casualty evacuation.MethodsThis study was designed to create a survey questionnaire with problem items using disaster management phases mandated by Taiwan’s Emergency Medical Care Law (EMCL), use statistical methods (t test) to analyze the results and issues the EOCs encountered during the operation, and propose solutions for those problems.ResultsFindings showed that EOCs lacked authority to intervene or coordinate with associated agencies. Also, placing emphasis on the recovery phase should improve future prevention and response mechanisms.ConclusionsTo improve the response to MCIs, the EMCL needs to be amended to give EOCs the lead during disasters; use feedback from the recovery phase to improve future disaster management and operation coordination; and establish an information-sharing platform across agencies to address all aspects of relief work.(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2014;0:1-6)


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