Can Saddam be Contained? History Says Yes

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer ◽  
Stephen M. Walt

Should the United States invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein? Over the past few months, advocates of war have advanced a number of reasons why toppling Saddam is desirable. He is a bloodthirsty tyrant. He has defied the United Nations on numerous occasions. He has backed terrorists in the past. Removing him will reinforce respect for American power and spark democratic reform in the Middle East. If you're looking for a reason to support a war, in short, there are lenty from which to choose.

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wertheim

Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of the conferences that directly established the UN in 1944 and 1945. The answer lies earlier in the war, from 1940 to 1942, when, under the pressure of fast-moving events, American officials and intellectuals decided their country must not only enter the war but also lead the world long afterwards. International political organization gained popularity – first among unofficial postwar planners in 1941 and then among State Department planners in 1942 – because it appeared to be an indispensable tool for implementing postwar US world leadership, for projecting and in no way constraining American power. US officials believed the new organization would legitimate world leadership in the eyes of the American public by symbolizing the culmination of prior internationalist efforts to end power politics, even as they based the design of the UN on a thoroughgoing critique of the League, precisely for assuming that power politics could be transcended.


1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shlomo Slonim

The United States has been involved in the question of Jerusalem ever since the American government assumed a major role in promoting adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution at the United Nations in 1947. The continuing centrality of the Jerusalem issue in the Arab-Israeli dispute is attested to by the references to Jerusalem in the 1982 Reagan Plan for Peace in the Middle East. Even more significant is the fact that although the Jerusalem issue did not figure in the text of the 1978 Camp David Agreements, it was the subject of three separate letters appended to the Agreements by Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat and President Carter. In fact, it is no secret that the Camp David Talks nearly foundered at the last minute over the Jerusalem question. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the United States, which signed the Agreements simply as a witness and not as a party, found it necessary and proper to publicly define its position on the issue of Jerusalem. On no other issue did the American government feel compelled to put forth an official independent viewpoint in the final documents.


Author(s):  
Gregory A. Barton

While a few positive stories on organic farming appeared in the 1970s most mainstream press coverage mocked or dismissed organic farmers and consumers. Nevertheless, the growing army of consumer shoppers at health food stores in the United States made the movement impossible to ignore. The Washington Post and other newspapers shifted from negative caricatures of organic farming to a supportive position, particularly after the USDA launched an organic certification scheme in the United States under the leadership of Robert Bergland. Certification schemes in Europe and other major markets followed, leading to initiatives by the United Nations for the harmonization of organic certification through multilateral agencies. As organic standards proliferated in the 1990s the United Nations stepped in to resolve the regulatory fragmentation creating a global market for organic goods.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.


Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.


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