scholarly journals States, firms, and security: How private actors implement sanctions, lessons learned from the Netherlands

Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 135-139
Author(s):  
Antonios Tzanakopoulos

The United States and other actors such as the European Union impose “targeted sanctions” against foreign officials for acts carried out in their official capacity, or against legal entities of targeted states. This mirrors the practice and experience of the United Nations. The Security Council's practice of imposing comprehensive sanctions in the early 1990s quickly evolved into a practice of “targeted” or “smart” sanctions, to both improve effectiveness and to alleviate the significant effects of sanctions on the population of targeted states. However, the legal regime for resorting to sanctions is different when it comes to states acting unilaterally than it is for collective action within the framework of the UN Charter. This essay first clarifies some terminological issues. It then delves into the legality of the practice of unilateral “targeted sanctions,” and concludes that the most legally difficult aspect of these measures is their purported extraterritoriality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 348-355
Author(s):  
Alina Alexandru

Abstract New technologies have marked the beginning of the Forth Industrial Revolution era. While the advantages of new technologies for our day-to-day life are undeniable, we cannot fail to notice that emerging and disruptive technologies also imply challenges and risks for individuals, societies and countries. Moreover, in the absence of regulations and norms internationally accepted and assumed, risks associated to the misuse of new technologies tend to increase, transforming the domain into a competition arena. States and international organizations perceive the pressure to address emerging technologies. The United Nations, the United States and the European Union have defined their own strategies and policies on the new technologies with the aim at capitalizing the benefits and minimizing the risks. While different in their view, UN’s, US’ and EU’ strategies and policies offer landmarks to consider in addressing new technologies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-195
Author(s):  
Michael D. Rosenthal

For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”


The United Nations Security Council reflects a setup of the past rather than the reality of the present world order. There has been a clamour for the induction of new countries as permanent members into the council to render it truly universal. But would the expansion of the permanent members naturally lead to the democratization of the most important international organization?India has been one of the claimants for permanent membership. Even though India’s demand is legitimate, it must first seek and secure its place at the global high table and should play a role in helping shape the global order.The European Union tries to lead and influence the international politics by its example and intends to replicate its success at the global level. Just like India, the EU is a votary of ‘multilateralism’ and it stands for the UN, and insists on the need for international laws, agreements, rules and institutions. India is part of EU’s global security strategy and is considered as one among the ‘key’ strategic partners. EU can thus be the perfect and reliable partner for India to achieve its foreign and strategic policy goals. India should join hands with the EU to formulate new global democratic laws and norms, thereby becoming a norm setter on its own right.


2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Clara Portela ◽  
Thijs Van Laer

Since the 1990s, sanctions senders like the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations have been imposing visa bans and asset freezes on individuals as a key element of their sanctions packages. Notwithstanding the growing centrality that individual sanctions have acquired in international sanctions practice, little is known about the impact of sanctions listings on designees. Some researchers have scrutinised targeting choices, while others have explored the effects of sanctions on designees. However, no study has yet examined the fit between targeting choices and impacts on designees. First, we interrogate the theory of targeted sanctions to identify the expectations that it generates. Second, we examine the effects on designees and contrast them with the targeting logic of the sender, in a bid to ascertain their fit. Our analysis of the cases of Côte d’Ivoire (2010–2011) and Zimbabwe (2002–2017) benefits from original interview material.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.


2020 ◽  
pp. 073889422094872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick M Weber ◽  
Gerald Schneider

The European Union, the United Nations, and the United States frequently use economic sanctions. This article introduces the EUSANCT Dataset—which amends, merges, and updates some of the most widely used sanctions databases—to trace the evolution of sanctions after the Cold War. The dataset contains case-level and dyadic information on 326 threatened and imposed sanctions by the EU, the UN, and the US. We show that the usage and overall success of sanctions have not grown from 1989 to 2015 and that while the US is the most active sanctioner, the EU and the UN appear more successful.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-744
Author(s):  
Paul C. Szasz

By now everyone in the United States, certainly every lawyer, must be conscious of the tort liability crisis and the consequent liability insurance crisis. Private individuals, businesses, not-for-profit enterprises and even governmental units, from school boards to the federal Government, are finding that the damages they have to pay or their insurance costs are skyrocketing, sometimes catastrophically or even cripplingly; as a result, worthwhile events must be canceled and valuable facilities are idled. Although it may be thought that these mundane concerns cannot affect an international organization—even one, like the United Nations, based in the United States—that surely it can shelter itself with its immunity, this unfortunately is not so. Although the United Nations, like other intergovernmental organizations, does enjoy full jurisdictional immunity, based generally upon its Charter but more specifically on international treaties and even national legislation, there is somewhat less to this protection than meets the uninformed eye. Since their member states expect the organizations they establish to be good international citizens, they have prohibited them from hiding behind their functional immunity for the purpose of evading either contractor tort-related responsibilities. Indeed, they may only use their immunity in order to avoid litigation in a national court or some other inappropriate forum; but if they cannot resolve a dispute, for example with a tort claimant, they must offer some other suitable means of settling the matter, such as by arbitration.


Author(s):  
Amaney A. Jamal

This chapter extends the analysis to Palestine and Saudi Arabia. In 2002, the road map for peace adopted by the European Union, United States, Russian, and the United Nations called for the necessity of Palestinian reforms in moving the peace process forward. The United States was vocal about the need for the Palestinians to reform their system of government and pushed for Palestinian elections in the early years of the new millennium. However, the United States was hoping that a pro-Fatah alliance would emerge and neglected to state publicly that it would nullify any outcome that was not favorable to its own interests. The Palestinians learned the hard way that the United States would indeed punish the entire population for exercising democracy the wrong way. The case of Saudi Arabia mirrors in many ways the experiences of non-oil-rich states captured in this manuscript. Significant segments of the Saudi public recognize the importance of the Saudi regime in maintaining close alliances with the United States.


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