INSTRUMENTAL RULES AND MOTIVATION

Legal Theory ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antony Hatzistavrou

In this paper I address the issue of the normativity of instrumental rules (for example, legal rules). On the one hand, I criticize Scott Shapiro's “constraint model” of instrumental rule-following according to which instrumental rules have motivational clout qua rules: the agent conforms to them simply because they are rules. On the other, I argue for a purely epistemic account of instrumental rule-following. According to this account, instrumental rules inform the agent which action she is required to perform but do not get her to act. Rather the agent is motivationally guided by the reasons for which she adopted the instrumental rules.

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Melanie Uth

AbstractThis article examines the relation between the philosophy of language proposed by the later Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, and his ambition to cure philosophy from the mapping of linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic entities, on the one hand, and Chomsky's statements regarding language, meaning, and thought, and regarding the sense and non-sense of different fields of linguistic research, on the other. After a brief descriptive comparison of both approaches, it is argued that Chomsky's criticism on Wittgenstein's theory of meaning (Chomsky 1974 – 1996), or on Wittgenstein's basic concepts such as e. g. rule-following (Chomsky 2000 onwards), respectively, is (a) unwarranted and (b) caused by a fundamental misconception. Moreover, it is argued that the hypothesis evoked by Grewendorf (1985: 126), according to which „Chomsky would like to explain what Wittgenstein describes“, is misleading since the objects of investigation of Chomsky and Wittgenstein are in complementary distribution one to the other.


1960 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Roberts-Wray

British administration in overseas countries has conferred no greater benefit than English law and justice. That may be a trite observation, but I offer no apology. It has been said so often by so many people—as many laymen as lawyers and perhaps more Africans than Englishmen—that it must be assumed to be true. But what, in this context, are English law and justice, or similar expressions (it is put in many different ways) to be taken to comprehend ? I have heard one or two lawyers who have served overseas speak as if there were a rebuttable presumption that anything suitable for this country should be acceptable for a country in Africa. Even if that were true, and I am sure it is not, it would not that all English legal rules and institutions are appropriate for Africa, for they are not even suitable for England. It is only too true that the law is sometimes “an ass”. Not so often as some laymen like to claim, though laymen may be fair judges of what is good sense in law. I well remember how as a law student I became impatient with principles, especially in the law of torts and the rules of evidence, which to my mind left a large gap between law on the one hand and justice or common sense on the other. I am well aware that in my critical attitude I was at one with the majority, and all lawyers must welcome the labours of the Law Reform Committees, which have borne fruit in a steady stream of important Bills during the last thirty years.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Schulte

AbstractThis paper is an attempt at a continuous, though certainly incomplete, commentary on Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules and rule-following in PI, §§ 80 - 86. On the one hand, these remarks are seen as fitting in with their immediate context (proper names, exactness and its opposite), on the other, as anticipating in some ways, but at the same time differing in other ways from, the famous and much-discussed observations on rule-following in §§ 185 ff. The notion of a rule which emerges from this discussion is not easy to reconcile with widespread ideas about ‘rule-governed activities’, where at least some of the rules involved are not supposed to be public (at any rate not as public as Wittgenstein’s arrows and signposts) nor stateable and deliberately obeyed or flouted (as in the examples mentioned by Wittgenstein).


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-33
Author(s):  
Kirill A. Rodin ◽  

The article presents an attempt to evaluate the influence of the late Wittgenstein philosophy (by the example of the rule-following problem) on sociology and some empirical programs of sociological research. At first we give a brief overview of the rule-following problem and consider, on the one hand, a skeptical reading and a skeptical solution to the problem by S. Kripke and, on the other hand, criticism towards Kripke by some Wittgensteinians). Then we reveal the role of skeptic reading in the sociological works of D. Bloor and the role of anti-sceptic reading in ethnomethodological projects. At the end we show the paramount importance of Peter Winch – we prove the following thesis: the ideas of Peter Winch anticipated many of the points and arguments in the dispute between D. Bloor and ethnomethodology.


2020 ◽  
pp. 46-49
Author(s):  
K.A. Sinkin ◽  
D.A. Emelyanova

The article is devoted to the problem of the interaction between law and morality and especially whenlaw influences on morality. The influence of law on morality has two opposite sides. On the one hand, lawdefenses morality but on the other hand, law alters morality. The author of the article marks that suchalteration has negative trend according to which law approves immoral behavior as conformist or marginal.On the basis of analysis of certain legal rules and historical examples the author shows different possibilitiesof the interaction between law and morality and especially the influence of law on morality. There is aconclusion in the article according to which it is highly important to form legal system of Russia based onmorality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105-118
Author(s):  
Oona A. Hathaway

Arthur Ripstein offers a Kantian response to what he calls “Shawcross’s argument”—the argument that the killing of combatants in war is justifiable only where the war is legal. In doing so, he is seeking to provide a moral justification for what may appear to be an incoherence between the two main pillars of modern law of war: On the one hand, the ius ad bellum provides that states may only lawfully resort to war when they have a just cause. On the other hand, the ius in bello specifies rules governing conduct that apply equally to both sides in a conflict—regardless of whether they are waging a lawful or unlawful war. Hence combatants in an unlawful war are entitled to the same immunities from prosecution as combatants in a lawful one. But how can that possibly be morally just? Shawcross rejects that moral equivalence, comparing combatants in unlawful wars to a “lawless robber band.” In the process, Shawcross—and those sympathetic to his view—threaten to upend the modern law of war. Ripstein comes to international law’s defense, though not in terms most international lawyers would find familiar. Ripstein’s effort to morally ground the international legal rules is admirable. Yet the argument provides a moral foundation for the modern rules of war that is incomplete at best. Moreover, it fails to grapple with the voluntary nature of international law, which allows states to agree to further their long-term best interests even at the price of short-term constraints.


2009 ◽  
pp. 97-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
Yu. Simachev

The article examines state corporations as one of the options to organize the governance of state-own assets. The basic legal rules of state corporations contain imbalance between the complexity and diversity of goals and concentration of resources within state corporations, on the one hand, and weak capacity of control over their activity on the ground of formal rules, on the other hand. In these circumstances the direct control by the highest level of governmental authorities over the corporations activity is critical for achieving the state objectives. The important role of the principal and relatively low demand for corporate governance rules are common features of state corporations and modern Russian private companies.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Roberts

To what extent are international legal rules formally applicable, and practically relevant, to a prolonged military occupation? The question has assumed prominence because of the exceptional duration of the occupation by Israel of various territories that came under its control in the war of June 5–10, 1967. The situation there has had two classic features of a military occupation: first, a formal system of external control by a force whose presence is not sanctioned by international agreement; and second, a conflict of nationality and interest between the inhabitants, on the one hand, and those exercising power over them, on the other. In highlighting these features, the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, which began in Gaza and the West Bank in December 1987, has added urgency to the question of the law applicable to prolonged occupations.


Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg

Chapter 1 states the objective of this book: to develop contract law as it should be. Attention is also given to describing contract law as it is, because what contract law should be cannot be developed in a vacuum. Chapter 1 also describes some of the terms used in this book: doctrinal propositions is used in this book to mean propositions that purport to state legal rules and are found in or can be derived from sources that are generally regarded as authoritative by the legal profession. Social propositions is used to mean policies, which characterize states of affairs as good or bad, depending on whether they are conducive or adverse to the general welfare; moral norms, which characterize conduct as right or wrong; and experiential propositions, which describe the way in which the world works and mediate between moral and policy propositions, on the one hand, and doctrinal propositions on the other. All doctrinal propositions should be based on social propositions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 394
Author(s):  
Mousa Sami Al-Qaaida

This study investigates the most important legal matters of arbitration of Arab oil contracts. It has focused on the independent nature of arbitration, and the distinguished characteristics which make arbitration the most preferable means to settle international economic disputes. The study as well as sheds light on the arbitration agreement which included in the oil contracts in a way that excludes this agreement from the legal rules that usually prevent such agreements from developing in scope and content on the one hand, whereas on the other hand the study takes a look on the arbitration tribunal resulting from the arbitration agreement that included in the oil contracts which have special characteristics that distinguishes them from any other contracts in other economical and trading ventures. This study has concluded that it is better for the disputes resulting from the oil contracts to be resolved via arbitration without necessarily arbitrated affecting the judicial immunity function. additionally, settlement of disputes in issuing the arbitration decision should be voluntarily implemented by the two parties in conflict. Finally, the researcher recommends arbitration as the only viable tool for settling conflicts/disputes of oil contracts in oil producing Arab nations because it’s the fastest, most reliable, least expensive and time saving method of conflict resolution.


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