DOES MODEL UNCERTAINTY JUSTIFY CAUTION? ROBUST OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc P. Giannoni

This paper proposes a general method based on a property of zero-sum two-player games to derive robust optimal monetary policy rules—the best rules among those that yield an acceptable performance in a specified range of models—when the true model is unknown and model uncertainty is viewed as uncertainty about parameters of the structural model. The method is applied to characterize robust optimal Taylor rules in a simple forward-looking macroeconomic model that can be derived from first principles. Although it is commonly believed that monetary policy should be less responsive when there is parameter uncertainty, we show that robust optimal Taylor rules prescribe in general a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in inflation and the output gap than is the case in the absence of uncertainty. Thus model uncertainty does not necessarily justify a relatively small response of actual monetary policy.

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 1345-1369
Author(s):  
Stephen McKnight

Recent research has shown that forward-looking Taylor rules are subject to indeterminacy in New Keynesian models with capital and investment spending. This paper shows that adopting a forward-looking Wicksellian rule that responds to the price level, rather than to inflation, is one potential remedy for the indeterminacy problem. This result is shown to be robust to variations in both the labor supply elasticity and the degree of price stickiness, the inclusion of capital adjustments costs, and if output also enters into the interest-rate feedback rule. Finally, it is shown that the superiority of Wicksellian rules over Taylor rules is not only confined to forward-looking policy, but also extends to both backward-looking and contemporaneous-looking specifications of the monetary policy rule.


2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (12) ◽  
pp. 2186-2212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Cogley ◽  
Bianca De Paoli ◽  
Christian Matthes ◽  
Kalin Nikolov ◽  
Tony Yates

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Tillmann

Empirical evidence suggests that the instrument rule describing the interest rate–setting behavior of the Federal Reserve is nonlinear. This paper shows that optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty can motivate this pattern. If the central bank is uncertain about the slope of the Phillips curve and follows a min–max strategy to formulate policy, the interest rate reacts more strongly to inflation when inflation is further away from target. The reason is that the worst case the central bank takes into account is endogenous and depends on the inflation rate and the output gap. As inflation increases, the worst-case perception of the Phillips curve slope becomes larger, thus requiring a stronger interest rate adjustment. Empirical evidence supports this form of nonlinearity for post-1982 U.S. data.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Solikin M. Juhro

By developing a long-run macro structural model, The Structural Cointegrating Vector Autoregression (VAR), the optimality principle of monetary policy response in Indonesia is formulated. It accommodates not only long-run policy response and short-run dynamic errorcorrection mechanism, but also specific shocks emerged due to structural changes in the economy. In that context, the generated policy response basically reflects the optimal response of a “state-contingent rule”, different from common simple policy rules, such as Taylor rule and McCallum rule. This study captures several important aspects related to the implementation of “state-contingent rule” as an optimal monetary policy in Indonesia, namely: (i) the superiority of interest rate as a policy variable, or an operational target, against monetary base, (ii) the identification of monetary policy lag which is estimated averagely one-and-a half year, and (iii) the sub optimality of central bank monetary policy response, attributed by an over tight or loose policy response.JEL Classification: C32, E52Keywords: Kebijakan Moneter di Indonesia, Respon Kebijakan Moneter, Structural Cointegration Vector Autoregression(VAR).


Author(s):  
Timothy Cogley ◽  
Bianca De Paoli ◽  
Christian Matthes ◽  
Kalin Nikolov ◽  
Tony Yates

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-145
Author(s):  
Nadia Tahir

This study uses the forward-looking rule and backward-looking Taylor rule to investigate the conduct of monetary policy in Pakistan during 1971–2011. We compare the pre- and post-reform periods, and find that the estimates obtained using the generalized method of moments indicate that no interest rate rule was being followed. This explains the inability of monetary policy to control inflation and minimize the output gap. Although monetary policy was not very active in the pre- and post-reform periods, the post-reform quarterly data show some interest rate inertia and smoothing. Monetary policy was less accommodating of the cyclical nature of the output gap. We conclude that the behavior of the State Bank of Pakistan was not very different under forward- or backward-looking rules.


2012 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-199
Author(s):  
Olga Kuznetsova

A great number of recent researches have found importance of country specific shocks for optimal monetary policy construction in the context of a currency union. This however has been almost completely overlooked by the analysis of optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty. The main purpose of our work is to fill this gap. By using a model of a two-country currency union with sticky prices, we have derived robust monetary policy that works reasonably well even in the worst case of model perturbations. We find some anti-attenuation effect of uncertainty, and show that the central bank?s optimal reaction to economic shocks becomes more aggressive with an increase in the extent of misspecification.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (11) ◽  
pp. 5769
Author(s):  
Andrea Bacchiocchi ◽  
Germana Giombini

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper analyses an optimal monetary policy under a non-linear Phillips curve and linear GDP dynamics. A central bank controls the inflation and the GDP trends through the adjustment of the interest rate to prevent shocks and deviations from the long-run optimal targets. The optimal control path for the monetary instrument, the interest rate, is the result of a dynamic minimization problem in a continuous-time fashion. The model allows considering various economic dynamics ranging from hyperinflation to disinflation, sustained growth and recession. The outcomes provide useful monetary policy insights and reveal the dilemma between objectives faced by the monetary authority in trade-off scenarios.</p>


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