scholarly journals Robust monetary policy in a currency union

2012 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-199
Author(s):  
Olga Kuznetsova
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Model Uncertainty ◽  
Currency Union ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Attenuation Effect ◽  
Optimal Reaction ◽  
Country Specific

A great number of recent researches have found importance of country specific shocks for optimal monetary policy construction in the context of a currency union. This however has been almost completely overlooked by the analysis of optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty. The main purpose of our work is to fill this gap. By using a model of a two-country currency union with sticky prices, we have derived robust monetary policy that works reasonably well even in the worst case of model perturbations. We find some anti-attenuation effect of uncertainty, and show that the central bank?s optimal reaction to economic shocks becomes more aggressive with an increase in the extent of misspecification.

PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY AND NONLINEAR MONETARY POLICY RULES

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Tillmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Parameter Uncertainty ◽  
Phillips Curve ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Rate Adjustment ◽  
The Interest Rate

Empirical evidence suggests that the instrument rule describing the interest rate–setting behavior of the Federal Reserve is nonlinear. This paper shows that optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty can motivate this pattern. If the central bank is uncertain about the slope of the Phillips curve and follows a min–max strategy to formulate policy, the interest rate reacts more strongly to inflation when inflation is further away from target. The reason is that the worst case the central bank takes into account is endogenous and depends on the inflation rate and the output gap. As inflation increases, the worst-case perception of the Phillips curve slope becomes larger, thus requiring a stronger interest rate adjustment. Empirical evidence supports this form of nonlinearity for post-1982 U.S. data.

scholarly journals Optimal Monetary Policy when Information is Market-Generated

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (628) ◽  
pp. 956-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenza Benhima ◽  
Isabella Blengini
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Supply Shocks ◽  
Individual Demand ◽  
Real Shocks

Abstract The nature of the private sector’s information changes the optimal conduct of monetary policy. When firms observe their individual demand and use it as a signal of real shocks, the optimal policy consists in maximising the information content of that signal. When real shocks are deflationary (like labour supply shocks), the optimal policy is countercyclical and magnifies price movements, which contrasts with the exogenous information case, where optimal monetary policy is procyclical and stabilises prices. When the central bank communicates its information to the public, this policy is still optimal if firms pay limited attention to central bank announcements.

scholarly journals A Bayesian approach to optimal monetary policy with parameter and model uncertainty

2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (12) ◽  
pp. 2186-2212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Cogley ◽  
Bianca De Paoli ◽  
Christian Matthes ◽  
Kalin Nikolov ◽  
Tony Yates
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Bayesian Approach ◽  
Model Uncertainty ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy

scholarly journals ROBUST MONETARY POLICY IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH IMPERFECT INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1504-1526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Gerke ◽  
Felix Hammermann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Model Misspecification ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Loan Rate ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Policy Shifts

We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be misspecified. We find that, first, whether robust optimal monetary policy under commitment responds more cautiously or more aggressively depends crucially on the source of shock. Imperfect pass-through amplifies the robust policy. Second, if the central bank is concerned about uncertainty, it dampens volatility in the inflation rate preemptively but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and loan rate. However, for highly sticky loan rates, insurance against model misspecification becomes particularly pricy. Third, if the central bank fears uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilization away from inflation.

DOES MODEL UNCERTAINTY JUSTIFY CAUTION? ROBUST OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A FORWARD-LOOKING MODEL

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc P. Giannoni
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Model Uncertainty ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Taylor Rules ◽  
True Model ◽  
The Interest Rate ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
General Method ◽  
Forward Looking

This paper proposes a general method based on a property of zero-sum two-player games to derive robust optimal monetary policy rules—the best rules among those that yield an acceptable performance in a specified range of models—when the true model is unknown and model uncertainty is viewed as uncertainty about parameters of the structural model. The method is applied to characterize robust optimal Taylor rules in a simple forward-looking macroeconomic model that can be derived from first principles. Although it is commonly believed that monetary policy should be less responsive when there is parameter uncertainty, we show that robust optimal Taylor rules prescribe in general a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in inflation and the output gap than is the case in the absence of uncertainty. Thus model uncertainty does not necessarily justify a relatively small response of actual monetary policy.

scholarly journals Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near-Rational Expectations

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 274-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Woodford
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Stabilization Policy ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
Model Consistency ◽  
Long Run

The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking model, when the central bank recognizes that private sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency. It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent than if rational expectations are assumed. (JEL C62, D84, E13, E31, E32, E52)

scholarly journals A Bayesian Approach to Optimal Monetary Policy with Parameter and Model Uncertainty

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Cogley ◽  
Bianca De Paoli ◽  
Christian Matthes ◽  
Kalin Nikolov ◽  
Tony Yates
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Bayesian Approach ◽  
Model Uncertainty ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy
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