God’s Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant’s Moral Justification for Divine Hiddenness

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-157
Author(s):  
Tyler Paytas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Divine Hiddenness ◽  
Self Interest

AbstractThe problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ arises from the lack of an explanation for why an all-loving God would choose not to make his existence evident. I argue that Kant provides a compelling solution to this problem in an often overlooked passage located near the end of the second Critique. Kant’s suggestion is that God’s revealing himself would preclude the development of virtue because we would lose the experience of conflict between self-interest and the moral law. I provide a reconstruction and defence of Kant’s argument, and I explain why it is consistent with his overall position in the second Critique.

scholarly journals Is there Such a Thing as a Good Profit? Taking Conventional Ethics Seriously

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marja K. Svanberg ◽  
Carl F. C. Svanberg
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Christian Ethics ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Profit Motive ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper will show that if we take conventional ethics seriously, then there is no moral justification for business profits. To show this, we explore three conventional ethical theories, namely Christian ethics, Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics. Since they essentially reject self-interest, they also reject the essence of business: the profit motive. To illustrate the relationship, we will concretize how the anti-egoist perspective expresses itself in business and business ethics. In business, we look at what many businesses regard as proof of their virtue. In business ethics, we look at what many business ethicists say about the relationship between morality and self-interest and, thus, the profit motive. Ultimately, we will argue that conventional ethics can, at most, only justify the means of business (i.e., aspects of running a business), but not the end of business (i.e., profits).

The Motive of Duty and the Nature of Emotions: Kantian Reflections on Moral Worth

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Weber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Mere Presence

It is unclear in the Groundwork exactly what Kant takes to be necessary for an act to be morally good or worthy. Traditionally it has been thought that for Kant there are two conditions: it is 1) done in accord with duty, or the moral law, and 2) done for the sake of duty alone. The second condition is commonly thought to entail that an act is not morally good if the agent has a ‘supporting inclination’ or desire to do what is right — be it an inclination of self-interest, or one stemming from some emotion of ‘fellow feeling,’ such as sympathy, compassion, or love. Recent Interpreters, however, claim that Kant is not so strict, because for him the mere presence of a supporting inclination does not necessarily impugn the moral goodness of a dutiful act.

The Law of Nature as the Moral Law

1988 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Gert
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Long Term Preservation

AbstractAlthough Hobbes talks about the laws of nature as prescribing the virtues, it is easier to think of them as proscribing the vices. The nine vices that are proscribed by the laws of nature are injustice, ingratitude, greed or inhumanity, vindictiveness (Hobbes does not name the vice corresponding to mercy, this is my attempt to provide one.), cruelty, incivility or contumely, pride, arrogance, and unfairness (I take this to be the vice corresponding to equity). The corresponding virtues that are prescribed by the laws of nature are justice, gratitude, humanity or complaisance, mercy, (Hobbes does not give, and I do not know what would count as, the virtue corresponding to his account of cruelty), civility, humility, (Hobbes uses this as one of the names for the virtue corresponding to the vice of arrogance, but I am using it as the opposite of pride.), modesty, and equity. The difficulty of coming up with names for some of the virtues, and even for some of the vices, shows that they are not all among the most common moral virtues and vices. Nonetheless, as described by Hobbes, they are genuine moral virtues and vices, traits of character such that all impartial rational persons would favor everyone having the virtues and no one having the vices. All of these virtues are such that they benefit everyone impartially by promoting peace, and are not primarily of benefit to the person having them. This is what makes them moral virtues and distinguishes them from the personal virtues of courage, prudence, and temperance. (See H, XIII, 9) The laws of nature are the dictates "of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." (C, II, 1; see also L, XIV, 3) But the law of nature "dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes;" (L, XV, 34; see also C, III, 32) is also the moral law because "in the means to peace, [it] commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral." (C, III, 31; see also L, XV, 40) Hobbes correctly sees both that peace benefits all persons impartially and that impartiality is essential to morality. His account of the moral virtues correctly makes them traits of character that would be favored by all impartial persons. His argument for the rationality of these moral virtues is that one's self-interest, which for Hobbes is primarily one's long-term preservation, is enhanced by having these virtues. There is no incompatibility between morality and self-interest as long as what is in one's own self-interest is equally in the interest of everyone else. Hobbes sees this point quite clearly and it is at the heart of his justification of the moral virtues.

Responsible gambling:The need for collaborative government, industry, community and consumer involvement

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 307-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Blaszczynski
Keyword(s):  
Responsible Gambling ◽  
Consumer Involvement ◽  
Harm Minimization ◽  
Harm Minimisation ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Gambling Expenditure ◽  
Innovative Products ◽  
Industry Community

Abstract. Background: Tensions exist with various stakeholders facing competing interests in providing legal land-based and online regulated gambling products. Threats to revenue/taxation occur in response to harm minimisation and responsible gambling policies. Setting aside the concept of total prohibition, the objectives of responsible gambling are to encourage and/or restrict an individual’s gambling expenditure in terms of money and time to personally affordable limits. Stakeholder responsibilities: Governments craft the gambling environment through legislation, monitor compliance with regulatory requirements, and receive taxation revenue as a proportion of expenditure. Industry operators on the other hand, compete across market sectors through marketing and advertising, and through the development of commercially innovative products, reaping substantial financial rewards. Concurrently, governments are driven to respond to community pressures to minimize the range of negative gambling-related social, personal and economic harms and costs. Industry operators are exposed to the same pressures but additionally overlaid with the self-interest of avoiding the imposition of more stringent restrictive policies. Cooperation of stakeholders: The resulting tension between taxation revenue and profit making, harm minimization, and social impacts creates a climate of conflict between all involved parties. Data-driven policies become compromised by unsubstantiated claims of, and counter claims against, the nature and extent of gambling-related harms, effectiveness of policy strategies, with allegations of bias and influence associated with researchers supported by industry and government research funding sources. Conclusion: To effectively advance policies, it is argued that it is imperative that all parties collaborate in a cooperative manner to achieve the objectives of responsible gambling and harm minimization. This extends to and includes more transparent funding for researchers from both government and industry. Continued reliance on data collected from analogue populations or volunteers participating in simulated gambling tasks will not provide data capable of valid and reliable extrapolation to real gamblers in real venues risking their own funds. Failure to adhere to principles of corporate responsibility and consumer protection by both governments and industry will challenge the social licence to offer gambling products. Appropriate and transparent safeguards learnt from the tobacco and alcohol field, it is argued, can guide the conduct of gambling research.

Love and Self-Interest

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Graham L. Staines
Keyword(s):  
Self Interest

Ethics and self-interest, me and you

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Peters ◽  
Kees Van den Bos ◽  
Ramona Bobocel
Keyword(s):  
Self Interest
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