The Motive of Duty and the Nature of Emotions: Kantian Reflections on Moral Worth

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Weber
Keyword(s):  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Mere Presence

It is unclear in the Groundwork exactly what Kant takes to be necessary for an act to be morally good or worthy. Traditionally it has been thought that for Kant there are two conditions: it is 1) done in accord with duty, or the moral law, and 2) done for the sake of duty alone. The second condition is commonly thought to entail that an act is not morally good if the agent has a ‘supporting inclination’ or desire to do what is right — be it an inclination of self-interest, or one stemming from some emotion of ‘fellow feeling,’ such as sympathy, compassion, or love. Recent Interpreters, however, claim that Kant is not so strict, because for him the mere presence of a supporting inclination does not necessarily impugn the moral goodness of a dutiful act.

God’s Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant’s Moral Justification for Divine Hiddenness

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-157
Author(s):  
Tyler Paytas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Divine Hiddenness ◽  
Self Interest

AbstractThe problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ arises from the lack of an explanation for why an all-loving God would choose not to make his existence evident. I argue that Kant provides a compelling solution to this problem in an often overlooked passage located near the end of the second Critique. Kant’s suggestion is that God’s revealing himself would preclude the development of virtue because we would lose the experience of conflict between self-interest and the moral law. I provide a reconstruction and defence of Kant’s argument, and I explain why it is consistent with his overall position in the second Critique.

The Effect of Incentives: The Value of Reputation

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Reputation Effects

It is useful to model the temptation to act wrongly using the prisoner’s dilemma, one of the most important games in game theory. The prisoner’s dilemma appears to show that the pursuit of self-interest can paradoxically lead to situations in which everyone makes choices they know will undermine their self-interest. However, introducing the possibility of repeated, self-sorting prisoner’s dilemmas with reputation effects reveals something important about the connection between self-interest and morality: We have strong incentives not to cheat because in the long run, we do best by developing the reputation for being honest. However, unfortunately, this also introduces an incentive to exaggerate our moral goodness and to engage in moral grandstanding.

Kantian Conceptions of Moral Goodness

1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Worth ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Goodness

There are two general views associated with Kant about the nature of morally good persons and their actions. One view is that one's actions have moral worth only if one is motivated by a sense of duty and not by inclination. The other view is that morally good persons are motivated by reason and not by desire. These two views are not always distinguished. But taken at face value, they do seem distinct. They seem distinct at least in that one might suppose that one of the desires one has is a desire to do one's duty. And so being motivated by a sense of duty would not necessarily imply that one is motivated by something other than one of one's desires.

The Law of Nature as the Moral Law

1988 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Gert
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Long Term Preservation

AbstractAlthough Hobbes talks about the laws of nature as prescribing the virtues, it is easier to think of them as proscribing the vices. The nine vices that are proscribed by the laws of nature are injustice, ingratitude, greed or inhumanity, vindictiveness (Hobbes does not name the vice corresponding to mercy, this is my attempt to provide one.), cruelty, incivility or contumely, pride, arrogance, and unfairness (I take this to be the vice corresponding to equity). The corresponding virtues that are prescribed by the laws of nature are justice, gratitude, humanity or complaisance, mercy, (Hobbes does not give, and I do not know what would count as, the virtue corresponding to his account of cruelty), civility, humility, (Hobbes uses this as one of the names for the virtue corresponding to the vice of arrogance, but I am using it as the opposite of pride.), modesty, and equity. The difficulty of coming up with names for some of the virtues, and even for some of the vices, shows that they are not all among the most common moral virtues and vices. Nonetheless, as described by Hobbes, they are genuine moral virtues and vices, traits of character such that all impartial rational persons would favor everyone having the virtues and no one having the vices. All of these virtues are such that they benefit everyone impartially by promoting peace, and are not primarily of benefit to the person having them. This is what makes them moral virtues and distinguishes them from the personal virtues of courage, prudence, and temperance. (See H, XIII, 9) The laws of nature are the dictates "of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." (C, II, 1; see also L, XIV, 3) But the law of nature "dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes;" (L, XV, 34; see also C, III, 32) is also the moral law because "in the means to peace, [it] commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral." (C, III, 31; see also L, XV, 40) Hobbes correctly sees both that peace benefits all persons impartially and that impartiality is essential to morality. His account of the moral virtues correctly makes them traits of character that would be favored by all impartial persons. His argument for the rationality of these moral virtues is that one's self-interest, which for Hobbes is primarily one's long-term preservation, is enhanced by having these virtues. There is no incompatibility between morality and self-interest as long as what is in one's own self-interest is equally in the interest of everyone else. Hobbes sees this point quite clearly and it is at the heart of his justification of the moral virtues.

Kantian Challenges for the Bioenhancement of Moral Autonomy

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 121-143
Author(s):  
Anna Frammartino Wilks
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
Moral Deliberation ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement ◽  
Biochemical Genetic ◽  
Key Features

AbstractIn the debate over moral bioenhancement, some object that biochemical, genetic, and neurological interventions aiming at enhancing moral agency threaten the autonomy of persons, as they compromise moral deliberation and motivation. Opponents of this view argue that such interventions may actually enhance autonomy itself, thereby increasing a person's capacity for moral agency. My aim is to explore the various senses of autonomy commonly appealed to in such controversies and to expose their limitations in resolving the central disputed issues. I propose that a Kantian conception of autonomy is more effective in addressing these issues, as it specifies the key features that inform an intelligible account of moral worth and moral law. A consideration of these features is typically lacking in the arguments advanced by contenders in these debates. Guided by a Kantian framework, I argue that moral bioenhancement projects directed at affecting moral autonomy are not as promising as they appear, for both metaphysical and empirical reasons.

Altruism Versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neera Kapur Badhwar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Short Term ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Other Regarding

In the moral philosophy of the last two centuries, altruism of one kind or another has typically been regarded as identical with moral concern. When self-regarding duties have been recognized, motivation by duty has been sharply distinguished from motivation by self-interest. Accordingly, from Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick to Rawls, Nagel, and Gauthier, concern for our own interests, whether long-term or short-term, has typically been regarded as intrinsically nonmoral. So, for example, although Thomas Nagel regards both prudence and altruism as structural features of practical reason, he identifies only the latter as a moral capacity, prudence being merely rational, long-term egoism. Similarly, John Ravvls and David Gauthier contrast self-interest and other nontuistic interests—interests that are independent of others' interests—with moral interest. We are morally permitted, no doubt, to act out of self-interest within certain constraints, but such acts can have no intrinsic moral worth. Pursuit of our own interests out of duty (if there is such a duty) does have intrinsic moral worth, but such pursuit, by hypothesis, cannot be motivated by self-interest. Self-interested pursuit of our own interests as such, no matter how realistic, farsighted, temperate, honest, or courageous, cannot be intrinsically moral. And this remains the case even if self-interest motivates us to perform other-regarding acts: only those other-regarding acts that are (appropriately) motivated by others' interests count as moral, because only such acts are altruistic.

On Foundation Problems of Normative and Educational Ethics

1998 ◽  
pp. 215-222
Author(s):  
Horst Seidl
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Deontological Ethics ◽  
Educational Ethics ◽  
The Will ◽  
Natural Inclination

The controversies in our time between teleological and deontological ethics which come down to the problem "from being to ought," referring to human being or nature, can be resolved only by an adequate conception of human nature. Taking up the ancient tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Stoa) again, we can re-examine the teleological conception of human nature as primarily instinctive and selfish, and say that human nature is constituted also by reason and that the instinctive nature is predisposed to be guided by reason or intellect. The constitutive order of the human soul, with the subordination of the instinct under the intellect, involves already some natural goodness, of which the intellect is aware (in the natural moral conscience) and for which the will strives (in a natural inclination). This is the basis for the "moral law" and for normative ethics. Thus, human nature is not selfish in itself. Although moral goodness as humankind’s perfection is an ideal, it has in us already imperfect natural beginnings, a "natural morality." In a certain sense, the moral ought of actions comes from one’s being, from the natural moral goodness of which the intellect is aware in itself, and from its good intentions.

An Oxford Nolloth Professor

2019 ◽  
pp. 114-129
Author(s):  
Clement Webb
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
Moral Duties

The work Clement Webb did on the moral argument often had for its context wider theological questions that he wished to explore. He primarily looked to Plato for inspiration about the nature of moral goodness, and he looked to Immanuel Kant on the nature of moral duties. Although he initially thought Kant had reduced religion to morality, he eventually softened on that conviction. As empirical experience justifies belief in an external world, he took our moral experience as solid justification for belief in moral realities. Inspired by James Martineau, Webb argued that the phenomenology of moral duties (which Kant explained so well) warranted belief in departing from an overambitious kind of Kantian autonomy that precludes belief in a “Higher than ourselves” (Martineau’s term) that gives us the moral law. Finally, Webb also saw some of the profound political implications of the erosion of moral foundations.

When a Good Conscience Errs

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Gerald Gleeson
Keyword(s):  
Roman Catholic ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Catholic Theology ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Good Conscience ◽  
Positive Evaluation

Standard Roman Catholic theology emphases the truth of the moral law and typically regards an error of conscience as a matter of ignorance, for which a person may be more or less culpable. Those who in good faith do wrong are, at best, to be “excused” rather than blamed. This article goes beyond the categories of ignorance, mistake and excuse to offer a positive evaluation of the good, albeit erring, conscience. Newman's understanding of the twofold nature of conscience is compared with recent studies of the distinction between (moral) goodness and (ethical) rightness. A well-formed conscience is shown to be both upright and faithful, and open to continuing conversion.

Beyond Self and Other

1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
The Self ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Philo Of Alexandria ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Difference

Today there is a tendency to do ethics on the basis of what I should like to call the “self-other model.” On this view, an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others–and not even then, unless it is motivated by altruism rather than selfishness. This radical rift between self-interest and virtue traces back at least to Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 b.c.–50 a.d.), according to whom, “lovers of self, when they have stripped and prepared for conflict with those who value virtue, keep up the boxing and wrestling until they have either forced their opponents to give in, or have completely destroyed them.” More recently, the distinction between those who value themselves and those who “value virtue” has been drawn sharply by Bernard Williams: “[I]n moral theory … it is not the Kantian leap from the particular and the affective to the rational and universal that makes all the difference; it is rather the Humean step–that is to say, the first Humean step–from the self to someone else.”

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