scholarly journals Russia–Tariff Treatment: Identifying Systematic Violations of WTO Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-312
Author(s):  
KARA M. REYNOLDS ◽  
BORIS RIGOD

AbstractIn October 2014, the European Union requested consultations with Russia under the WTO's dispute settlement system regarding Russia's tariff treatment of various agricultural and manufacturing products. Although most of the measures challenged by the EU were individual tariff lines, the final measure in its complaint was a ‘more general measure’ referred to as the systematic duty variation. A WTO Dispute Panel eventually ruled that the EU failed to establish the systematic nature of the duty treatment afforded by Russia to certain products. In this paper, we explore the Dispute Panel's ruling, as well as how claims of systematic non-compliance are treated in other legal settings. We conclude by exploring whether future WTO Panels should instead consider statistical evidence of systematic treatment to promote compliance.

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 74
Author(s):  
Ahmed Arafa ◽  
Dexiang Guo

Berserk resentment of the existing framework regulating the international investment protection system and the operating of investment tribunals have direct to a prevalent perception that there is an immediate need for reform. This is especially pronounced having to do with Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), where there is an overall perception that it is not anything but an unfair and unbiased arbitration system available to decide disputes between states and foreign investors. Therefore, ISDS has been obtained a reputation for being non-transparent, one-sided, and contradictory in all decisions made by ISDS tribunals. The European Union (EU) has responded to this need, by proposing an international investment court; in this research, an attempt is making to look at this court, according to the European Union’s proposal. Moreover, the research explores the potential in creating this international investment court since a system can be drastically altered. However, some criticism can be addressed by international investment courts. However, specific steps can be taken to improve the international community’s investor-state dispute settlement system by re-valuating all the objectives and goals to solve international investment disputes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
Naiara Arriola Echaniz

Resumen: En el presente artículo se analiza la confluencia de ordenamientos jurídicos entre la OMC y la UE desde la perspectiva del sistema de fuentes del Derecho. Esta interconexión normativa ha derivado en disputas comerciales sobre las que se ha pronunciado no sólo el Sistema de Solución de Diferencias de la OMC sino el propio Tribunal de Justicia de la UE.Palabras clave: Derecho constitucional, sistema de fuentes, Derecho de la UE, Organización Mundial del Comercio, interconexión normativa.Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyze the conjunction of legal systems between the World Trade Organization and the European Union. This normative interconnection has caused dis-putes solved not only by the Dispute Settlement System within the WTO but also applied within the EU judicial system.Keywords: Constitutional Law, conflicts of norms, European Union Law, World Trade Organi-zation, normative interconnection.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


Author(s):  
Antonello Tancredi

This chapter provides a brief analysis of the enforcement tools foreseen in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It focuses in particular on some of the peculiarities which differentiate them from the EU legal system. As the analysis shows, the relevance of reciprocity and post-litigation negotiations between States influences the legal nature of the WTO dispute settlement system, which today remains to a large extent a mixed or hybrid system. This contrasts one of the mantras diffused in the legal scholarship immediately after the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements. It also represents a vehicle for the potential fragmentation of the multilateral legal framework governing international trade, which contributes to undermining the idea of uniformity of the obligations arising under the WTO Agreements for all Members.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-320
Author(s):  
Jed Odermatt

The question of how disputes arising from Brexit are to be resolved, and by which body, is one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations on the uk’s withdrawal from the European Union and the envisaged future relationship between the uk and the eu. The legal issues related to withdrawal are further magnified in complexity due to the nature of the eu itself, which does not neatly fit into the category of a traditional international organization. The uk has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the continued role of the eu Court of Justice in the uk legal system after withdrawal. Any dispute settlement system must also respect the constitutional requirements of the eu legal order, most notably, by not infringing on the autonomy of eu law. This article discusses some of the various models from international dispute settlement that could be used to inspire a dispute settlement system in the Brexit context. It discusses dispute settlement in the withdrawal agreement and the role of the Court of Justice during and after a transition period. It then discusses the challenges of designing a dispute settlement system for the future relationship agreement. While aspects of these various models could be replicated, there is no dispute settlement system that is fully appropriate to deal with the various complexities and challenges of Brexit. The paper proposes the establishment of a standing international tribunal to resolve disputes arising from Brexit.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fathi Hussain ◽  
Mahdi Zahraa

Abstract Dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) are the heart of international organisations without which organisations would be ineffective. The European Union (EU) is probably the most effective regional body whose efficacy is largely due to its powerful judicial organ, the Court of Justice (CJEU). This article also examines the DSM available in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in order to assess its effectiveness. It briefly discusses aspects of the EU and CJEU to help provide suggestions to improve the GCC DSM. This article concludes that the GCC DSM lacks effectiveness due to an inherent defect in its DMS organs. This defect is twofold: first, the GCC has yet to establish an effective judicial organ to deal with its disputes; and, second, there is a lack of political will to establish an organ that is vested with a supranational power that can override the individual will of the Member States.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 287-296
Author(s):  
Colin Brown

Colin Brown, representing the European Commission, presented the EU’s view on the reform of the investment dispute settlement system. At the core of the EU’s proposal is the creation of a permanent Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) with full-time judges. According to the EU, only a permanent standing two-tier mechanism with full-time judges can effectively address the concerns regarding the currently existing investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system in respect of which reform is – according to the EU – desirable.


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