‘Two Roads Diverged in [Soft]wood’ Targeted Dumping, Differential Pricing Methodology, and Zeroing: US – Canada Anti-Dumping in Softwood Lumber

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Eugene Beaulieu ◽  
Janet Whittaker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Export Price ◽  
The United States ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Differential Pricing ◽  
Countervailing Duties ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Price Differences

Abstract The United States and Canada have a long-standing series of disputes over softwood lumber that until now have focused on alleged subsidies and countervailing duties (CVDs). The United States changed things up this time around and the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) found dumping after applying the Differential Pricing Methodology to softwood lumber from Canada. The panel found that the USDOC erroneously aggregated export price differences when applying the differential pricing methodology (DPM), but departed from the WTO Appellate Body's previous ruling in US–Washing Machines regarding the use of zeroing and the inclusion of differential prices under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. To date, the United States and Canada have not been able to resolve the long-standing softwood lumber dispute, and this time the focus shifts from subsidies and countervailing duties to anti-dumping duties. It remains to be seen what happens in this specific dispute on appeal – if, and when, the WTO Appellate Body starts to function again. It will also be interesting to see whether this panel decision encourages parties to argue for, and future panels to permit departures from, Appellate Body rulings with which they disagree.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

scholarly journals United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (WT/DS217/AB/R: DSR 2003:I,375)

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (S1) ◽  
pp. 52-86
Author(s):  
Henrik Horn ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Hong Kong ◽  
European Community ◽  
The United States ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Byrd Amendment ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

On January 16, 2003, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) issued its report on the appeal by the United States (US) of the Panel decision in United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. The report concerns the consistency of the United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (the “CDSOA,” or the so-called Byrd Amendment) with several WTO provisions. This legislation requests the federal state to distribute proceeds from antidumping and countervailing duties to all US economic operators that have supported a request previously submitted to the ratione materiae competent US authority to investigate alleged dumping or subsidization. The appeal was directed against the Panel’s finding that the Byrd legislation was inconsistent with the US obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement (AD), and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). A total of 11 complainants (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Community, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand), and five additional third parties (Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong (China), Israel, and Norway), evidence the interest among WTO Members in the issues at stake in the dispute.

scholarly journals United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Thailand: a cat in the bag

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
EDWIN VERMULST
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
The United States ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Relative Simplicity ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Long Line ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

AbstractThis paper analyzes the dispute between Thailand and the United States regarding the method of calculating the anti-dumping duty on polyethylene retail carrier bags from Thailand. In December 2006, after a series of WTO Appellate Body reports, the United States ceased zeroing in original investigations. The United States implemented the policy change prospectively, that is only for future cases. Consequently, the margins in this case remained unchanged because they had been calculated in 2004. Thailand challenged the United States' use of zeroing in the final determination. The US did not contest the claim. The Panel confirmed that zeroing was used and, following the long line of Appellate Body rulings, found the United States' practice inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. After the Panel Report was adopted, the United States retroactively applied the policy change to the facts of this case and recalculated the margins without zeroing. The relative simplicity of the panel proceeding and the United States' willingness to amend the calculations following the adoption of the Panel Report may invite other WTO members to pursue a similar course of action in instances where their exporters have been subjected to US zeroing.

scholarly journals United States—Anti-dumping Measures Applying Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-743
Author(s):  
Niccolò Ridi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
The United States ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This dispute, brought by Canada against the United States, constitutes another chapter in three separate sagas: the enduring softwood lumber dispute between the two North American nations; the debate over the acceptability of the practice of “zeroing”; and the fight over the value and role of World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body precedent. Notably, the panel departed from established Appellate Body decisions finding, inter alia, that zeroing was permissible under a weighted average-to-transaction (W-T) methodology. This departure is remarkable, not just because it runs counter to prior jurisprudence, but also for the reasoning supporting it and the circumstances in which it occurred. Indeed, the Panel Report was issued in the midst of a crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system arising from the United States’ decision to block the reappointment of Appellate Body members. The United States justified this action, which eventually resulted in the Appellate Body losing its quorum to hear new appeals on December 10, 2019, on the basis of complaints, among others, that the Appellate Body had championed an approach to precedent that the United States found incompatible with the intended role of dispute settlement within the WTO. While members worked feverishly to formulate a compromise that might respond to the United States’ criticisms and soften the effect of the Appellate Body's approach, the Panel suggested its own. Thus, it found room to depart from prior precedent (which the United States argued had been wrongly decided) while paying lip service to the Appellate Body.

scholarly journals United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China: Passing the Buck on Pass-Through

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
EDWIN VERMULST
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appropriate Use ◽  
Normal Value ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Public Body ◽  
Countervailing Duties ◽  
Pass Through

AbstractIn 2007, the United States reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping duties (ADDs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against nonmarket economies. Subsequently, the United States has imposed concurrent ADDs and CVDs in numerous cases against China. China challenged a number of aspects of the US practice, most notably the double-remedies issue, which occurs when a domestic subsidy is offset by both an ADD and CVD. The Appellate Body (AB) correctly ruled that double remedies are inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and that the burden was on the investigating authorities to ensure that double remedies were not being imposed; however, the AB largely limited its discussion to measurement concerns, an approach that may have inadvertently opened the door to future double-remedies disputes involving other methods for computing normal value. Two other issues that are likely to have significant long-term ramifications are (i) the scope of the term ‘public body’ and (ii) the appropriate use of out-of-country benchmarks. On both issues, we believe the AB's conclusions and analysis were correct.

How Should WTO Members React to Their WTO Crises?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
National Parliaments ◽  
Selection Procedures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Other World ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

AbstractSince 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members have been violating their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU). Article 17 defines the AB as being ‘composed of seven persons’, with vacancies being ‘filled as they arise’. Sections 2 and 3 explain why none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates – on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates – can justify the illegal disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX WTO – if necessary, based on ‘a majority of the votes cast’ – to complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Sections 4 and 5 explain why the competition, social policy, and rule-of-law principles underlying European ‘ordo-liberalism’ offer coherent strategies for overcoming the WTO governance crises by limiting hegemonic abuses of both US neo-liberalism and Chinese state-capitalism.

scholarly journals US Compliance with WTO Rulings on Zeroing in Anti-Dumping

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
BERNARD HOEKMAN ◽  
JASPER WAUTERS
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Effective Communication ◽  
The United States ◽  
Direct Argument ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

AbstractThis paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Reports on United States–Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5 DSU – EC) (WT/DS294/AB/RW, 14 May 2009) and United States–Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 DSU – Japan) (WT/DS322/AB/RW, 18 August 2009). The Appellate Body found that the United States had not brought its anti-dumping measures into compliance with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement as it continued to use zeroing in annual reviews of anti-dumping orders. We argue that this conclusion – based on a complicated discussion of what constitutes a ‘measure taken to comply’ – could have been reached through a much simpler and direct argument. Continued noncompliance by the United States generates costs to traders targeting the United States and the trading system more generally. We argue that from a broader WTO compliance perspective consideration should be given to stronger multilateral surveillance of anti-dumping practice by all WTO members and to more analysis and effective communication by economists regarding the costs of zeroing and anti-dumping practices more generally.

scholarly journals China–GOES (Article 21.5): Time to Clarify the Standard for Price Suppression and Price Depression in AD/CVD Investigations

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
JULIA QIN ◽  
HYLKE VANDENBUSSCHE
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Electrical Steel ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Modeling ◽  
Objective Standard ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
The Us ◽  
Countervailing Duties

AbstractThis dispute concerns the measures China took to implement the Dispute Settlement Body's rulings inChina–GOES, which had found a number of violations with respect to China's antidumping and countervailing duties imposed on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel (GOES) imported from the United States. In this compliance proceeding, the United States claimed that the Redetermination issued by China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) continued to violate WTO law. At the center of the dispute were MOFCOM's findings that the US imports had the effect of suppressing and/or depressing the prices of domestic like products. While the Panel reached the conclusion that the MOFCOM findings were inconsistent with WTO rules, it did not clarify the criteria for determining such price effects. In this comment, we call for the adoption of a clearer and more objective standard for determining price suppression and price depression in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, via the tools of economic modeling.

scholarly journals Book Review: Jens Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?

sui generis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Sieber-Gasser
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The US policy of blocking new appointments to the WTO Appellate Body relied on a number of legal arguments against the body’s work and ultimately succeeded in rendering the appellate mechanism of the WTO dispute settlement system inoperable in December 2019. In his book, Jens Lehne carefully analyses the various legal arguments officially brought forward by the US until summer 2019. His analysis is proof of the vulnerability of the WTO: despite equality of WTO members enshrined in the WTO treaties, the fate of the WTO remains largely dependent on the willingness of large economies to comply with a legally binding dispute settlement system.

China–Broiler Products (Article 21.5 – United States) – can the sum of the parts be less than the whole?

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-296
Author(s):  
Maria Alcover ◽  
Meredith Crowley
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
The Us ◽  
Domestic Prices ◽  
Countervailing Duties

AbstractThis article explores economic and legal issues in the WTO dispute China–Broiler Products (Article 21.5–United States). In 2011, the US initiated a dispute against the conduct and results of China's 2009 trade remedy investigation into US broiler products (chickens). The Panel Report found that China had acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations. On the basis of a redetermination, China continued to impose duties and the United States initiated WTO compliance proceedings. The compliance Panel Report, circulated in 2018, concluded that China had failed to comply with its WTO obligations when allocating costs to construct US domestic prices for broiler products. However, China was found to have acted consistently with its WTO obligations with respect to two claims which raise some interesting legal questions. Ultimately, after almost a decade of litigation, China removed the antidumping and countervailing duties on US broiler products in 2018.

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