The strategic use of pensions by not-for-profit organizations

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 388-414
Author(s):  
THAD DANIEL CALABRESE ◽  
ELIZABETH A. M. SEARING

AbstractDefined benefit pension plans are an important and unexplored aspect of not-for-profit compensation, covering between 15% and 21% of the estimated national not-for-profit workforce. Here we consider whether pension contributions and actuarial assumptions are mechanisms for achieving not-for-profit financial management objectives such as smoothing consumption, managing reported net earnings, and minimizing pension liabilities. The empirical results indicate a variety of these behaviors. Not-for-profit pension plan sponsors use accumulated net assets to smooth consumption. Further, not-for-profits manage reported profits downwards when they exceed expectations by increasing pension contributions, but both minimize contributions and liberalize actuarial assumptions when they underperform relative to their desired earnings targets.

Author(s):  
Anubhav Gupta ◽  
Thad Calabrese

In 2003, the FASB issued an accounting standard (132R) requiring defined-benefit pension plan sponsors to disclose in the notes the asset allocations of their sponsored pension plans. A motivation for this requirement was to help users evaluate a plan's expected rate of return (ERR) assumption which is supposed to be determined by the allocation of plan assets to risky investments. All else being equal, the higher the assumption, the lower is the pension expense and the higher are reported profits of plan sponsors. We hypothesize that not-for-profits used the ERR to inflate these earnings by reducing pension expenses. Using a dataset of audited financial statements and a difference-in-differences design, we find that not-for-profits significantly decreased their ERRs post-SFAS 132R. The results suggest that opportunistic actuarial assumptions by not-for-profits were reduced following the implementation of SFAS 132R.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (02) ◽  
pp. 289-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Iqbal Owadally

An assumption concerning the long-term rate of return on assets is made by actuaries when they value defined-benefit pension plans. There is a distinction between this assumption and the discount rate used to value pension liabilities, as the value placed on liabilities does not depend on asset allocation in the pension fund. The more conservative the investment return assumption is, the larger planned initial contributions are, and the faster benefits are funded. A conservative investment return assumption, however, also leads to long-term surpluses in the plan, as is shown for two practical actuarial funding methods. Long-term deficits result from an optimistic assumption. Neither outcome is desirable as, in the long term, pension plan assets should be accumulated to meet the pension liabilities valued at a suitable discount rate. A third method is devised that avoids such persistent surpluses and deficits regardless of conservatism or optimism in the assumed investment return.


2021 ◽  
pp. 088636872110451
Author(s):  
John G. Kilgour

This article examines the problem of missing and nonresponsive participants and beneficiaries from defined-benefit (DB) and especially defined-contribution (DC) pension plans, mainly in the private (for profit) sector of the United States. It focuses on the current search requirements of the three government agencies involved in finding missing participants and beneficiaries: the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the Department of Labor (DOL) and its Employee Benefit Services Administration (EBSA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The article also reviews the efforts of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in this area. It then reviews proposed legislation, the Retirement Savings Lost and Found Act of 2020 (now S. 1730; RSLFA). The issue of missing participants and beneficiaries often becomes critical when an employer goes out of business or for some other reason stops sponsoring a pension plan. The missing participants are owed their earned retirement benefits. They, not the employer, own them.


2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1119-1144 ◽  
Author(s):  
João F. Cocco ◽  
Paolo F. Volpin

AbstractWe use UK data to show that firms that sponsor a defined-benefit pension plan are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition and, conditional on an attempted takeover, they are less likely to be acquired. Our explanation is that the uncertainty in the value of pension liabilities is a source of risk for acquirers of the firm's shares, which works as a takeover deterrent. In support of this explanation we find that these same firms are more likely to use cash when acquiring other firms, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition is associated with positive announcement effects.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINA ATANASOVA ◽  
EVAN GATEV

AbstractWe use a large sample of defined benefit (DB) pension plans to document economically significant differences in the risk-taking of plans sponsored by privately-held versus publicly-traded firms. The magnitude and the main determinants of pension plan risk-taking are different for public and private firms. The effect of pension liabilities’ funded status on risk-taking is two and a half times higher for plans with publicly-traded sponsors than for plans with private sponsors. In contrast, changing sponsor contributions has more than four times higher effect on risk-taking for plans with private sponsors. The results suggest that the alignment of incentives for the stakeholders in a pension contract is different for plans sponsored by private versus publicly-traded firms.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan I. Blankley ◽  
Rober Y. W. Tang

We examine pension funding measures and interest rate disclosures for 223 firms from the Fortune 500. Three different liability measures are used to develop funding ratios, which indicate sample firms funding condition. We then examine firms discount rate estimates and compare these estimates with their funding levels. Using chi-square tests to examine dependence between rates and funding, we determine whether over (under) funding is simply an artifact of the choice of discount rates or the result of authentic economic conditions surrounding the pension plan.


2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Iqbal Owadally

An assumption concerning the long-term rate of return on assets is made by actuaries when they value defined-benefit pension plans. There is a distinction between this assumption and the discount rate used to value pension liabilities, as the value placed on liabilities does not depend on asset allocation in the pension fund. The more conservative the investment return assumption is, the larger planned initial contributions are, and the faster benefits are funded. A conservative investment return assumption, however, also leads to long-term surpluses in the plan, as is shown for two practical actuarial funding methods. Long-term deficits result from an optimistic assumption. Neither outcome is desirable as, in the long term, pension plan assets should be accumulated to meet the pension liabilities valued at a suitable discount rate. A third method is devised that avoids such persistent surpluses and deficits regardless of conservatism or optimism in the assumed investment return.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Mortimer ◽  
Linda R. Henderson

SYNOPSIS While retired government employees clearly depend on public sector defined benefit pension funds, these plans also contribute significantly to U.S. state and national economies. Growing public concern about the funding adequacy of these plans, hard hit by the great recession, raises questions about their future viability. After several years of study, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) approved two new standards, GASB 67 and 68, with the goal of substantially improving the accounting for and transparency of financial reporting of state/municipal public employee defined benefit pension plans. GASB 68, the focus of this paper, requires state/municipal governments to calculate and report a net pension liability based on a single discount rate that combines the rate of return on funded plan assets with a low-risk index rate on the unfunded portion of the liability. This paper illustrates the calculation of estimates for GASB 68 reportable net pension liabilities, funded ratios, and single discount rates for 48 fiscal year state employee defined benefit plans by using an innovative valuation model and readily available data. The results show statistically significant increases in reportable net pension liabilities and decreases in the estimated hypothetical GASB 68 funded ratios and single discount rates. Our sensitivity analyses examine the effect of changes in the low-risk rate and time period on these results. We find that reported discount rates of weaker plans approach the low-risk rate, resulting in higher pension liabilities and creating policy incentives to increase risky assets in pension portfolios.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Adams ◽  
Mary Margaret Frank ◽  
Tod Perry

SYNOPSIS Using a sample of firms over the period of 1991 through 2005, we examine the opportunity that exists for firms to inflate earnings through the expected rate of return (ERR) assumption associated with defined benefit pension plans. The evidence suggests that, on average, the ERR is not overstated relative to several benchmarks, including contemporaneous actual returns, historical cumulative actual returns, and expected future returns based on asset allocation within the pension. We also find that actual changes in the ERR are infrequent and typically have less than a 1 percent impact on annual operating income. We also estimate that a 0.5 percent change (50 bps) in the ERR will result in a cumulative effect on operating income over a five-year period of approximately 0.5 percent or less for the majority of firms. When we examine firms with the highest ERRs or with the greatest opportunity to inflate earnings, again, we find that the ERR is not overstated relative to several benchmarks. Although we do not observe pervasive inflating of reported income through the ERR during our sample period, we do find that for some firms, small increases in ERR can have a material impact on reported earnings. Our results provide evidence related to the pervasiveness, materiality, and impact of overstated earnings through the ERR, which helps regulators assess the costs and benefits of eliminating this discretion in financial reporting.


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