Fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU Law, and the Charter

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 361-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takis Tridimas
Keyword(s):  
Personal Data ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
General Principles Of Law ◽  
Judicial Scrutiny ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe purpose of this chapter is to explore selected aspects of the relationship between the general principles of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The chapter first looks at the expansion of fundamental rights in EU law and the importance of general principles by reference to three principles which have provided fruitful grounds for judicial activism: the right to judicial protection, the principle of non-discrimination, and the right to personal data. It then examines the sources of fundamental rights under Article 6 TEU and the relationship between Charter rights and general principles. Finally, it explores a pivotal issue in EU constitutional discourse, namely, the scope of application of the Charter and the general principles of law. The chapter concludes by observing that, far from declining in importance, the general principles of law continue to be an integral part of judicial methodology; that, following the introduction of the Charter, the CJEU applies a heightened level of judicial scrutiny; and that it favours a centralised approach opting for an autonomous interpretation of the Charter, granting it precedence over national constitutional norms, and understanding broadly its scope of application.

scholarly journals The right to paid annual leave as an EU fundamental social right. Comment on Bauer et al.: Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-448
Author(s):  
Maria Antonia Panascì
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Horizontal Direct Effect

This case note examines the judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union delivered in Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16 Stadt Wuppertal v. Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Volker Willmeroth v. Martina Broßonn on 6 November 2018. It engages with the noteworthy aspects of the ruling, such as the horizontal direct effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), the relationship between primary and secondary law in the European Union legal order and the scope of application of the Charter.

THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS AN EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kornezov
Keyword(s):  
European Parliament ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
Universal Suffrage ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
The Right

IS the right to vote in European Parliament elections a matter for EU law? Until recently, the answer to this query seemed to be a clear “no”. Indeed, while Article 223(1) of the TFEU does confer on the European Union the competence to lay down a uniform procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament (“MEPs”), this competence has not been exercised so far. Consequently, Article 8 of the Act concerning the election of the MEPs by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (OJ 1976 L 278 p. 1, henceforth “the 1976 Act”), provides that the “electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions”. Apart from the general principles of “direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot” and of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, enshrined respectively in Article 14(3) of the TEU, Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act, and Article 20(2)(b) of the TFEU, there is nothing in EU law that governs specifically the eligibility to vote in EP elections.

6. General principles of law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
General Principles Of Law ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the development of the general principles by the Court of Justice (CJ) to support the protection of human rights in the European Union (EU) law. It analyses the relationship of the general principles derived from the CJ’s jurisprudence to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). It discusses the possible accession of the EU to the ECHR and the implications of Opinion 2/13. It suggests that although the protection of human rights has been more visible since the Lisbon Treaty and there are now more avenues to such protection, it is debatable whether the scope and level of protection has increased.

“Not Taking Rights Seriously”. Opting for the Primacy of eu Law over Broader Human Rights Protection

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-302
Author(s):  
Fisnik Korenica ◽  
Dren Doli
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Relationship

The European Union (eu) accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (echr) has been a hot topic in the European legal discourse in this decade. Ruling on the compliance of the Draft Agreement on eu accession to the echr with the eu Treaties, the Court of Justice of the eu (cjeu) came up with a rather controversial Opinion. It ruled that the Draft Agreement is incompliant with the eu Treaties in several respects. One of the core concerns in Opinion 2/13 relates to the management of horizontal relationship between the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights (ChFR) and echr, namely Article 53 ChFR and Article 53 echr. The article examines the Opinion 2/13’s specific concerns on the relationship between Article 53 ChFR and Article 53 echr from a post-accession perspective. It starts by considering the question of the two 53s’ relationship from the eu-law autonomy viewpoint, indicating the main gaps that may present a danger to the latter. While questioning from a number of perspectives the plausibility of the cjeu’s arguments in relation to the two 53s, the article argues that the Court was both controversial and argued against itself when it drew harshly upon these concerns. The article also presents three options to address the cjeu’s requirements on this issue. The article concludes that the cjeu’s statements on the two 53s will seriously hurt the accession project, while critically limiting the possibility of Member States to provide broader protection.

scholarly journals Whose Autonomy is it Anyway? Freedom of Contract, the Right to Work and the General Principles of EU Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-317
Author(s):  
Niall O’Connor
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Legal Studies ◽  
Right To Work ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Just how significant is the freedom of contract found in Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights for the regulation of the employment relationship? For the first half of its existence, few could have foreseen that Article 16 would soon be at the centre of debates surrounding the place of business freedoms within EU employment law. This has changed in the wake of a number of controversial decisions in which the Court of Justice of the EU relied on Article 16 to undermine the effectiveness of employee-protective legislation. The article begins by setting out the nature of freedom of contract in EU law and its effects in the employment context. This is followed by a consideration of the relationship between the general principles and the Charter. Critical Legal Studies is relied on to show that existing arguments as to the use of Article 16 as a radical tool in the employment context have been both exaggerated and underplayed. Finally, potential counterweights to freedom of contract are examined, notably the right to work as both a general principle and Charter right.

Article 1 Subject-matter and objectives

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hielke Hijmans
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right

The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right. Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.

Access to Personal Data and the Right to Good Governance during Asylum Procedures after the cjeu’s YS. and M. and S. judgment (C-141/12 and C-372/12)

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 259-272
Author(s):  
Evelien Brouwer ◽  
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius
Keyword(s):  
Good Governance ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Data Protection Directive ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Access Rights ◽  
Right To Good Administration ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

In the YS. and M. and S. judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on three procedures in which Dutch judges asked for clarification on the right of asylum seekers to have access to the documents regarding the decision on asylum applications. The judgment is relevant for interpreting the concept of personal data and the scope of the right of access under the Data Protection Directive, and the right to good administration in the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. At first glance, the judgment seems disappointing from the viewpoint of individual rights. Nevertheless, in our view the judgment provides sufficient grounds for effective access rights to the minutes in future asylum cases.

Bridge Is Down, Data Truck Can’t Get Through …

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oreste Pollicino ◽  
Marco Bassini
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Private Life ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Technological Environment ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Us ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Right

The decision of the Court of Justice in Schrems follows the Digital Rights Ireland and Google Spain stances in the Court process of revisiting the data protection framework in Europe in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Through the invalidation of Decision 2000/520/EC of the Commission on the adequacy of the US safe harbor principles, the Court of Justice has relied on a very extensive interpretation of the right to private life and data protection. As in the former decisions that have let emerge the existence of a new digital right to privacy, this judgment mirrors some degree of manipulation by the Court of Justice, justified by the goal of protecting as much as possible personal data in the new technological environment.

Judicial Review of Economic Policy: The EU Courts

2020 ◽  
pp. 204-244
Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Ripple Effect ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Eu

This chapter seeks to unpack access to EU courts in the area of EMU, the emphasis being on the challenges facing austerity-hit litigants wishing to put their substantive case before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The discussion will proceed as follows. First, it will be shown that aggrieved individuals might not always be able to locate a formally binding EU law measure which could form the basis of a direct or indirect challenge before the EU courts. Second, it will be seen that the judicial doors to an Article 263 TFEU challenge (action for annulment) are, nevertheless, firmly shut as most private persons will not be able to overcome the admissibility hurdles of direct and individual concern. Third, almost all Article 267 TFEU challenges (preliminary reference) have so far been declared inadmissible, which begs the question as to the legal quality of the bailout terms and its ripple effect on the scope of application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Fourth, though aggrieved individuals could in principle bring an Article 340 TFEU action for damages before the EU courts, litigants are likely to face an uphill struggle in trying to convince the CJEU that the relevant requirements for liability of the EU institutions for damages for breach of EU law were met. The final section of this chapter will focus on the scope of application of the EU Charter, which has formed the basis of many (unsuccessful, thus far) challenges to austerity measures.

scholarly journals The Relationship between EU Law and Fundamental Principles of Estonian Substantive Criminal Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 174-182
Author(s):  
Kaie Rosin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Principle Of Legality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.

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