The Precedence of EU Law from the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
René Barents

The position of EU law in the national legal order – Precedence of EU law – Relationship between legal orders – Foundation of precedence – Autonomous precedence v. precedence based on national constitutional law – The concept of an integrated or composed legal order as a false paradigm – The value of constitutional pluralism to explain the relationship between EU law and national law

2020 ◽  
pp. 154-178
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter focuses on the relationship between EU law and national law. It first explores the jurisprudence on what is known as the doctrine of supremacy of EU law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). When a national court observes that a national law clashes with an EU law, they must set aside that national law. The EU legal order would not work without a doctrine like supremacy: not only would domestic courts not be compelled to apply EU law instead of conflicting national law, but it is likely that different domestic courts would take different decisions as to whether to apply EU law over national law in a given scenario. The chapter then considers how supremacy has been received in Germany and the UK, looking at how the German and UK legal orders interact with EU law. It then addresses whether ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ is compatible with EU membership, and examines the impact of Brexit on the supremacy of EU law.


Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn

Chapter 4 turns to the domestic law of the countries of Europe, arguing that the combination within European public law of EU law, the law of the ECHR, and of domestic law cannot be conceived of along the lines of a pyramidal hierarchy. The chapter examines the ways in which the different European domestic legal systems conceive of the relationship between international law and domestic law. The chapter then looks at the relationship between international law and domestic law through a constitutional lens, an approach which more and more domestic courts in Europe seem to be adopting. The chapter then turns to the integrated legal order of the European Union, a legal order distinct both from domestic and general international law. Finally, the chapter teases out and analyses four shared guiding principles of European public law: equality and non-discrimination; proportionality; subsidiarity; and legal certainty.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 303-352
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts. The UK version contains a further section analysing the relevance of the supremacy of EU law in relation to the UK post-Brexit.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai

AbstractThis article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.


2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Timothy Roes

AbstractComparing the EU law principle of loyalty with international law good faith and the duty of federal good faith in German constitutional law (Bundestreue), this article contributes to the discussion on the nature of the EU legal order and its relationship to international law more generally by finding that EU loyalty is in essence a specific incarnation of the international law principle that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith. At the same time, it challenges the assumption that international law good faith differs fundamentally from federal good faith. To this end, the article points at historical links between both, and posits that good faith is in essence a principle of constructive interpretation, the strictures of which increase with the level of integration of the legal order in which it is applied.


Author(s):  
Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella

AbstractThe relationship between Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court and EU law is, at first glance, apparently weak, as the subject matter of the former is not governed by the latter, nor there have been any judgments from EU courts regarding the case. However, if one considers the origin and purpose of the EU itself and the state of relations between Italy and Germany, one cannot help but examine the case from a European law perspective. Judgment 238/2014 is relevant to European law in several ways, all of which concern not only military cooperation in the EU but also the protection of human rights, the risk of forum shopping and, above all, how reliable member states are in their mutual relations. European law in turn is relevant to the present case not so much because it offers solutions but because it shows a method for settling clashes between legal systems and illustrates its inherent difficulties. Sentenza 238/2014 is an unpersuasive judgment and can be criticized from different angles: the legal one (international and constitutional law), the factual reconstruction and the judgment’s likely effects. There are, however, two possibilities of resolving the situation that Sentenza has produced: firstly the legal one, which involves the use of all possible tools to limit its effects; and secondly the diplomatic one, which implies further negotiations. European law does not provide a ground for a preference between these two options, but it suggests that none of these ways is neglected.


Author(s):  
Violeta Moreno-Lax

This chapter will catalogue the multiple ways in which human rights penetrate the EU legal order and the different functions they play qua (internalised/’Europeanised’) ‘fundamental rights’, both as standards of validity and as means of interpretation of EU acts. The main preoccupation is to identify the sources of fundamental rights obligations, retrace their origin and overall significance within the EU legal system, and determine the rules relevant to their interpretation and application. The ‘integrated’ or ‘cumulative standards’ approach will be developed against this background. According to this method, the precise level of protection that Charter rights afford will be determined by reference to Articles 52 and 53 thereof, taking the ECHR, other ‘international obligations common to the Member States’ (Recital 5 CFR), and any relevant ‘autonomous requirements’ of EU law into account. Drawing on post-Lisbon case law, it will be shown how any other approach fails to ensure compliance with all relevant requirements simultaneously. This technique will inform assessments in chapters of Part II.


Author(s):  
Paul Gragl

This book defends the theory of legal monism against dualism and pluralism. Whereas dualism holds that different bodies of law such as international and national law are entirely separate and pluralism argues that there are many potentially overlapping and heterarchical bodies of law, monism considers all law to form part of one unitary and hierarchically ordered legal order, be it international, EU, or national law. To this end, this book will use the pure theory of law of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence, which has—since its inception in the first half of the twentieth century—been largely ignored by legal theorists. On the basis of philosophical/epistemological, legal, and moral/political arguments, it will argue in favour of monism under the primacy of international law, i.e. that in cases of normative conflicts, international and EU law prevail over national law, and thereby restore the respect for international legal cooperation. In other words, it will argue that only this version of monism takes the law and the concept of legal validity seriously; that it can better describe and explain the relationship between legal orders and resolve normative conflicts than dualism and pluralism; and that it has a superior moral dimension, which can help bring about a cosmopolitan legal order under global democracy and peace.


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