Legal Monism

Author(s):  
Paul Gragl

This book defends the theory of legal monism against dualism and pluralism. Whereas dualism holds that different bodies of law such as international and national law are entirely separate and pluralism argues that there are many potentially overlapping and heterarchical bodies of law, monism considers all law to form part of one unitary and hierarchically ordered legal order, be it international, EU, or national law. To this end, this book will use the pure theory of law of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence, which has—since its inception in the first half of the twentieth century—been largely ignored by legal theorists. On the basis of philosophical/epistemological, legal, and moral/political arguments, it will argue in favour of monism under the primacy of international law, i.e. that in cases of normative conflicts, international and EU law prevail over national law, and thereby restore the respect for international legal cooperation. In other words, it will argue that only this version of monism takes the law and the concept of legal validity seriously; that it can better describe and explain the relationship between legal orders and resolve normative conflicts than dualism and pluralism; and that it has a superior moral dimension, which can help bring about a cosmopolitan legal order under global democracy and peace.

Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn

Chapter 4 turns to the domestic law of the countries of Europe, arguing that the combination within European public law of EU law, the law of the ECHR, and of domestic law cannot be conceived of along the lines of a pyramidal hierarchy. The chapter examines the ways in which the different European domestic legal systems conceive of the relationship between international law and domestic law. The chapter then looks at the relationship between international law and domestic law through a constitutional lens, an approach which more and more domestic courts in Europe seem to be adopting. The chapter then turns to the integrated legal order of the European Union, a legal order distinct both from domestic and general international law. Finally, the chapter teases out and analyses four shared guiding principles of European public law: equality and non-discrimination; proportionality; subsidiarity; and legal certainty.


2020 ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà

This chapter deals with some fundamental realities of international law as a body of legal rules which traditionally requires implementation at domestic level through transposal. In so doing it discusses the traditional theoretical distinction between monism and dualism, as abstract approaches to the relationship between domestic and international legal order. It then tackles the issue of the effects (including direct effects) that international law may have in concrete situations within national systems, as a consequence of, or, in some instances even irrespective of, transposal through national legislation. Thirdly, the chapter discusses the ‘verticalization’ of the international legal order with the affirmation in the second half of the twentieth century of the notion of jus cogens (or peremptory norms) and the effects this has (or might have) within international law and in its relationships with municipal laws.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER

AbstractHans Kelsen is known both as a legal theorist and as an international lawyer. This article shows that his theory of international law is an integral part of the Kelsenian Pure Theory of Law. Two areas of international law are analysed: first, Kelsen's coercive order paradigm and its relationship to the bellum iustum doctrine; second, the Kelsenian notion of the unity of all law vis-à-vis theories of the relationship of international and municipal law. In a second step, the results of Kelsenian general legal theory of the late period – as interpreted and developed by the present author – are reapplied to selected doctrines of international law. Thus is the coercive order paradigm resolved, the unity of law dissolved, and the UN Charter reinterpreted to show that the concretization of norms as positive international law cannot be unmade by a scholarship usurping the right to make law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 330
Author(s):  
Luis Ignacio Gordillo Pérez

Resumen: Este trabajo realiza un análisis crítico de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia respecto del Derecho internacional. Para ello, analiza los acuerdos internacionales y otras fuentes afines, la problemática derivada de los acuerdos firmados por los Estados miembros con terceros Estados, la relación entre el Derecho de la UE y el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y, finalmente, el valor que el Tribunal confiere al Derecho internacional general y a la Carta de Naciones Unidas. La conclusión fundamental será que el principio básico que guía la jurisprudencia del TJ es la reivindicación y protección de su propia autonomía.Palabras clave: monismo, dualismo, pluralismo, autonomía, acuerdos mixtos, Dictamen 2/13, Dictamen 2/15.Abstract: This paper critically analyzes the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on International law. To that end, it analyzes international agreements and other related sources, the problems arising from agreements signed by Member States with third States, the relationship between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights, and finally the value that the Court confers on general international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The fundamental conclusion will be that the basic principle guiding the jurisprudence of the CJEU is the claim and protection of its own autonomy.Keywords: monism, dualism, pluralism, autonomy, mixed agreements, Opinion 2/13, Opinion 2/15.


Author(s):  
Sanford Levinson

This chapter considers the relationship between the Constitution—and the sovereign people ostensibly represented in its terms—and morality. Constitution faith requires the linkage of law and morality even as most twentieth-century jurisprudence has emphasized their analytic separation. All calls for renewed faith in the rule of law and renewal of the constitutional covenant imply that submission to the Constitution will create not only order but also the conditions of a social order worthy of respect. In order to see the logic and desirability of submission to the rule of the Constitution, the assumed linkage between it and morality must be closely examined.


2019 ◽  
pp. 78-102
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter assesses the relationship between international law and municipal law. Though international law deals primarily with inter-State relations, and municipal law addresses relationships between individuals or between individuals and the State, there are many overlapping issues on which both international and national regulation are necessary, such as the environment, trade, and human rights. Though the international legal order asserts its primacy over municipal legislation, it leaves to domestic constitutions the question of how international legal rules should be applied or enforced in municipal orders. Two conflicting doctrines define the relationship between international and municipal legal orders: dualism and monism. Dualism is usually understood as emphasizing the autonomy and distinct nature of municipal legal orders, in which the State is sovereign and supreme. Meanwhile, theories of monism conceive the relationship between international and municipal legal orders as more coherent and in fact unified, their validity deriving from one common source.


2020 ◽  
pp. 154-178
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter focuses on the relationship between EU law and national law. It first explores the jurisprudence on what is known as the doctrine of supremacy of EU law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). When a national court observes that a national law clashes with an EU law, they must set aside that national law. The EU legal order would not work without a doctrine like supremacy: not only would domestic courts not be compelled to apply EU law instead of conflicting national law, but it is likely that different domestic courts would take different decisions as to whether to apply EU law over national law in a given scenario. The chapter then considers how supremacy has been received in Germany and the UK, looking at how the German and UK legal orders interact with EU law. It then addresses whether ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ is compatible with EU membership, and examines the impact of Brexit on the supremacy of EU law.


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