European and Domestic Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
European Public ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Domestic Law

Chapter 4 turns to the domestic law of the countries of Europe, arguing that the combination within European public law of EU law, the law of the ECHR, and of domestic law cannot be conceived of along the lines of a pyramidal hierarchy. The chapter examines the ways in which the different European domestic legal systems conceive of the relationship between international law and domestic law. The chapter then looks at the relationship between international law and domestic law through a constitutional lens, an approach which more and more domestic courts in Europe seem to be adopting. The chapter then turns to the integrated legal order of the European Union, a legal order distinct both from domestic and general international law. Finally, the chapter teases out and analyses four shared guiding principles of European public law: equality and non-discrimination; proportionality; subsidiarity; and legal certainty.

6. The relationship between EU and national law

2020 ◽  
pp. 154-178
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars
Keyword(s):  
National Court ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Membership ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter focuses on the relationship between EU law and national law. It first explores the jurisprudence on what is known as the doctrine of supremacy of EU law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). When a national court observes that a national law clashes with an EU law, they must set aside that national law. The EU legal order would not work without a doctrine like supremacy: not only would domestic courts not be compelled to apply EU law instead of conflicting national law, but it is likely that different domestic courts would take different decisions as to whether to apply EU law over national law in a given scenario. The chapter then considers how supremacy has been received in Germany and the UK, looking at how the German and UK legal orders interact with EU law. It then addresses whether ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ is compatible with EU membership, and examines the impact of Brexit on the supremacy of EU law.

A Union of Peoples

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rival Theory ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
The Eu

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,

scholarly journals El TJUE y el Derecho Internacional: la defensa de su propia autonomía como principio constitucional básico = The CJEU and International Law: the defence of its own autonomy as a basic constitutional principle

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 330
Author(s):  
Luis Ignacio Gordillo Pérez
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
Fundamental Conclusion

Resumen: Este trabajo realiza un análisis crítico de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia respecto del Derecho internacional. Para ello, analiza los acuerdos internacionales y otras fuentes afines, la problemática derivada de los acuerdos firmados por los Estados miembros con terceros Estados, la relación entre el Derecho de la UE y el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y, finalmente, el valor que el Tribunal confiere al Derecho internacional general y a la Carta de Naciones Unidas. La conclusión fundamental será que el principio básico que guía la jurisprudencia del TJ es la reivindicación y protección de su propia autonomía.Palabras clave: monismo, dualismo, pluralismo, autonomía, acuerdos mixtos, Dictamen 2/13, Dictamen 2/15.Abstract: This paper critically analyzes the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on International law. To that end, it analyzes international agreements and other related sources, the problems arising from agreements signed by Member States with third States, the relationship between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights, and finally the value that the Court confers on general international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The fundamental conclusion will be that the basic principle guiding the jurisprudence of the CJEU is the claim and protection of its own autonomy.Keywords: monism, dualism, pluralism, autonomy, mixed agreements, Opinion 2/13, Opinion 2/15.

Part I General Principles, 3 International Law as it Affects Private Law Conventions Governing Cross-Border Commercial Transactions

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Commercial Law ◽  
Typical Structure ◽  
The Public ◽  
State Security ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Domestic Law

Chapter 3, after describing general principles of international law and the relationship between international law and domestic law, focuses on the hitherto neglected subject of private commercial law conventions. Textbooks on international law invariably focus on public law treaties. By contrast this chapter addresses issues relating to private law conventions. It goes through the typical structure of a private law convention, the interpretation of conventions and the treatment of errors, and the enforcement of private conventional rights against States. The subject of private law conventions and public law has become of increasing importance with the appearance in several private law instruments of provisions of a public law nature designed, for example, to ensure that creditors’ rights are not enforced in a manner that adversely affects the public interest or State security. Reservations and declarations are also discussed, together with the subject of conflicts between conventions.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Stirn
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Cultural Heritage ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Public Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Project ◽  
European Public ◽  
Domestic Law

The introduction shows how the history and diversity of Europe have given rise to the European project. On the basis of historical differences, there are great differences between the countries of Europe; nevertheless, as a function of common cultural heritage, a project of European integration has emerged. Beginning with European history, the chapter shows how the European project has evolved and been consolidated through law and how, against the background of the European Union (EU), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the domestic law of the countries of Europe, a European public law is taking shape.

A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian Courts

2003 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 3-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jutta Brunnée ◽  
Stephen J. Toope
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Norms ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Legal Effect ◽  
Potential Impact ◽  
Treat All ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Do So

SummaryCanadian courts are approaching the task of mediating the relationship between international law and domestic law with newfound energy. Yet, for all their declared openness to international law, courts are still inclined to avoid deciding cases on the basis of international law. This does not mean that international law is given no effect or that its broad relevance is denied. The avoidance strategy is more subtle: even when they invoke or refer to international law, Canadian courts generally do not give international norms concrete legal effect in individual cases. Although international law is brought to bear on a growing range of questions, its potential impact is tempered — and we fear largely eviscerated — because it is merely one factor in the application and interpretation of domestic law. Within the Canadian legal order the question of “bindingness” of international law is closely intertwined with the manner in which it comes to influence the interpretation of domestic law. In the case of norms that are binding on Canada under international law, Canadian courts have an obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with the relevant international norms, as far as this is possible. By contrast, norms that do not bind Canada internationally (for example, soft law or provisions of treaties not ratified by Canada) can help inform the interpretation of domestic law and, depending on the norm in question and the case at issue, may even be persuasive. Courts may, and in some cases should, draw upon such norms for interpretative purposes, but they are not strictly speaking required to do so. However, especially following the Supreme Court’s decision inBaker, there appears to be a trend towards treating all of international law, whether custom or treaty, binding on Canada or not, implemented or unimplemented, in the same manner — as relevant and perhaps persuasive, but not as determinative, dare we say obligatory. Our concern is that if international law is merely persuasive, it becomes purely optional, and can be ignored at the discretion of the judge. We argue that it is not enough to treat all normative threads in this fashion — over time this approach risks weakening the fabric of the law.

scholarly journals EU Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Scholarship

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 321-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joris Larik
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Scholarly Attention ◽  
The Eu

EU external relations law is a doubly peculiar field of scholarship that has attracted significant scholarly attention over the last several decades. It is both part of EU law—considered a “new legal order” distinct from international law—and it is concerned with the European Union as a global actor, a “strange animal” in that the EU is neither a state nor a classical international organization.

scholarly journals Article 3(5) TEU a decade on: Revisiting ‘strict observance of international law’ in the text and context of other EU values

2021 ◽  
pp. 1023263X2110151
Author(s):  
Rupert Dunbar
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Balanced Approach ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
The Eu

Article 3(5) of the Treaty on the European Union concerns EU external relations and was a new provision of the Lisbon Treaty. It has been seized upon by scholars for its reference to ‘strict observance of international law’ by the EU in its relations with the wider world. However, recent case law in the Court of Justice of the European Union has demonstrated little movement towards this supposed ideal. This article supports the fact that rigid and unquestioning adherence to international law has not emerged in case law, particularly as Article 3(5) TEU also mandates that the Union ‘uphold and promote its values and interests’. By taking a broader view of both the text and context of Article 3(5) TEU in EU law as a whole, and through consideration of the limited demands international law places on domestic courts, the article argues that – contrary to current literature – a more expressly balanced approach towards respect for international law is required and should be nurtured in the case law.

scholarly journals Objective justification, less discriminatory alternatives, and the ‘Great Repeal Bill’

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Indirect Discrimination ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Apparent Reason ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
The Eu

On the 13 July of this year, the UK Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 1 more commonly called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Aside from the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 (and with it the proposed ousting of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), the Bill’s purpose is to ‘convert the acquis’ of EU law and preserve any UK law implementing EU law.2 This will include ‘workers’ rights’ and with it their employment discrimination rights.3 The efficacy of such a move will be limited if the British judges fail to adopt the same interpretations of these rights as their counterparts in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Over the years of Britain’s membership, there have been many references to Luxembourg to clarify the meaning of particular aspects of the discrimination provisions, with the Court generally giving a more liberal interpretation than the domestic courts had suggested would be their preference. One element of the law largely untouched by this process is the objective justification defence to claims of indirect discrimination. This is because the domestic courts have maintained a fiction that their interpretation is consistent with the EU formula. For no apparent reason, the domestic courts have reworded the EU formula while labelling it as being no different. This presents a major challenge for the Bill. It would be all too easy for Parliament to assume all is well with this aspect of workers’ rights, especially when the judges tell them so. Using a handful of cases, this article exposes the shortfalls within the domestic law and suggests some solutions. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the Bill (which no doubt is due for many amendments), but to focus on one important aspect of discrimination law, both pre- and post-Brexit.

Direct Effects and Indirect Effects of Union Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
Indirect Effects ◽  
Direct Contact ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
European Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Domestic Law

Classic international law holds that each state can choose the relationship between its ‘domestic’ law and ‘international’ law. Two—constitutional—theories thereby exist: monism and dualism. Monist states make international law part of their domestic legal order. International law will here directly apply as if it was domestic law. By contrast, dualist states consider international law separate from domestic law: international law is viewed as the law between states; national law is the law within a state. International law needs to be ‘transposed’ or ‘incorporated’ into domestic law; and it can therefore only have indirect effects through the medium of national law. For dualist states, all European law would need to be ‘incorporated’ into national law before it could have domestic effects. Individuals would here never come into direct contact with European law; and where a Member State violated European law, individuals could not invoke ‘their’ European rights in the national courts.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document