scholarly journals Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-426
Author(s):  
Armin von Bogdandy ◽  
Luke Dimitrios Spieker

EU Rule of law crisis – Article 2 TEU – EU values – EU fundamental rights – Freedom of speech – Member state courts – Interpretation of national law in conformity with Article 2 TEU values – Preliminary reference – Duty of referral – Criminal liability of judges – Reverse Solange – ASJP judgment – Judicial applicability of Article 2 TEU – Value-oriented interpretation of EU law – Mutual Amplification – Essence of EU fundamental rights – L.M. judgment – Aranyosi judgment – Federal balance – Red lines – Systemic deficiencies – Solange presumption – Mutual trust

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Wendel

Mutual trust – Essence of EU fundamental rights – Values under Article 2 TEU – Intrinsic link between essence and values – Federalism – LM judgment – Rule of law crisis in Poland – Right to fair trial – Judicial independence – Fundamental right to an independent tribunal – Prohibition on transfers – Obligation to presume compliance with fundamental rights – Condition of ‘systemic deficiencies’ as a federal safeguard – Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – European Arrest Warrant – Dublin system


2021 ◽  
Vol 106 (6) ◽  
pp. 144-154
Author(s):  
Vadim Voynikov ◽  

Mutual trust is one of the central principles of the area of freedom, security and justice and the whole EU. Despite the fact, that mutual trust is not stipulated in founding treaties, this principle has been widely developed by the European Court of Justice. The purpose of this article is to identify the legal and political components of mutual trust in the EU, as well as the approaches to its implementation. The author comes to the conclusion that the principle of mutual trust originated from the internal market, however its development is mostly associated with the area of freedom, security and justice. Mutual trust in the EU presupposes that a member state does not need additional verification that another member state respects Union law and fundamental rights. Initially, the principle of mutual trust was given the absolute character, but in the post-Lisbon period, “blind trust” was replaced by the “earned trust”, which implies the possibility, in exceptional cases, to refuse mutual trust to another member state if the latter violates fundamental rights. Despite the development of the concept of mutual trust by the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions, recently there has been a serious deficit of interstate trust within the Union. In this regard, the principle of mutual trust is becoming declarative.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 1180-1197
Author(s):  
Georgios Anagnostaras

AbstractThe Common European Asylum System constitutes one of the principal areas in which the fundamental rights of individuals are essentially placed in competition with the core principle of mutual confidence and the need to preserve the effectiveness of EU law. That competitive relationship becomes particularly evident when applicants for international protection rely on alleged violations of their fundamental rights in order to contest their transfer to the Member State that is normally responsible for examining their asylum request according to the criteria of the Dublin III Regulation. The balancing process that needs to be carried out in this respect and the measure of the monitoring obligation that EU law imposes on the receiving Member State regarding the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers are well exemplified by the preliminary ruling in Jawo. That case provides additional clarification regarding the circumstances in which the protection of fundamental rights may introduce exceptions to the principle of mutual trust. At the same time, it illustrates the inherent tensions that exist between the protection of fundamental rights and the application of the principle of mutual confidence.


Author(s):  
Iris Canor

AbstractMutual trust is the basis on which the Member States’ judiciaries are expected to deal with each other in the European Union. By constitutionalizing the principle of mutual trust, the CJEU has introduced an axiological addition to the basic structure of the European Union. From a Union which concentrated on the vertical relationships between each Member State and the central Union’s institutions, the Union has turned out to be additionally preoccupied with the horizontal relationships among the Member States, which are based on what might be called a doctrine of Horizontal Solange.According to the principle of mutual trust, each Member State must presume that all other Member States are in compliance with EU law, in particular promote its values and respect European fundamental rights. This presumption, however, can be rebutted in exceptional circumstances. These exceptional circumstances are based on a two-prong test: first, the violation of the values or the fundamental rights must amount to a systemic deficiency; second, there is a need for an assessment whether the individual concerned will be the victim of this systemic deficiency.This contribution critically analyses these exceptional circumstances. Regarding the first prong, it is argued that the existence of systemic deficiencies should ideally be established by the CJEU via preliminary ruling references or via direct infringement proceedings. Alternatively, such systemic deficiencies may also be established by domestic courts in a host Member State. Regarding the second prong, it is argued that the individual test is redundant in cases where the systemic deficiency imposes challenges to the existing legal order of the Member State in question. Finally, it is argued that the suspension of mutual trust can serve as a decentralized instrument for protecting the European rule of law by pressuring the violating state to restore the rule of law.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-153
Author(s):  
Tatjana Josipović

The paper considers and comments on the instruments of protection of the fundamental rights of the Union in private law relationships that are in the scope of applicable EU law. Special attention is paid to the influence of fundamental rights of the Union on private autonomy and the freedom of contract in private law relationships depending on whether fundamental rights are protected by national law harmonized with EU law, or by horizontal effects of the Charter of general principles. The goal of the paper is to determine the method in private law relationships that can attain the optimal balance between the protection of fundamental rights of the Union and the principle of private autonomy and the freedom of contract regulated by national law of a member state. The author favors the protection of fundamental rights in private law relationships by applying adequate measures that create indirect horizontal effects of the provisions of EU law on fundamental rights. These concern national measures that can also secure adequate protection of fundamental rights via interpretation and application of national law in line with EU law in private law relationships.


2018 ◽  
pp. 144-200
Author(s):  
Elise Muir

Earlier chapters have warned against relying too heavily on a constitutional narrative to address the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. This indeed risks hindering political debate on fundamental rights at the European level. Chapter 5 sheds light on how certain features of EU law can in contrast be usefully exploited to support political debate and the development of a fundamental rights culture at the domestic level. One of the great added values of EU intervention in the field of fundamental rights protection lies in the procedural safeguards and governance tools available under EU law: they are remarkably advanced and sophisticated for a supranational organization seeking to combat fundamental rights violations. EU equality law and policy can in that sense be treated as a laboratory for the governance of fundamental rights steered at supranational level. Specialized watchdogs, such as equality bodies, may play a particularly interesting role. Furthermore, understanding specific EU policies as being intended to promote a fundamental right opens a vast area for comparative research across the given sectors of EU fundamental rights law, leading to a better grasp of how best to enhance the governance of these rights beyond state level. By way of experiment, this chapter explores the potential for legislative and jurisprudential cross-fertilization of the notion of independent fundamental rights guardians, such as equality bodies and data protection authorities, at the domestic level.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Radim Charvát

Abstract The paper addresses the issue whether customs authorities of Member States are entitled to suspend or detain goods in transit (i.e., products directing from one non- Member State to another non-Member State through the EU) and the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice related to this matter. Prior to the judgment in Philips and Nokia cases, a so-called manufacturing fiction theory was applied by some Member State courts (especially Dutch courts). According to this theory, goods suspended or detained by customs authorities within the EU were considered to be manufactured in the Member State where the custom action took place. In the Philips and Nokia judgments, the Court of Justice rejected this manufacturing fiction theory. But the proposal for amendment to the Regulation on Community trade mark and the proposal of the new Trademark directive, as a part of the trademark reform within the EU, go directly against the ruling in the Philips and Nokia cases and against the Understanding between the EU and India.


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